

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 2005

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10:47 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Stevens, Cochran, Specter, Bond, Shelby, Gregg, Burns, Inouye, Byrd, and Feinstein.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACCOMPANIED BY:

GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, U.S. AIR FORCE, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

HON. TINA JONAS, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE—COMPTROLLER

STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS

Senator STEVENS. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, we welcome you back before the subcommittee at this important time for our Nation and the Department of Defense (DOD) and we welcome the Comptroller, Tina Jonas. The focus of our hearing today is on the fiscal year 2006 defense budget. This is our normally scheduled hearing where we ask the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to testify near the end of our hearing cycle to provide their important perspectives on the budget.

General Myers, I understand this may be your last hearing with us as you plan to retire this year after 40 years of service. We hope we will see you again, but in any event we congratulate you and commend you for your service to our Nation and your appearances before our subcommittee and for your personal friendship.

General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STEVENS. We have enjoyed that very much.

General MYERS. Thank you.

Senator STEVENS. The budget request for defense reflects a shift in priorities for the Defense Department, spending more on personnel, the defense health programs, special operations forces, chemical and biological defense, and restructuring Army and ma-

rine ground forces and less on aircraft and ships designed for conventional war.

The subcommittee continues to review this request and we look forward to this hearing today and the discussion with you of your priorities in the budget regarding investments for the future of our military. We would also welcome any operational update you may wish to provide.

Your full statements will be part of our subcommittee record. We would ask each member to be limited to 5 minutes in an opening round of questions. Time permitting, we will proceed to a second round of questioning.

I would like to ask our chairman if he has any remarks. Chairman Cochran, do you wish to make a comment?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, no. I just join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses and commend them for the tremendous leadership that they are providing to our country in this very important time in our history.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Our co-chairman, Senator Inouye.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUE

Senator INOUE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I want to echo your comments in thanking General Myers for his long service to our Nation and for the stellar job he has done. I can tell you that we sincerely appreciate all you have done for us.

General MYERS. Thank you very much.

Senator INOUE. Gentlemen, the Defense Department has received unprecedented funding levels during the past few years. Even in inflation-adjusted dollars, the levels surpass anything we have seen since World War II. One would think that with the funding that has been provided we would not be facing any budgetary issues. Unfortunately, that is not the case.

We understand the services are having problems with recruiting and retaining military personnel. We know that some have raised concern about the proposed cuts in the F-22, C-130, and shipbuilding. We recognize that there is a great demand to expand pay and benefits for men and women who serve. So too, there are difficult policy questions being considered.

So how does the military adapt to improve intelligence capability without violating policies on the conduct of covert activity? Will we require a permanent increase in our forces to meet the challenges that the Nation faces today? Is the Nation prepared to implement changes in defense policy regarding space control? Does the new conventional global strike concept create challenges for arms control treaties?

Today we have more than 150,000 men and women deployed in harm's way in Iraq and Afghanistan, and their willingness to serve and the heroism they have displayed every day is an inspiration to all of us. We know you share our goal to ensure that they are taken care of. Together we have a responsibility to provide them with the equipment they need to fight, to offer support for their families

back home, and to guarantee fair policies which ensure equitable treatment for each service member across all departments.

I am certain I speak for all when I say we appreciate all that you have done on our behalf.

So, Mr. Chairman, General Myers, we are most pleased you could be with us to share with us your views, and I look forward to the testimony.

Thank you very much.

Senator STEVENS. May I ask if any member has a problem and must leave before we have a chance to hear the Secretary and General through? Senator Bond.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My apologies to my colleagues, but we are trying to get the long-delayed highway bill to the floor at 11 o'clock and there is some interest, as I gather from talking to my colleagues, about trying to pass the highway bill. If it is all right, I would like to make a very brief statement to our distinguished panel, leave some questions for the record, because I will not be able to participate.

Senator STEVENS. Each member is going to be recognized for 5 minutes. We would recognize you at this time, Senator.

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, General Myers, Under Secretary Jonas: We thank you for being here, the great work you do, the positions and responsibility you hold. Several items that are very important to me and to the people I serve. As founding co-chair of the National Guard Caucus, we do not have to tell you that 50 percent of the combat force in Iraq and approximately 40 percent of the entire force is composed of the National Guard. Anybody who knows the Guard, as I have known from working as their commander in chief in Missouri for many years, knows that it comes at a price.

Lieutenant General Blum has expressed concern about equipment shortfalls for Guard forces here at home, and I would ask most respectfully that you focus your attention on the readiness needs of the CONUS-based forces. Additionally, I would ask that you review the future total force (FTF) strategy of the Air Force, which has many Guard leaders and several of my colleagues and me concerned that the future total force may turn into a futile total force if the Air Guard is not provided a substantive role.

I have two letters that I recently received copies of from senior representatives of the National Guard. I will provide those for the record and copies for you, sir. A letter from Major General Rataczak, the President of the Adjutants General Association, to General Jumper expressing concerns about the FTF, stating that "Issues exist that could be very detrimental to the National Guard, to the point of irreversible deterioration. In particular, we fear the initiative as we understand it will cause serious gaps in the capability to defend the homeland."

The second letter, from Brigadier General Stephan Koper, President of the National Guard Association, to Congressmen on the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), says: "Our membership is expressing grave concern about the direction of the FTF plan and its immediate negative impact on the Air Guard force struc-

ture. Concerns include continuation of the air sovereignty mission, funding transition mission personnel from current missions to future missions, and the limited role adjutants general have played in the developing the FTF plan and its impact on the Air Guard in anticipate of base realignment and closure (BRAC)."

[The information follows:]

MARCH 17, 2005.

The Honorable DUNCAN L. HUNTER,
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services, 2120 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515-6035.

The Honorable IKE SKELTON,
Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Armed Services, 2120 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515-6035.

DEAR CHAIRMAN HUNTER AND CONGRESSMAN SKELTON: This decade our military forces have faced some of the greatest challenges in our nation's history. By supporting successful missions in Operation Enduring Freedom, Noble Eagle and Operation Iraqi Freedom, while at the same time transforming to face the threats of the future, our Air National Guard has played a critical role in supporting U.S. strategic interests at home and abroad.

Currently, the Department of the Air Force is developing its transformation plan, called Future Total Force (FTF). Over the years, the ANG has proven its willingness to transform and evolve. However, our membership is expressing grave concerns about the direction of the FTF plan and its immediate negative impact on Air Guard force structure. Such concerns include: continuation of the Air Sovereignty missions; funding to transition personnel from current missions to "future missions;" the limited role that The Adjutants General have played in developing the FTF plan; and the impact these force structure reductions will have on Air Guard basing in anticipation of BRAC.

As you and your staff continue holding hearings, NGAUS respectfully requests that the House Armed Services Committee conduct a hearing on Future Total Force. Should any hearing be scheduled, we respectfully request that the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) be invited to testify on behalf of the National Guard and its membership to outline the Guard perspective in relation to FTF. In addition, we offer to coordinate with you and your staff the selection of appropriate Adjutants General that could also offer relevant and critical testimony.

The NGAUS recognizes a need for the Air National Guard to remain a ready, reliable and relevant component of our total air force capability. We also believe it is imperative that any future force modernization discussions that impact the Air National Guard involve a cooperative and collaborative interaction with the Adjutants General.

Respectfully,

STEPHEN M. KOPER,
Brigadier General, USAF (ret), President.

ADJUTANTS GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, DC, March 9, 2005.

General JOHN P. JUMPER,
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, HQ USAF/CC, 1670 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20330-1670.

DEAR GENERAL JUMPER: The Adjutants General of the 54 states see the USAF transformation strategy known as Future Total Force (FTF) having a profound effect on the Air National Guard (ANG). We want to help the Air Force shape a strategy and force structure that uses the ANG to its full potential. Homeland defense is a critical issue for us as we are responsible to our Governors for homeland security matters.

Adjutant General involvement with the FTF initiative only began recently with three Adjutants General being invited to participate on the AF/XP sponsored General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC). Lieutenant General Steve Wood has actively engaged us since coming on board late last year. His focus on open exchange of information is refreshing and is setting a course that will benefit all.

From our initial perspective the FTF initiative seems to focus on accelerated reductions of current weapon systems located predominately in the Air National Guard and the relocation of ANG units to active duty bases. The loss of flying units

will be compensated by rolling ANG force structure into new missions to sustain its end strength. Issues exist that could be very detrimental to the National Guard to the point of irreversible deterioration. In particular, we fear the initiative as we understand it will cause serious gaps in our capability to defend the homeland.

Our concern compels us to ask you to undertake actions to refine and improve the FTF initiative. These proposals are necessary to preserve the Air National Guard, ensure defense in depth of the homeland, and provide the most lethal and cost effective force in the future.

The Adjutants General can add significant value to Air Force modernization initiatives. First, we feel we should be involved with developing and vetting options, and be given the opportunity to contribute data and analysis to various studies. Through our Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS) we can offer valuable ideas and critiques in a timely manner that will enhance the FTF initiative by making it more palatable to a broader range of interested parties.

Second, the Air Force should thoroughly evaluate the air sovereignty mission after receiving USNORTHCOM requirements from which to develop a realistic force structure plan for homeland defense. The evaluation should consider weapon system dispersion as well as lethality and determine more precisely the extent other services will support this vital mission.

Third, we want to work with the Air Force to develop a roadmap to 2025 that uses proportionality as a key principle for determining roles and missions for the Air National Guard. This is not to say that current proportionality must be strictly adhered to. But rather, it is a starting point for determining the best mix of active and reserve component forces for future operations. We believe increasing full time strength for key weapon systems in the ANG deserves evaluation. The ANG may more effectively support critical Air Expedition Force rotations and other vital missions with a different mix of full time and traditional Guard personnel in units.

Fourth, the community basing plan should be expanded immediately to include additional sites and different weapon systems for a more comprehensive evaluation. The Adjutants General believe very strongly that community basing is a key to sustaining the relevant and ready Air National Guard which has performed so magnificently in homeland defense and contingency missions.

Fifth, to sustain an effective ANG end strength of approximately 107,000 the FTF schedule must be adjusted to slow aircraft retirements while accelerating the assumption of new missions by the ANG to avoid a lengthy gap between mission changes during the transitory period. A gap will cause the loss of experienced personnel while impeding our transition to the Air Force of the Twenty-first Century.

Sixth, the ANG should field new Air Force aircraft weapon systems in ratios consistent with our contribution to the war fight and interspersed throughout each system's fielding plan. The nation will be well served by involving the Air National Guard early on during the fielding F/A-22, C-17, and F-35 weapon systems. This would also apply to the new tanker and other flying systems (such as intra-theater lift) as they emerge from development. The Adjutants General can provide the Air Force valuable support if given a clear picture showing ANG participation throughout weapon system fielding.

The Adjutants General have an obligation to nurture the rich heritage of the Air National Guard and ensure its readiness and relevance. We have defined several principles that will guide our actions in influencing the make up of the future of the Air Force.

1. Retain the militia basing concept which connects the Air Force to communities dispersed throughout the nation and provides for agile and quick responses to dispersed threats;
2. Leverage the cost efficiencies, capabilities, and community support generated by ANG units in the several states by including them as an integral part of the Future Total Force structure;
3. Each state needs a baseline force for homeland defense which includes civil engineering, medical, and security forces;
4. The Air National Guard maintains essential proportions of flying missions to nurture and sustain direct connectivity with America's communities while supporting the expeditionary Air Force cost effectively, captures the extensive aircrew and maintenance experience of the Air National Guard;
5. The nation is well served by a continuing dialog involving the Air Force, National Guard Bureau, and the Adjutants General as new missions emerge and threats change.

Our desire is to work with the National Guard Bureau in developing, vetting, and implementing initiatives. We provide perspectives from the field that when aligned with the programmatic expertise of NGB will result in sound courses of action with solid support from the several states.

Sir, we truly understand and appreciate your Herculean efforts to transform the greatest Air Force in the World into something even better. We only ask that we are allowed to help in the process.

Respectfully,

DAVID P. RATACZAK,

Major General, AZ ARNG, President, Adjutants General Association.

Senator BOND. Finally, the third major item, I would ask you to look closely at the Air Force decision not to leverage its \$68 million investment in the V-3 AESA radar, which upon completion of development within the next year will be the most advanced weapon system in the world for tactical fighters. The V-3 not only increases the expeditionary capability of our air forces, it also makes CONUS-based aircraft the most capable homeland defense platform in the world, second to none.

I am mystified why the Air Force elected not to acquire this system. If this is the Pentagon's idea of a sound business plan, I need to go back to school and take a refresher course on good Government.

I would just—the one question I would ask you, Mr. Secretary: Have you been briefed on why the Air Force elected to shelve the—

Senator STEVENS. Senator, you may submit the questions.

Senator BOND. I will submit that.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

Senator BOND. All right, thank you, sir.

Senator STEVENS. Yes, sir.

Senator BOND. Thank you very much.

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Secretary, we want to recognize you and General Myers and then we will proceed with questions from the subcommittee.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee.

Sixty years ago, allied forces fought in some of the fiercest battles of World War II. The outcome of that difficult struggle certainly helped to transform much of the world, bringing freedom to distant shores, turning dictatorships into democracies, and long-standing enemies into friends. Today another generation of Americans, along with our coalition allies, have come to freedom's defense and thank you are helping millions of liberated people transform their countries from terrorist states into democracies.

Two weeks ago I met again with coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and with officials of those countries on the front lines of the struggle. Everywhere we traveled I saw first-hand the point you made, Mr. Chairman: the men and women in uniform, volunteers all, undertaking difficult duties with confidence and with courage. The debt we owe them is a great one.

Members of this subcommittee who have visited with them and the wounded here in the hospitals, I thank you for it. You cannot help but come away, as I do, inspired by their courage and their skill.

I certainly thank the Congress for providing the resources necessary to support them as they complete their missions. It is becoming increasingly clear that the sacrifices they are making have made a difference in bringing about a world that is freer and more peaceful and that rejects terrorism and extremism.

If you think of what has been accomplished in the past 3 years, we have—Afghans and Iraqis have held historic elections and selected moderate Muslim leadership. Extremists are under pressure. Americans' national security apparatus is seeing historic changes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is undergoing reforms in organization and missions, deploying forces outside of the NATO treaty area for the first time, outside of Europe. And some 60 nations are engaged freshly in an unprecedented multinational effort to address the proliferation of dangerous weapons.

We are here today to discuss the President's fiscal year 2006 request for the Department, as well as funding for the ongoing operations in the global war on terror. Before discussing dollars and programs and weapons, let me just offer some context for the tasks ahead. When President Bush took office 4 years ago, he recognized the need to transform our defense establishment to meet the unconventional and somewhat unpredictable threats of the 21st century. The attacks on September 11 gave urgency and impetus to the efforts then underway to make the armed forces more agile, more expeditionary, and more lethal.

The national security apparatus of the United States has undergone and continues to undergo historic changes on a number of fronts. We are addressing the urgency of moving military forces rapidly across the globe, the necessity of functioning as a truly joint force, the need to recognize that we are engaged in a war and yet still bound by peacetime behavior and practices and constraints and regulations and requirements. But we are up against an enemy that is unconstrained by laws or bureaucracies. We are adjusting to a world where the threat is not from a single superpower, as it was, that we could become quite familiar with over a sustained period of time, but rather from various regimes and extremist cells that can work together and proliferate lethal capabilities.

After more than 3 years of conflict, two central realities of this struggle are clear. First is that the struggle will not be won by military means alone. That is clear. Second is the reality that in this new era the United States cannot win the global struggle alone. No one nation can. It will take cooperation among a great many countries to stop weapons proliferation, for example. It takes nations working together to locate and dismantle extremist cells and to stop future attacks.

One thing we have learned since September 11 and in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere is that in most cases the capacities of our partners and our allies can be critical to the success of our own military forces, as is the ability and proclivity of our partners to curb the spread and appeal of that poisonous ideology in their education systems, news media, religious and political institutions.

Mr. Chairman, for all the progress that has been made, and it is substantial, the armed forces are still largely equipped, understandably, to confront conventional armies, navies, and air forces. We have made major commitments to modernize and expand the Army, adding some \$35 billion over the next 7 years in addition to the \$13 billion the Army has in the baseline budget.

We are increasing deployable combat power from 33 active duty brigades to 43 more powerful modular brigade combat teams. These teams are designed to be able to deploy quickly abroad, but will have firepower, armor, and logistics support to be sustained over a period of time.

In addition to increasing overall combat capability, the Army's modularity initiative plus an increase of 30,000 troops in the size of the operational Army is to reduce stress on the force by increasing by 50 percent the amount of time that active duty soldiers will be able to spend at home between overseas deployments.

As a result of a series of reforms, we are making the Reserve components, those individual reservists and guardsmen in high demand specialties, will be in the future be deployed less often, for shorter periods of time, and with more notice and predictability for themselves and for their families.

The Department continues to reevaluate our contingency plans, our operations, force structure, in light of the technological advances of the past decades. These advances, plus improved force organization and deployment, have allowed the Department to generate considerably more combat capability with the same or in some cases fewer numbers of weapon platforms.

For example, in Operation Desert Storm one aircraft carrier could engage about 175 targets per day. During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004, one aircraft carrier, instead of engaging 175 targets per day, could engage 650 targets per day, more than a three-fold increase. Today one B-2 bomber can be configured to attack as many as 80 different targets with 80 precision weapons during one sortie.

In the past the Navy maintained a rigid deployment schedule. Ships would deploy for 6 months, overlapping with the ships they relieved, and upon arriving home they would become relatively useless. Training and equipment readiness plummeted into what became known in the Navy as "the bathtub," with many battle groups unavailable for missions. The Navy's new fleet response plan has the capability to surge five or six carrier strike groups in 30 days, with the ability to deploy an additional two in 90 days.

In consultation with Congress and our allies, the Department is making some long overdue changes in global basing. We are moving away from the cold war garrisons toward an ability to surge quickly to wherever capability is needed. When the President took office, the cold war had been over for a decade, but the United States (U.S.) forces overseas continued to be stationed as if we expected a Soviet tank attack in Germany and as though South Korea was still an impoverished country devastated by the Korean War.

We advanced the commonsense notion that U.S. troops should be where they are needed, they should be where they are wanted, a hospitable environment, and they should be where they can be used effectively in the 21st century. Those changes are bringing home some 70,000 troops and up to 100,000 family members. Military personnel and their families as a result will experience fewer changes of station, less disruption in their lives, which of course is an important factor in reducing stress on the force.

The new global security environment drives the approach to our domestic force posture as well.

Some thoughts about the future. To the seeming surprise of some, our enemies have brains. They are constantly adapting and adjusting to what we are doing. They combine medieval sensibilities with modern technology and with media savvy to find new ways to exploit perceived weaknesses and to weaken the civilized world.

We have to employ the lessons of the past 3½ years of war to be able to anticipate, adjust, and act and react with greater agility. These necessary reforms have encountered and will continue to encounter resistance. It is always difficult to depart from the known and the comfortable. Abraham Lincoln once compared his efforts to reorganize the Union army during the Civil War to bailing out the Potomac River with a teaspoon. We are finding it tough, but it is not going to be that tough.

If you consider the challenge our country faces to not only reorganize the military, but also to try to transform an enormous defense bureaucracy and to fight two wars at the same time—and if that were not enough, we are doing it, all of this, for the first time in history in an era with 24-hour worldwide satellite news coverage, live coverage of terrorist attacks, cell phones, digital cameras, global Internet, e-mail, embedded reporters, and increasingly casual regard for protection of classified documents and information, and a United States Government that is essentially still organized for the industrial age as opposed to the information age.

Mr. Chairman, the President's 2006 budget request proposes some tough choices and it proposes to fund a balanced combination of programs to develop and field the capabilities most needed by the American military. It continues to use Navy and Marine Corps shift toward a new generation of ships and related capabilities. It continues the acquisition of Air Force, Navy, and other aircraft to sustain U.S. air dominance and provide strong airlift and logistics support. It continues to strengthen U.S. missile defenses. It advances new intelligence and communication capabilities with many times the capacity of existing systems.

The budget would maintain the President's commitment to our military men and women and their families as well. It includes a 3.1 percent increase in military base pay. The budget keeps us on track to eliminate all inadequate military family housing units in the next 3 years.

As to the current budget process, I appreciate your efforts to move the President's supplemental request quickly. It is critical that the military services receive these funds soon. I know that the Members of Congress understand that. The Army's basic readiness and operating accounts will be exhausted in early May. Now it is just a matter of days. And it has already taken to stretching existing funds to make up the shortfalls.

So I urge the Congress to achieve final passage of the supplemental before the recess later this week.

Afghan and Iraqi security forces. Transferring resources away from the training and equipping of Iraqi and Afghan security forces of course would seriously impede their ability to assume responsibilities that are now borne by U.S. troops, and I would add at

vastly greater cost to our country in both dollars and lives. We need the flexibility to channel this funding to where it is needed most. The House's reductions in funding for sustaining other coalition forces as well as the underfunding of the President's request to reimburse cooperating nations would make it vastly more difficult for allies and partners to support military and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, further increasing the strain on U.S. forces.

Failure to fund projects that Central Command requested could impede our ability to support ongoing operations in the theater with respect to military construction.

We believe that restriction on acquisition of the DD(X) destroyer would drive up costs and would restrict options while the Navy and the Department conduct a detailed evaluation of the program. The pending Senate restrictions on the U.S.S. *John F. Kennedy* would prevent the Navy from freeing up resources to counter current threats while preparing for future challenges.

Finally, underfunding known costs, such as higher fuel expenditures, or including new unfunded death and injury benefits in the final bill will of necessity force us to divert resources from other troop needs.

So I respectfully ask this subcommittee to take these considerations into account.

Mr. Chairman, across the world brave men and women wearing America's uniform are doing the truly hard work of history. I know you share my desire to see that they have all the support they need. Bringing the hope of freedom to some of the darkest corners of the Earth will render a powerful blow to the forces of extremism, who have killed thousands of innocent people in our country and across the globe.

PREPARED STATEMENT

I thank you all for what you have done on behalf of our troops and we look forward to responding to questions. Thank you, sir.
[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD H. RUMSFELD

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, good afternoon.

Sixty years ago this month, Allied forces fought in some of the fiercest battles of World War II. Many young men lost their lives and were grievously wounded in those battles, and I would be remiss if I did not recognize the service and heroism of at least two of the members of this distinguished committee.

The outcome of that long, difficult struggle helped to transform much of the world—bringing freedom to distant shores, turning menacing dictatorships into peaceful democracies, and longstanding enemies into friends.

Today, another generation of Americans, along with our Coalition allies, have come to freedom's defense. They are helping millions of liberated people transform their countries from terrorist states into peaceful democracies.

Two weeks ago, I met again with our Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and with officials in countries that are on the front lines of this global struggle. Everywhere we traveled, I saw firsthand our men and women in uniform—volunteers all—undertaking difficult duties with confidence and courage. The debt we owe them and their families is immeasurable. Members of this Committee have visited with the wounded and their families. You, as I, cannot help but come away inspired by their courage, and their skill.

I thank the American people and their Congress for providing the resources and support our forces need to complete their missions. It is becoming increasingly clear that the sacrifices they are making have made a difference in bringing about a

world that is freer, more peaceful and that rejects the viciousness of terrorism and extremism.

Consider what has been accomplished in three years plus:

- Newly free Afghans and Iraqis have held historic elections that selected moderate Muslim leadership;
- Extremists are under pressure, their false promises being exposed as cruel lies;
- America's national security apparatus is seeing historic changes;
- NATO is undergoing reforms in both organization and mission deploying forces outside of its traditional boundaries; and
- Some 60 nations are freshly engaged in an unprecedented multinational effort to address the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons.

We are here today to discuss the President's fiscal year 2006 request for the Department as well as funding for ongoing operations in the Global War on Terror. Before discussing dollars, programs and weapons, let me offer some context for the tasks ahead.

When President Bush took office over four years ago, he recognized the need to transform America's defense establishment to meet the unconventional and unpredictable threats of the 21st Century. The attacks of September 11th gave new urgency and impetus to efforts then underway to make our Armed Forces a more agile, expeditionary and lethal force.

The national security apparatus of the United States has undergone, and continues to undergo, historic changes on a number of fronts.

We have confronted and are meeting a variety of challenges:

- The urgency of moving military forces rapidly across the globe;
- The necessity of functioning as a truly joint force—as opposed to simply de-conflicting the Services;
- The need to recognize we are engaged in a war and yet still bound by a number of peacetime constraints, regulations and requirements, against an enemy unconstrained by laws; and
- Adjusting to a world where the threat is not from a single superpower, but from various regimes and extremist cells that can work together and proliferate lethal capabilities.

After more than three years of conflict, two central realities of this struggle are clear.

First is that this struggle cannot be won by military means alone. The Defense Department must continue to work with other government agencies to successfully employ all instruments of national power. We can no longer think in terms of neat, clear walls between departments and agencies, or even committees of jurisdiction in Congress. The tasks ahead are far too complex to remain wedded to old divisions.

A second central reality of this new era is that the United States cannot win a global struggle alone. It will take cooperation among a great many nations to stop weapons proliferation. It will take a great many nations working together to locate and dismantle global extremist cells and stop future attacks.

One thing we have learned since September 11th and in the operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, is that in most cases the capacities of our partners and allies can be critical to the success of our own military forces. As is the ability—and proclivity—of our partners to curb the spread and appeal of that poisonous ideology in their education systems, news media and religious and political institutions.

Mr. Chairman, for all the progress that has been made in recent years, the Armed Forces are still largely organized, trained and equipped to confront other conventional armies, navies and air forces—and less to deal with the terrorists and extremists that represent the most recent lethal threats.

We have made a major commitment to modernize and expand the Army, adding some \$35 billion over the next seven years, in addition to the \$13 billion in the Army's baseline budget. We are increasing deployable combat power from 33 active duty combat brigades to 43 more powerful "modular" brigade combat teams. These teams are designed to be able to deploy quickly abroad, but will have the firepower, armor and logistical support to sustain operations over time.

In addition to increasing overall combat capability, the Army's modularity initiative, accompanied by an increase of 30,000 in the size of the operational Army, is designed to reduce stress on the force by increasing by 50 percent the amount of time active duty soldiers will be able to spend at home between overseas deployments.

And, as a result of a series of reforms we are making in the Reserve Components, those individual Reservists and Guard personnel in high demand specialties will in the future be deployed less often, for shorter periods of time and with more notice and predictability for themselves and their families.

The Department continues to reevaluate our contingency plans, operations, and force structure in light of the technological advances of the past decade. These advances, plus improved force organization and deployment, have allowed the Department to generate considerably more combat capability with the same, or in some cases, fewer numbers of weapons platforms.

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In the past, the Navy maintained a rigid deployment schedule. Ships would deploy for six months, overlapping with the ships they relieved, and upon arriving home, become relatively useless. Training and equipment readiness plummeted into what became known as the “bathtub,” with many battle groups unavailable for missions. The Navy’s new Fleet Response Plan has the capability to surge five or six carrier strike groups in 30 days, with the ability to deploy an additional two in 90 days.

In consultation with Congress and our allies, the Department is making long overdue changes in U.S. global basing, moving away from fixed Cold War garrisons and towards an ability to surge quickly to wherever capability is needed.

When President Bush took office the Cold War had been over for a decade, but U.S. forces overseas continued to be stationed as if Soviet tank divisions threatened Germany and South Korea was still an impoverished country devastated by war. We advanced the common sense notions that U.S. troops should be where they’re needed, where they’re wanted, and where they can be used.

Those changes will bring home some 70,000 troops and up to 100,000 of their family members. Military personnel and their families will experience fewer changes of station and less disruption in their lives—an important factor in reducing stress on the force.

The new global security environment drives the approach to our domestic force posture as well. The Department continues to maintain more military bases and facilities than are needed—consuming and diverting valuable personnel and resources. Base Realignment and Closure, or BRAC, will allow the Department to reconfigure its current infrastructure to one that maximizes warfighting capability and efficiency. And it will provide substantial savings over time—money that is needed to improve the quality of life for the men and women in uniform, for force protection, and for investments in needed weapons systems.

Another challenge the Department faces is attracting and retaining high-caliber people to serve in key positions. For decades, the Department has lived with personnel practices that would be unacceptable to any successful business. With the support of Congress, the Department is now instituting a new National Security Personnel System, designed to provide greater flexibility in hiring, assignments and promotions—allowing managers to put the right people in the right positions when and where they are needed. About 60,000 Department of Defense employees, the first spiral in a wave of over 300,000, will transition into this new system as early as this summer.

The Pentagon also began to change the way it does business.

We have adopted an evolutionary approach to acquisition. Instead of waiting for an entire system to be ready before fielding it, this approach has made it possible, for example, to more rapidly field new robots to detonate roadside bombs in Iraq. Some thoughts about the future.

To the seeming surprise of some, our enemies have brains. They are constantly adapting and adjusting to what we’re doing. They combine medieval sensibilities with modern technology and media savvy to find new ways to exploit perceived weaknesses and to weaken the civilized world.

We must employ the lessons of the past three and half years of war to be able to anticipate, adjust, act and react with greater agility. These necessary reforms have encountered, and will continue to encounter, resistance. It is always difficult to depart from the known and the comfortable. Abraham Lincoln once compared his efforts to reorganize the Union Army during the Civil War to bailing out the Potomac River with a teaspoon.

But, consider the challenge our country faces to not only reorganize the military, but to also transform the enormous Defense bureaucracy and fight two wars at the same time. And, if that were not enough, to do all this for the first time in an era with:

- 24 hour worldwide satellite news coverage, with live coverage of terrorist attacks, disasters and combat operations;
- Cell phones;

- Digital cameras;
- Global internet;
- E-mail;
- Embedded reporters;
- An increasingly casual regard for the protection of classified documents and information; and
- A U.S. government still organized for the Industrial Age, not the Information Age.

FISCAL YEAR 2006 REQUEST

Mr. Chairman, the President's fiscal year 2006 Budget request makes some tough choices and proposes to fund a balanced combination of programs to develop and field the capabilities most needed by America's military.

- It continues the Navy and Marine Corps shift towards a new generation of ships and related capabilities;
- It continues the acquisition of Air Force, Navy and other aircraft to sustain U.S. air dominance and provide strong airlift and logistics support;
- It continues to strengthen U.S. missile defenses; and
- It advances new intelligence and communications capabilities with many times the capacity of existing systems.

The Budget would maintain the President's commitment to our military men and women and their families. It includes a 3.1 percent increase in military base pay. The Budget also keeps us on track to eliminate all inadequate military family housing units over the next three years.

FISCAL YEAR 2005 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

As to the current budget process, I appreciate your efforts to move the President's supplemental request quickly. It is critical that the Military Services receive these funds very soon. The Army's basic readiness and operating account will be exhausted in early May—a matter of days—and it has already taken to stretching existing funds, such as restraining supply orders, to make up the shortfalls.

I urge Congress to achieve final passage of the supplemental before the Senate recesses later this week.

Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces.—Transferring resources away from the training and equipping of Afghan and Iraqi security forces would seriously impede their ability to assume responsibilities now borne by U.S. troops—at vastly greater cost to our nation in both dollars and lives. We need the flexibility to channel this funding to where it is needed most.

Coalition Partners.—The House's reduction in funding for sustaining other Coalition forces, as well as the underfunding of the President's request to reimburse cooperating nations, will make it vastly more difficult for allies and partners to support military and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—further increasing the strain and stress on U.S. forces.

Military Construction.—Failure to fund projects that Central Command requested impedes our ability to support ongoing operations in the theater. Of special concern are the projects at Ali Al Salem Airfield and Al Dhafra Air Base to provide needed upgrades to logistics, intelligence and surveillance support.

Unrequested Provisions.—The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget reflects the Department of Defense's commitment to meeting the threats and challenges of the 21st Century. However, the Senate-passed bill limits the Department of Defense's flexibility for its transformation agenda by affecting the planned acquisition strategy for several major programs. The Department of Defense is examining strategies to control costs in its modernization effort and should be allowed to balance cost, schedule, and performance in an optimum manner.

The Administration is also concerned that the Senate bill includes a provision that would prevent the Navy from retiring the U.S.S. *John F. Kennedy*. Any requirement to obligate funds for the maintenance and repair of a ship the Navy believes is no longer essential is not a good use of resources. Further, the Administration opposes a requirement to maintain at least 12 active aircraft carriers as the Department is currently engaged in a Quadrennial Defense Review that will examine options for the Navy shipbuilding program and make recommendations to ensure force structure addresses future needs.

Finally, new or expanded benefits, such as for payments to survivors of fallen servicemembers, must be fully funded in the bill. Otherwise, the effect will be to divert resources from other troop needs.

I respectfully ask this Committee to take these considerations into account.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, across the world, brave men and women wearing America's uniform are doing the hard work of history. I know you share my desire to see that they have the support they need. Bringing the hope of freedom to some of the darkest corners of the Earth will render a powerful blow to the forces of extremism who have killed thousands of innocent people in our country and across the globe.

I thank you for all you have done on behalf of our troops, and I look forward to responding to your questions.

Senator STEVENS. General Myers, do you have a statement, sir?

STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS

General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator Inouye and members of the subcommittee. Once again, thank you for your unwavering support of our armed forces and, more specifically, the men and women in uniform, particularly as they fight this all-important global war on terrorism and violent extremism.

We remember the brave service men and women and Government civilians who have been wounded or given their lives for this noble cause and we grieve with their friends and with their families.

We are now in the fourth year of sustained combat operations and our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, Coast Guardsmen, and U.S. Government civilians continue to perform superbly under extremely challenging conditions. I am tremendously proud of them, as I know you are.

Our forces are fully prepared to support our national defense strategy and to assure our allies, while we dissuade, deter, and defeat any adversary. The fiscal year 2006 defense budget request provides critical funding for winning the global war on terrorism, securing peace in Iraq and Afghanistan, combatting weapons of mass destruction, enhancing our joint warfighting capabilities, and transforming the armed forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Our forces are the world's most capable, in large part because they are the best trained and equipped. The 2006 defense budget and the funds you supported in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental request are vital to ensuring our troops are trained and resources for the missions they are assigned and to sustain their readiness while they are deployed.

In my opinion this is a pivotal moment in our Nation's history and in world history. We must stay committed in this global war on terrorism and violent extremism if justice, tolerance, and freedom are to triumph over violence, fear, and oppression. Make no mistake, we have undertaken a long and hard task to help people long brutalized by repressive regimes build a future based on freedom and tolerance.

Our significant progress in Iraq and Afghanistan and other places around the world is a tribute to the hard work and sacrifice of our dedicated American service members and our coalition partners and to the continuing dedication of the American people and the Congress.

In Iraq, the United States remains committed to helping the Iraqis build a secure and peaceful future with a representative government based upon the rule of law. Over the last year, the Iraqi

people have become more and more self-reliant. The transfer of sovereignty last June, the successful election, followed by the Transitional National Assembly selection of the Presidency Council and the Prime Minister, showed their courage and determination to support a free and democratic country and also to continue to represent a moral defeat for the insurgents.

Despite the many challenges, the Iraqis have shown a strong pride of ownership in their new government and in their future. Forming a new government is not easy, but continued progress is essential to sustaining the positive momentum seen since the January elections.

In Afghanistan, the coalition continues to make great progress. Congress' firm commitment is leading the international effort to fund and equip Afghan reconstruction. NATO and the coalition will continue to help build and train the commands and institutions the Afghans need to sustain and manage their security apparatus.

One of the great challenges in Afghanistan is the illegal drug trade. The Afghan government and the international community must continue to combat these challenges.

All these operations at home and overseas, they all come at a cost, especially for our people, both our Active and Reserve component. They are so tremendously dedicated. They understand their mission very, very well and they understand what a huge difference they are making, and their morale is good.

In the face of continued demands on our forces, we are analyzing all our policies and making changes to mitigate readiness challenges. I am concerned with the wear and tear on our equipment and I thank this subcommittee for its continued support of our request to help repair and replace our rapidly aging resources. Congressional support, both in the annual budget and supplemental funding, has been exceptional and essential for funding our continued operations and for funding Army modularization, recapitalization, and transformation.

I am proud of our transformational efforts and successes and we must continue to invest heavily in transformation both intellectually and materially so we can meet the challenges facing our country today and in the future.

This year we are working through three major processes that will have a far-reaching impact on the future force posture. The first of course is the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and it will provide a comprehensive strategic plan for transforming the armed forces.

Second, the base realignment and closure process provides an excellent opportunity to further transform our warfighting capability and eliminate excess capacity.

Third, our global basing strategy transforms the cold war footprint into one that is focused on combining the capabilities of U.S.-based rotational forces that are lean and agile with strategically placed overseas-based forces.

The important transformational decisions we make today will have a lasting impact on our Nation's defense capabilities and the capabilities of our allies and coalition partners.

As I know all of you know, we must stay committed if we are to win this global war on terrorism and extremism and defend the

United States and our national interests. As the Secretary said, the U.S. military cannot do this alone. Success in this 21st security environment requires cooperating with our multinational partners and integrating military capabilities across the U.S. interagency. In my view, our way of life remains at stake, so failure is not an option. With Congress' continued strong support, our military will continue to be unwavering in our focus, our resolve, and our dedication to peace and freedom.

PREPARED STATEMENT

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee, and we look forward to your questions.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD B. MYERS

In my fourth and final Posture Statement, I look forward to reporting to you on the state of the United States Armed Forces, our successes over the last year, our continuing challenges, and our priorities for the coming year. I also would like to thank you for your unwavering support of our armed forces and our servicemen and women.

Our Nation is entering the fourth year of sustained combat operations. Our successes in the past year are clearly due to the dedicated and courageous service of our Nation's Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen, and civilians who are serving within our borders and around the globe. Their service as warriors, diplomats, peacekeepers and peacemakers has been exceptional. They are truly our Nation's most precious and important assets. Serving alongside our Coalition partners and allies, they have accomplished very demanding, and many times, very dangerous missions.

Building democracy and hope in areas long ruled by terror and oppression is a long, hard task. Our success in both Iraq and Afghanistan is a tribute to the hard work and sacrifice of our Coalition partners and our dedicated American servicemembers. The U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen and U.S. Government civilians who have been killed or wounded sacrificed to make the world safer and provide hope to millions. We grieve with their families, and with the families of all the Coalition forces and civilians who made the ultimate sacrifice in these noble endeavors.

While overall results are positive, significant challenges affect our forces engaged in demanding combat operations. These operations create many readiness challenges, including Combat Service and Combat Service Support capability limitations, Reserve Component mobilization challenges, equipment challenges, and manning a growing number of Combined and Joint Force headquarters. The past 3 years have been demanding, and while there are no "silver bullets" to make our problems go away, I will outline our way ahead to address our long-term challenges.

We remain resolved, dedicated, and committed to winning the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), securing the peace in Iraq and Afghanistan, combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), enhancing joint warfighting capabilities and transforming the Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.

We are making steady progress in these areas. Our homeland is safer and we are committed to winning the Global War on Terrorism. Afghanistan has a democratically elected president and three quarters of al-Qaida's leadership has been killed or captured. In January, the Iraqi people democratically elected a Transitional National Assembly, a crucial step toward a permanent government and their first legitimate election in generations. We continue to improve our world-class joint warfighting capability, and we are making good progress in transforming our Armed Forces.

Despite the current operational demands on our forces, we remain ready to support the President's National Security Strategy to make the world not just safer, but better. We are fully prepared to support our strategy to assure our allies while we dissuade, deter and defeat any adversary. Our revised National Military Strategy links this strategic guidance to operational warfighting, defining three interrelated National Military Objectives—protect the United States, prevent conflict and surprise attack, and prevail against adversaries—along with supporting additional military tasks and missions. Success in meeting these objectives necessitates cooper-

ating with multinational partners and integrating military capabilities across the Interagency to harness all elements of National power.

Executing our strategy requires a force fully prepared to simultaneously conduct campaigns to prevail against adversaries, protect the United States from direct attack, and undertake activities to reduce the potential for future conflict. Success requires an array of capabilities, from combat capabilities to defeat the forces that threaten stability and security, to capabilities integrated with the Interagency for stability and security operations. We must continue to invest in activities such as International Military Education and Training and Theater Security Cooperation that serve to expand and strengthen alliances and coalitions. These alliances and activities contribute to security and stability and foster international conditions that make conflict less likely.

We expect this year will be no less challenging than last year, as we fight the Global War on Terrorism, continue to excel in joint operations, and transform our Armed Forces. With the continued strong support of Congress and the dedicated service of the men and women of our Armed Forces, we will succeed.

WINNING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

The Global War on Terrorism will continue to be a long and difficult war affecting the entire global community. It will require our firm commitment and the cooperation of our allies and coalition partners as well as international organizations, domestic state governments, and the private sector.

The United States is fighting a new kind of war against a new kind of enemy. This enemy is motivated by extremist ideologies that threaten such principles as freedom, tolerance, and moderation. These ideologies have given rise to an enemy network of extremist organizations that deliberately target innocent civilians to spread fear. Extremists use terrorism to undermine political progress, economic prosperity, the security and stability of the international state system, and the future of civil society. We are fighting to bring freedom to societies that have suffered under terrorism and extremism and to protect all societies' right to participate in and benefit from the international community.

The United States cannot defeat terrorism alone, and the world cannot defeat terrorism without U.S. leadership. We must ally ourselves with others who reject extremism. Success in this war depends on close cooperation among agencies in our government and the integration of all instruments of national power, as well as the combined efforts of the international community.

The U.S. Government strategy for winning the Global War on Terrorism has three elements: protect the homeland, disrupt and attack terrorist networks, and counter ideological support for terrorism. We continued to make progress in the Global War on Terrorism during 2004 and the beginning of 2005. Democratic forms of government now represent people who were controlled by brutal dictatorships. Lawless territories have now been reclaimed. Terrorist networks have been disrupted and their safe havens have been denied. The United States and its allies have captured or killed numerous terrorist leaders in Iraq and around the world. Freedom has replaced tyranny in parts of the world.

Despite this success, the United States continues to face a variety of threats from extremist networks, criminal organizations, weapon proliferators, and rogue states that cooperate with extremists. To combat these threats, we continue to refine the role of the Armed Forces in homeland defense by combining actions overseas and at home to protect the United States. Critical to this role are U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) mission of homeland defense and DOD's contributions to consequence management. NORTHCOM can deploy rapid reaction forces to support time-sensitive missions such as defense of critical infrastructures or consequence management in support of the Department of Homeland Security or other lead federal agencies. NORTHCOM's Joint Task Force Civil Support coordinates closely with interagency partners and conducts numerous exercises to integrate command and control of DOD forces with federal and state agencies to mitigate chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive incidents. The National Guard now has thirty-two certified Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Teams. Twelve additional teams are undergoing the final 6 months of certification training. Congress established 11 more teams in fiscal year 2005. Those teams will conduct individual and unit training over the next 18–24 months. I thank Congress for your continued support of these important WMD Civil Support Teams. Additionally, last October the National Guard reorganized their state headquarters into 54 provisional joint force headquarters, allowing them to interact more efficiently with other military organizations.

The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) is providing robust air defense of the continental United States, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands through Operation NOBLE EAGLE. We are developing plans that build on the success of NORAD to improve maritime warning, maritime control, information operations, and enhanced planning. Although the effort expended on defending our country may be transparent to some, the operations and exercises being led by federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, NORTHCOM and NORAD, are robust, successful, and extremely important. The Total Force is doing a superb job in defense of our country, and I thank Congress for its continued funding of homeland defense initiatives.

Forces overseas, led by our Combatant Commanders, are conducting offensive counterterrorism operations along with interagency and international partners to defeat these threats closest to their source. In addition to attacking and disrupting terrorist extremist networks, Combatant Commanders assist in building counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, internal defense and intelligence capabilities of partner nations. Strengthening partner capacity improves internal security, and ultimately contributes to regional stability and the creation of global environment inhospitable to terrorism. The Special Operations Command is designated as the combatant command responsible for planning and directing global operations against terrorist networks.

The offensive efforts of our Global War on Terrorism strategy are designed to deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations, affecting terrorists' ability to effectively execute their attacks or sustain their ideology. DOD efforts include information operations that impede our enemy's ability to perform critical functions. Ultimately, continuous and successive attacks against the enemy cause their operations to fail.

These offensive actions overseas constitute the first line of homeland defense. In the land, air, space, maritime, and cyber domains, DOD will continue to coordinate closely with allies and partner nations and other U.S. agencies to interdict terrorists and their resources before they enter the United States. The United States goal is to disrupt their efforts to access targets, and defeat attacks against our homeland. This requires effective information sharing, persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, more and better human intelligence, and improved interoperability between the Armed Forces and other U.S. Government agencies.

The third and most important element of this strategy to defeat terrorism includes de-legitimizing terrorism so that it is viewed around the world in the same light as the slave trade, piracy, or genocide. Terrorism needs to be viewed as an activity that no respectable society can condone or support and all must oppose. Key to this effort are actions to promote the free flow of information and ideas that give hope to those who seek freedom and democracy. DOD contributes to this important effort with security assistance, information operations, assisting humanitarian support efforts, and influencing others through our military-to-military contacts.

The Global War on Terrorism will be a long war, and while the military plays an important role, we cannot win this war alone. We need the continued support of the American people and the continued support of the entire U.S. Government. The United States will have won the Global War on Terrorism when the United States, along with the international community, creates a global environment uniformly opposed to terrorists and their supporters. We will have won when young people choose hope, security, economic opportunity and religious tolerance, over violence. We will have won when disenfranchised young people stop signing up for Jihad and start signing up to lead their communities and countries toward a more prosperous and peaceful future—a future based on a democratically-elected government and a free, open, and tolerant society.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)

The United States is committed to helping the Iraqis build a secure and peaceful future with a representative government based upon the rule of law. The list of important accomplishments in Iraq in every sector—education, medical care, business, agriculture, energy, and government, to name a few—is long and growing. Most importantly, Iraq has reached several important milestones on the road to representative self-government: transfer of sovereignty, parliamentary and provincial elections leading to a Transitional National Assembly, selection of a Presidency Council, a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. The key to success in Iraq is for Iraqis to become self-reliant. A timetable for leaving Iraq would be counterproductive, leading the terrorists to think they can wait us out. We are in Iraq to achieve a result, and when that result is achieved, our men and women will come home.

With the help of the Coalition, the Iraqi people are creating a country that is democratic, representative of its entire people, at peace with its neighbors, and able to defend itself. The Iraqi people continue to assume greater roles in providing for their own security. The recent Iraqi elections showed their courage and determination to support a free and democratic country, and represented a moral defeat for the insurgents. The Iraqi people have a renewed pride of ownership in their government, and their future. Voters paraded down the street holding up their fingers marked with purple ink from the polls. They carried their children to the polls as a clear symbol that they were courageously voting to improve the Iraq their children would inherit.

This very successful election is just one milestone on a very long road. Together with our Coalition partners, the international community, Interagency partners, and Non-Governmental Organizations, we are fully committed to helping the Iraqi people provide for their own security and supporting their dream of a free, democratic, and prosperous future. I thank Congress for its continued support of our budget submissions and supplemental requests to help fund our operations and sustain our readiness posture. Your support and the support of the American people are key and have been exceptional.

Many Americans have paid with their lives to ensure that terrorism and extremism are defeated in Iraq, but the morale of our servicemembers remains very high, and they are dedicated to helping achieve peace and stability. There are approximately 140,000 U.S. servicemembers in Iraq and approximately 22,000 coalition forces. Commanders in the field will continue to evaluate our force structure and recommend changes as security conditions and Iraqi Security Forces capabilities warrant.

The insurgency in Iraq is primarily Sunni extremist-based and focused on getting Coalition forces out of Iraq and regaining illegitimate power in Iraq. Its leadership is predominantly former regime elements drawn from the Ba'ath Party, former security and intelligence services, and tribal and religious organizations. Other groups contribute to the instability, including militant Shia, Jihadists groups, foreign fighters, and extensive criminal networks and activity. They are generally well resourced with weapons, munitions, finances and recruits.

The greatest threat to stability in Iraq comes from former regime elements and their supporters. In the near-term, however, a group of Sunni extremists comprising the al-Qaida Associated Movement adds to the security challenge. This al-Qaida Associated Movement is part of a global network of terrorists. Other elements of this movement were responsible for some of the deadliest terrorist attacks in 2004, including the March 11 train bombings in Madrid, and the September 9 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia. In Iraq, the al-Qaida group led by al-Zarqawi claimed responsibility for the tragic suicide bombing of the mess tent at Forward Operating Base Marez in Mosul in 2004. He has claimed responsibility for additional deadly attacks against Coalition forces and innocent Iraqi civilians this year.

We expect insurgents to persist in their attacks, particularly as the Coalition continues to help Iraqis rebuild their country and form their new government. The Coalition will stand firmly beside the Iraqi people to sustain momentum and progress in helping the Iraqi Security Forces defeat these insurgents and terrorists.

Reconstruction and economic stabilization efforts are expanding steadily. In 14 of the 18 provinces in Iraq. In the other 4 provinces, the insurgents are sustaining a hostile environment that undermines reconstruction and economic stabilization. The use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), car bombs, and stand-off attacks continue at elevated levels.

The insurgents are tough enemies, but they offer no alternative positive vision for Iraq. Instead, they offer the old vision of Iraq: extremism, tyranny, violence and oppression. Insurgents are conducting an intimidation campaign to undermine popular support for the Iraqi Government, Iraqi Security Forces and emerging institutions. They use barbaric and cowardly attacks to target Iraqi government officials, their families and others who are trying to improve conditions in the country. We will continue to help the Iraqis hunt down extremists and their accomplices and capture or kill them.

Elements in neighboring countries are interfering with democratic efforts in Iraq. In Syria, displaced Iraqi Sunnis and Ba'athists are also influencing events in Iraq. These efforts include aiding and funding insurgents, extremists, and terrorists, to plan attacks inside Iraq and transit from Syria to Iraq. The Syrian military and government have made some attempts to halt this influence and the illegal flow of terrorists into Iraq, but they need to do much more.

Establishing Iraqi stability and security is a complex process but an important one, because it is the path to peace. There are several key components to this com-

plex issue, including physical, social, economic, and political security. Coalition forces play a direct role in many of these key components, but we must address all of these components simultaneously. The U.S. military cannot do it alone. This is an Interagency as well as an international effort. We must balance all components to avoid making the Coalition military presence a unifying element for insurgents. The objective must be to shift from providing security through Coalition counterinsurgency operations, to building Iraqi capacity to operate independently.

Currently, the Coalition is helping to provide physical security by protecting Iraq against both internal and external threats and training Iraqi military and police forces to provide their own physical security. Coalition military, NATO, and inter-agency cooperation has been very good. Currently, 31 (including the United States) countries and NATO are serving in Iraq. Based on the request of the Interim Iraq Government at the July 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO representatives agreed to help train Iraqi Security Forces. In February 2005, NATO opened their Training Center for mid-grade to senior officers in the International Zone, and continues to work toward launching an expanded program at Ar Rustamiyah later this year to include training for senior non-commissioned officers. NATO will employ a "train-the-trainer" approach to capitalize on existing Iraqi capabilities and grow their cadre of trainers. NATO has established a Training and Equipment Coordination Group located in Brussels. The Iraqi-chaired Training and Equipment Coordination Committee in Baghdad is helping to coordinate donated equipment and training opportunities for Iraqi Security Forces outside of Iraq. In order to maximize our efforts, NATO countries and the international community must fully support and contribute forces to the mission.

The Iraqi Government has over 155,000 security forces trained and equipped at varying levels of combat readiness. The growing Iraqi Army now comprises over 80 combat battalions. Not all of these battalions are combat ready; readiness capability is a function of numbers, training, equipment, leadership and experience. We continue to work with the Iraqi government on raising, training, and equipping even more security forces. Just as importantly as increasing forces, the Coalition is helping improve the capability and readiness of the security forces. Iraqi division commanders have recently been appointed and are receiving training and mentoring. Coalition forces are working with them to build their headquarters and forces capable of independent operations. These leaders will be critical to conducting independent counter-insurgency efforts as they gather intelligence, shape plans, and direct operations.

Iraqi servicemembers have fought valiantly alongside their Coalition partners in combat, and have had to face the constant threat of insurgent attack. Over 1,600 members of the Iraqi Security Forces have been killed in service to their country. Immediately on the heels of many effective combat operations, Iraqi and coalition partners have restored effective local governments that are responsive to the national government.

Training Iraqi police forces is a longer-term project, but good progress is being made, especially with the special police battalions. The Iraqis now have nine public order battalions, a special police brigade, nine police commando battalions and seven regional SWAT teams actively engaged in the fight against insurgents and terrorists on a day-to-day basis.

During the liberation of Fallujah, the Coalition that included Iraqi Security Forces made great progress in eliminating the insurgents' safe havens. Urban counter-insurgency operations are among the most difficult combat missions, but the Coalition courageously and successfully liberated the city, block by block and building by building. We continue to conduct effective offensive operations and help the Iraqi forces eliminate other safe havens.

The social aspect of security includes ensuring educational opportunities, adequate wages, health care, and other safety-net programs are available to ensure the population has basic human services. Economic security requires helping to promote the Iraqi economy and industrial base to create jobs and sources of income sufficient to support local and state government services, individuals and families. Although neither social nor economic security are primary U.S. military responsibilities, Coalition forces are actively involved in these efforts to bolster the legitimacy and effectiveness of local Iraqi governments. As much as possible, we are turning over responsibility for administering these projects to Iraqi leadership.

In June of 2004, there were 230 projects from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund on the ground "turning dirt." By January 2005, more than 1,500 projects were underway, accounting for more than \$3 billion in reconstruction funding and the progress continues. The U.S. military, Interagency, Coalition and non-governmental organizations are helping the Iraqis build sewers, electrical and water distribution systems, health centers, roads, bridges, schools, and other infrastructure. I cannot

overemphasize the importance of these activities to help the Iraqis rebuild their infrastructure, after decades of decay under Saddam Hussein's oppressive regime.

The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) is a high-impact program that has been instrumental in our efforts to help secure peace and help stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. Allowing commanders to respond immediately to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements, this program proved to be an immediate success story. In fiscal year 2005, the Consolidated Appropriations Act provided a total of \$500 million of budget authority for CERP. Through the supplemental budget request, DOD has requested a total of \$854 million for this program in fiscal year 2005, \$718 million for Iraq and \$136 million for Afghanistan. I support the request for an increase in authorizations for CERP in fiscal year 2005 and thank Congress for your continued support of the Commander's Emergency Response Program.

Political security means the Iraqis must be able to participate in the government processes without fear of intimidation. Last summer, Iraq began its transition to sovereignty. In August, military commanders shaped a plan that helped bring Iraq through the January elections and on to the constitutional elections in December 2005. The plan is on track. On January 30th, Iraqis elected a 275-person transitional national assembly, who will write a new Iraqi constitution. This was a very important step on the road to peace and security in Iraq.

The Coalition goal is for the Iraqis to have a safe and secure country. The political process is moving forward. The country needs to be rebuilt after 30 years of decay, and we need to continue to help build Iraqi military and security forces and encourage good governance. We are making excellent progress in so many areas in Iraq, even though this progress does not always get the attention it deserves. Daily reports alone cannot define our successes or failures. From a broad perspective, the Coalition has successfully reached the first of many important milestones. Less than 2 years ago, Coalition forces defeated a brutal dictator and his regime. We established a provisional authority to get Iraq back on its feet, and transferred sovereignty to an interim government. The Iraqis have elected their Transitional National Assembly, which has elected their Presidency Council. The National Assembly will write a new constitution that will lead to another round of nation-wide elections and a permanent government. The Iraqis have many challenges ahead and many more milestones to meet, and the Coalition forces are supporting their efforts to ensure democracy and freedom will prevail.

Although the stresses on our Armed Forces remain considerable, I am confident that we will achieve the goals set forth by the President. Our Coalition forces are dedicated, and the Iraqis are dedicated, as they proved on January 30th. As long as America keeps its resolve, we will succeed. Resolute Congressional leadership will be as important to our success in the future as it has been to date.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)

2004 was a historic year for Afghanistan. The entire region is a much better place due to the commitment of the United States, our Armed Forces and our Coalition partners. Currently in Afghanistan, 42 countries and NATO are working to protect and promote a democratic government, with NATO assuming an increasing role in stability and reconstruction efforts. We currently have approximately 20,000 United States servicemembers in Afghanistan.

The October 9, 2004 presidential election in Afghanistan was a historic moment for that country. Over 8 million people, 40 percent of whom were women, braved threats of violence and overcame poor weather to cast their ballots. The elections were conducted under the protection of their own National Army and Police Forces with the assistance of the Coalition and the International Security Assistance Force. The election of President Hamid Karzai is providing new momentum for reform efforts such as the demobilization of private militias, increased governmental accountability, and counter-narcotics planning and operations. Taking advantage of his electoral mandate, Karzai assembled a cabinet of well-educated and reform-minded ministers who reflect Afghanistan's diverse ethnic and political environment. National Assembly elections, currently scheduled for this spring, will provide additional leadership opportunities. The Presidential election represented a serious real and moral defeat to the insurgency. The Taliban's failure to disrupt the election further divided an already splintered insurgency. Nonetheless, some radical factions remain committed to the insurgency. Frustrated by their lack of success, these factions may seek to launch high profile attacks against the upcoming National Assembly elections, necessitating continued robust security.

Congress's firm commitment to Afghanistan is leading the international effort to fund and equip reconstruction in Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2005, \$290 million of

the authority enacted by Congress to train and equip security forces will be used to accelerate the growth of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Now numbering approximately 22,000 personnel—three times greater than last year—the Afghan National Army is a multi-ethnic, visible symbol of national pride, unity, and strength in Afghanistan. The goal is to fully man the ANA combat force with 43,000 servicemembers by late 2007, about 4 years earlier than originally planned. This is truly a success story. Fiscal year 2004 funding enabled the opening of 19 regional recruiting centers, which have been critical to attracting quality recruits to accelerate the growth of this force. In the next several years, the Coalition and NATO will help build the commands and institutions the Afghans need to sustain and manage their military. The ANA is on the path to becoming a strong military force, and in its early stages has proven tough and well disciplined in the field.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program is a great success. As hubs for security sector reform initiatives, reconstruction, good governance programs and humanitarian efforts, these teams are key to stabilizing Afghanistan. There are now 19 operational PRTs, 8 more than I reported last year. The Coalition currently leads 14 of these teams and NATO leads 5. With an improvement in security and increased Afghan governance and security capacity, the PRTs will eventually be transformed into civilian-only assistance teams, with Afghan district and provincial governments taking over an increased number of their functions.

Last October, the United Nations approved a resolution extending NATO's International Security Assistance Force for another year. ISAF now controls five PRTs in the North, with Phase Two of NATO expansion into the west occurring in 2005. The intent is to continue NATO expansion by region, gradually replacing Coalition forces with NATO forces.

In spite of the successes to date, low-scale insurgent attacks continue, and more disturbingly, opium production reached record levels last year. Afghanistan is responsible for most of the world's opium supply, and 80 to 90 percent of the heroin on the streets of Europe. Eliminating the cultivation of poppies used to produce opium is Afghanistan's number one strategic challenge. Illicit drug activity in Afghanistan funds terrorism and interferes with good government and legitimate economic development.

Coalition soldiers are assisting in the counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan by reporting, confiscating or destroying drugs and drug equipment encountered in the course of normal operations, sharing intelligence, helping to train Afghan security forces, and, through our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, by providing assistance in communities migrating to legal crops and businesses. Ultimately, the Afghan government, aided by the international community, must address drug cultivation and trade with a broad-based campaign that includes creating viable economic alternatives for growers and manufacturers.

Achieving security in Afghanistan is very dependent on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; cantoning heavy weapons; curbing warlordism; and defeating the narcotics industry. President Karzai's patience and persistence in dealing with factional leaders continues to achieve results. Over 40,000 former militia troops have been disarmed and demobilized, nearly 96 percent of the known heavy weapons were cantoned peacefully, and factional disputes continue to yield to central government resolution. The power of the warlords is methodically giving way to credible, effective national institutions.

Working closely with President Musharraf of Pakistan and President Karzai, we have been able to increase coordination among Coalition, Afghan and Pakistani forces along the border. The Pakistani government has taken the initiative to increase their military presence on the border, including manned outposts, regular patrols and security barriers. Pakistani military units also patrol in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, once considered "no-go" areas. Pakistan's support in securing key border points was instrumental in shaping a relatively secure environment during the Afghan presidential election. The Pakistani Army has significantly improved their counter-terrorism capabilities, thanks in part to equipment we are providing them, and has played a vital role in enhancing security in this region.

OTHER U.S. OVERSEAS OPERATIONS

Even as operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, the United States will face a number of other challenges and demands for military capabilities. Throughout the world, U.S. forces provide stability, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and hope; ultimately spreading democracy and progress and aiding in the Global War on Terrorism. U.S. Armed Forces have conducted operations ranging from our support to South and South East Asia for the Tsunami disaster, to keeping the peace in Kosovo. Of the over 2.6 million servicemembers serving in the Total Force, over

240,000 are deployed overseas in 54 countries or at sea. Additionally, 65,000 of these servicemembers are members of the Reserve or National Guard.

Our Armed Forces still have many enduring missions and challenges around the world as we fight the Global War on Terrorism. The Joint Task Force Horn of Africa at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti continues to conduct counter-terrorist and civil affairs operations in Eastern Africa. This contingent of 1,100 U.S. forces provides critical security assistance in support of civil-military operations and supports international organizations working to enhance long-term stability in this region.

In April 2004, we successfully completed the Georgian Train and Equip Program, training over 2,700 Georgian troops to meet the rising threat of transnational terrorism in the Caucasus. DOD recently accepted a Georgian request for U.S. support in training additional troops for the United Nations Protection Force and to sustain their current troop rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, a small contingent of U.S. military personnel remains in the southern Philippines aiding their forces in training for counter-terrorism operations.

Expanded Maritime Interdiction Operations (EMIO) have been a very successful international effort over the past year to interdict terrorists and their resources by sea. All geographic Combatant Commanders are successfully pursuing this initiative with particular focus on the Persian Gulf, Horn of Africa, the Mediterranean and throughout the Pacific Command. Beyond the goal of eliminating terrorist access to the maritime environment, EMIO has had other positive effects for the international community, including lower insurance premiums in the shipping industry, considerably less illegal immigration, and a reduction in piracy and narcotics smuggling.

The Korean peninsula continues to be a region of concern. North Korea's military is the world's fifth largest and remains capable of attacking South Korea with little further preparation. Our goals are for North Korea to dismantle their nuclear programs in a verifiable manner, eliminate their chemical and biological weapons programs, reduce their conventional threat posture, and halt their development and proliferation of ballistic missiles. North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003, and made clear its intentions to pursue its nuclear weapons program. To deal with the threat presented by North Korea's nuclear program, the United States has steadfastly pursued a multilateral diplomatic solution through the Six-Party talk process. There have been three rounds of the talks to date, the last occurring in June of 2004. North Korea has refused to return to the talks, citing United States "hostile policy," despite our government's clear and unequivocal statements that the United States has no intent to invade or attack North Korea.

North Korea is also one the world's leading suppliers of missiles and related production technologies, having exported to countries in the Middle East and North Africa as well as Pakistan. North Korea is expected to increase its nuclear weapons inventory by the end of the decade and continues to invest heavily in ballistic missiles and the infrastructure to support them. Taken together, North Korea's actions constitute a substantive threat to global security.

The United States remains committed to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. We provide military deterrence and defensive capabilities in combination with our South Korean ally and through maintaining strong military and diplomatic ties with our regional partners. The United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance remains strong, and we are improving our overall combat effectiveness while eliminating dated infrastructure and reorganizing our footprint to lessen the burden on the people we are defending. We still need to resolve a number of issues, but there is no doubt that the alliance is enduring, as is the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea is a major contributor to the Coalition in Iraq, providing over 3,300 troops.

Iran's apparent pursuit of nuclear weapons and the implications of their being a nuclear-equipped state sponsor of terrorism adds substantially to instability throughout the Middle East. While I hope that the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Union will deter and dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program, I have no long-term basis for optimism. So far, there have been no signs that Iran will give up its pursuit of uranium enrichment capability. I am also concerned with the Iranian government's continued attempts to influence the political process in Iraq and marginalize U.S. assistance in Iraq and throughout the region.

We must stay focused on the enormous global threat posed by the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Although operationally deployed nuclear weapon numbers are declining in Russia and the United States because of treaty commitments, we continue to prioritize the safety, security and accountability of these types of weapons. Furthermore, we project a slow increase in other states' in-

ventories. We are particularly troubled about North Korea's and Iran's on-going nuclear weapons-related activities. The trend toward longer range, more capable missiles continues throughout the world. We believe that some chemical and biological warfare programs are becoming more sophisticated and self-reliant, and we fear that technological advances will enable the proliferation of new chemical and biological warfare capabilities.

Fighting the proliferation of WMD is a challenging worldwide problem and is one of my greatest concerns. Terrorists have stated their desire and intent to obtain WMD. While most of this proliferation in the past was state-sponsored, proliferation by companies and individuals is growing. The revelations about the AQ Khan international and illicit nuclear proliferation network show how complex international networks of independent suppliers with expertise and access to the needed technology, middlemen, and front companies can successfully circumvent domestic and international controls and proliferate WMD and missile technology. Within DOD, the SecDef has tasked the U.S. Strategic Command to synchronize our efforts to counter WMD and ensure the force structure and the resources are in place to help all combatant commands defeat WMD.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) operational activities are central to DOD efforts to counter proliferation of WMD. We will continue to work with key countries to develop expanding circles of counter proliferation cooperation. We have been very successful in the last year. Today, more than 60 nations have endorsed the principles of PSI, with a number of others expressing willingness to cooperate in PSI efforts. 19 nations form the PSI Operational Experts Group. We are conducting PSI exercises around the world to enhance international interdiction capabilities and to serve as a deterrent to curtail the proliferation of WMD and the means to deliver those weapons. In October 2003, our WMD counter proliferation efforts provided a key motivation for Libya's abandonment of its WMD programs and helped speed the dismantling of the AQ Khan nuclear proliferation network. The key to success in combating WMD proliferation remains committed international partnership.

Today, the NATO Alliance is the most important and capable security alliance in the world. NATO commitment across the globe, to include operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, has been very good. However, there is room for improvement. Lack of defense funding by NATO Allies places a strain on the Alliance and our collective defense capability. Despite the general agreement that nations would hold their defense budgets at no lower than 2 percent of their gross national product, unfortunately, today, 50 percent of the nations in the Alliance are below 2 percent. This inadequate spending threatens NATO's ability to transform and adequately meet the Alliance's commitments. Additionally, member governments place numerous caveats on the use of their forces, rendering these forces less effective. For example, during the unrest in Kosovo last March, governmental caveats kept some countries from responding to the crisis. Finally, NATO needs to create a decision-making process that supports time sensitive requests. NATO forces have been slow to respond to security challenges because the NATO bureaucracy was too slow to react. Even with these deficiencies that need to be addressed, NATO has proven indispensable in today's security environment, and has committed itself to improving its capability.

Operations in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina stand as the definitive examples of how NATO can bring peace and stability to war-torn regions. Additionally, the NATO Response Force (NRF) reached its initial operating capability last October. The NRF gives NATO a joint force tasked to quickly deploy and execute the full spectrum of NATO missions. The Alliance's most recent success occurred in December when NATO concluded its first successful peacekeeping mission in its history. The successful Stabilization Force Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was brought to completion after 9 years and, at its peak, consisted of over 60,000 Allied troops. In total, over 500,000 NATO soldiers from 43 nations and 90,000 U.S. troops participated in operations that set the stage to establish judicial, economic, and governmental systems leading to self-governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO and the United States will remain engaged in Bosnia, where NATO has established a new headquarters that will have the lead role in supporting Bosnian defense reform. NATO forces will continue to hunt for war criminals, and will prevent terrorists from taking advantage of Bosnia's fragile structures. This NATO force will work closely with the newly created European Union (EU) Force and will retain access to the full range of military authorities provided under the Dayton Accords. The EU mission will focus on Bosnia's current security challenges, such as organized crime. This spring, the North Atlantic Council will review the Kosovo mission and the forces required. Based on this review, we will work with our NATO Allies to respond to the evolving security environment.

Narco-terrorism presents a global threat to security, prosperity, and good governance. Through Counter Narco-Terrorism operations, the United States is building coalitions, training and equipping forces, and enhancing the capabilities of allies in the Global War on Terrorism. Ongoing U.S.-sponsored multilateral operations promote security, improve effective border control, deny safe havens and restrict the ability of the narco-terrorists to operate with relative impunity.

Counter Narco-Terrorism (CNT) successes in Colombia over the last year have been exceptional. We appreciate recent Congressional action to increase the troop cap for DOD personnel operating in Colombia. This allows U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to maintain the flexibility to meet existing mission requirements while increasing information, logistic and training support to the Government of Colombia during the execution of Colombia's current Counter-Narco Terrorism campaign, Plan Patriota.

With approximately 18,000 members, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is the largest Narco-Terrorist (NT) group operating in Colombia, followed by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). In the past year, through a combination of aggressive CNT operations and offers of amnesty, Colombian security forces engaged in Plan Patriota have killed or captured 10 senior ranking members of the FARC and have demobilized record numbers of Narco-Terrorism group members. The Colombian Government is engaged in a peace process with the AUC that has already resulted in the demobilization of over 4,000 combatants. As a measure of the improved quality of life in Colombia, in the last year, massacres committed by Narco-Terrorism groups against civilians have decreased 44 percent, kidnappings decreased 42 percent, and attacks against infrastructure have decreased 42 percent. Cocaine seizures have increased 43 percent while heroin seizures have increased 72 percent.

In response to the devastating and tragic Tsunami last December, the U.S. military responded immediately with humanitarian assistance to South and South East Asia. We quickly established a Combined Support Force headquarters in Thailand. During the height of the humanitarian effort, more than 25 U.S. ships, 50 helicopters, numerous support aircraft and 15,000 U.S. troops were involved in delivering and distributing relief. Over 3,300 relief sorties were flown. Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, Airmen and Coastguardsmen provided over 5000 tons of relief supplies including over 420,000 gallons of water. Working with local governments, NGOs and international organizations, servicemembers provided all facets of humanitarian assistance, including providing medical care, clearing debris, and repairing critical infrastructure. This operation was a tribute to the versatility, responsiveness and compassion of our joint forces.

The U.S. Government has recently developed an excellent combating terrorism planning mechanism through the NSC-led Regional Action Plans for Combating Terrorism (RAP-CTs). These RAP-CTs are the primary vehicle for the Interagency to coordinate and deconflict Global War on Terrorism activities on a regional basis. This process is an Interagency success story, and the DOD is fully engaged in these planning activities.

Our global operations show the remarkable versatility, flexibility, agility, and professionalism of our American Armed Forces and highlight our effectiveness in fighting the Global War on Terrorism. Very few nations can field a force capable of expertly conducting simultaneous combat, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations around the world, while maintaining the flexibility to seamlessly transition from one mission to another.

JOINT WARFIGHTING

Our forces are the world's most capable, in large part because they are the best trained and equipped. They continually strive to be the best joint warfighters in the world, they work extremely hard and they are taking joint warfighting to the next level by working closely with our interagency partners. Our forces possess the requisite personnel, equipment, and resources to accomplish the military objectives outlined in the National Military Strategy. Our forces—whether forward deployed, operating in support of contingency operations, or employed in homeland defense—remain capable of executing assigned missions. But there are many challenges to meeting these commitments.

Our Nation's number one military asset remains the brave men and women serving in our Armed Forces. They have the training, spirit and agility to use modern technology to form the world's preeminent military force. They have the dedication, courage, and adaptability to combat dynamic global threats. The Administration, Congress and DOD have made raising our servicemembers' standard of living a top

priority, and I thank Congress for your tremendous support to our troops and their families during my tenure as Chairman.

The President's budget includes a 3.1 percent increase in basic pay, which keeps military pay competitive. We must ensure the civilian-military pay gap does not widen and that we support our Armed Forces with pay befitting their experience level, skills, and service. Thanks again to your actions, the aggressive increases in Basic Allowance for Housing eliminated an 18.8 percent deficit over the past 5 years and allowed us to eliminate average out-of-pocket housing expenses this year. Danger area compensation and other combat-related initiatives passed into law have also had a positive impact, mitigating the challenges of retaining and compensating our servicemembers serving in combat. Benefit increases have helped close the pay gap, improve health care and housing, and significantly contributed to improving the quality of life of our forces. As fiscal challenges mount for the Nation, I stand ready to work closely with Congress and the Department's civilian leadership regarding future benefit increases. Close coordination will ensure that our limited resources are used effectively to sustain our all-volunteer force.

DOD and Congress are working together to increase benefits for the survivors of deceased servicemembers. While no benefits can replace the loss of a human life, I agree that improvements are needed.

Current stresses on the force are significant and will remain so for the near term. I am concerned with the wear and tear on our equipment, especially our vehicles. High operational and training tempo is putting up to 5 years worth of wear on equipment per year, placing a huge demand on maintenance, supply, depot repair and production. In some units, combat-related damage is high, and there is substantial equipment damage caused by the harsh environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, many units leave their equipment overseas when they return from deployment, requiring re-supply and reconstitution as they train for their next deployment.

We continue to analyze our policies and make changes to mitigate readiness challenges to include how forces are selected for deployment, reserve mobilization, training, equipment wear and reset, unit reconstitution, and improving Command, Control, Communication, and Computer System infrastructures. Congressional support, both in the annual budget and supplemental funding, has been essential for continued operations, Army modularization, and recapitalization. However, many of the programs we have put in place take time to develop. We are currently addressing the significant stress in critical specialties in Combat Support and Combat Service Support, as well as Low Density/High Demand assets. Unit reconstitution of both equipment and trained personnel is also a challenging process. Our DOD fiscal year 2005 Supplemental request currently before the Congress is essential to all of these efforts, and I urge the Congress to act promptly and fully on this request.

We continue to rely heavily on our Reserve and Guard personnel. Our Reserve Components are serving critical roles in OIF and OEF, the Global War on Terrorism, and Homeland Defense, as well as serving around the world in other operations and activities. Citizen-soldiers in the Reserve Component are an important link to the American people. Morale in both the active and Reserve Component remains high, and their support by the American people has never been higher. As of April 2005, Guard and Reserve personnel comprised 33 percent of our Force in Iraq, 21 percent in Afghanistan, and 45 percent in Djibouti. We need to continue to review and update our processes to improve the efficiency and agility of our mobilizations. We are well aware of the strains on members, their families, and their employers, and we continuously seek better ways to support them.

While we have made strides in improving predictability and benefits for our Reserve Component servicemembers and continue to pursue rebalancing initiatives—especially in low density and high demand forces—significant additional steps are underway. The Reserve Component Cold War-era processes and policies that have guided training, readiness, administration, pay and health benefits, personnel accountability and mobilization must be reformed and streamlined if we are to have the deployable and sustainable Reserve Component force that our Nation needs. I look forward to working with the new Congressional Commission on Guard and Reserve matters to chart the future course for our very important Reserve Component.

In order to help compensate for the high-tempo force and materiel requirements associated with ongoing operations for the Total Force, we have revised many of our processes to improve readiness forecasting. We have identified Service and Combatant Command requirements, determined the scope of required reset actions, improved on forecasting demands, and addressed industrial base shortfalls. We have developed many of these solutions with the help of the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review process, and the DOD is developing a web-based Defense Readiness Report-

ing System. These efforts are part of an ongoing effort to improve our readiness reporting and responsiveness throughout the Services, the DOD and the Joint Staff.

By using all of these tools, we have identified readiness challenges and will continue to refine our priorities to successfully carry out our missions. This year's budget submission and the supplemental request greatly mitigate some of these readiness challenges, but many will remain as we continue to engage in sustained combat operations.

Because today's security environment demands a global perspective, in June 2004, SecDef approved a new Global Force Management process and designated Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as the primary Joint Force Provider. These changes will ensure the warfighters get the right forces from the right sources, focusing globally instead of regionally. In the future, JFCOM will coordinate all conventional force sourcing recommendations, excluding those assigned to Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). This is a new mindset. Integral to this new methodology is the Global Force Management Board. This board is composed of General Officer/Flag Officer-level representatives from the Combatant Commands, Services, Joint Staff and OSD who review emerging force management issues and make risk management recommendations for approval by the SecDef.

The pace of operations around the globe since 9/11 has led to Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) that are hard to sustain indefinitely in many specialties. As a risk mitigator, we have temporarily increased our end strength in the Army and Marine Corps. Making these personnel increases permanent is very expensive. Before making our currently increased level of forces permanent, we need to assess current force management initiatives and our future global commitments. Initiatives like the Army's transformation to a modular-based organization help accomplish this. Having the right force to meet today's threats is critical. The Quadrennial Defense Review will aid in this assessment and help us make informed decisions about the appropriate size and composition of our force structure and manning to achieve our strategic objectives.

One of the readiness challenges facing our forces is adequately resourcing Combat Service and Combat Service Support billets. To help these stressed career fields, we are aggressively rebalancing our force structure and organizations. Through fiscal year 2011 we expect to rebalance mission and skills for over 70,000 billets in the Active and Reserve components. Additionally, we have approximately 42,000 military to civilian conversions planned. The conversions will free up military billets to help reduce stress on the force. Together, these initiatives rebalance over 110,000 billets with a primary focus on high-demand specialties, including civil affairs, military police, intelligence, and Special Forces.

The DOD depends on the skills and expertise of its civilian workforce as a force multiplier. We simply could not perform our mission without the support, dedication, and sacrifice of our DOD civilian employees at home and overseas. To help simplify and improve the way it hires, assigns, compensates, and rewards its civilian employees, the DOD will implement the first phase of the National Security Personnel System this July. This system will improve the management of our civilian workforce, allowing for greater flexibility to support evolving missions.

As of April 1, 2005, enlisted recruiting within the active components remains strong except for the Army, which is at 89 percent of their goal. Many factors contribute to the Army's recruiting challenge, including their fiscal year 2005 end-strength increase and a resulting increase in the total number of recruits needed in fiscal year 2005. In the Reserve Component, recruiting continues to be a challenge. Of the six Reserve Components, only the USMC Reserve and Air Force Reserve made their recruiting goals through March. Each Service and component has mitigating plans and is aggressively attacking the problem. The Army Reserve Components will continue to be particularly challenged since more active Army soldiers are staying in the active force, and of those who get out, fewer are joining the Army Reserve Component. We have increased the number of recruiters and restructured enlistment bonuses to help mitigate these challenges.

The Services are on track to meet their annual end strength goals except for the Army Reserve Components and the Navy Reserve. The Army National Guard's end strength is currently at 95 percent and the Army Reserve's strength is 96 percent. The Navy Reserve is at 94 percent of its authorized end strength, which is on track to meet their target for fiscal year 2007.

We also need to look very closely at the experience level and demographics of the people who are leaving the Armed Forces. The leadership skills and combat skills that our servicemembers are gaining while fighting this Global War on Terror are priceless. It takes years to train quality leaders, and we need today's best officers and NCOs to become tomorrow's senior leaders.

The Army Stop Loss policy is vital to their efforts in the GWOT. This policy affects the Active Army forces in OIF and OEF, and Army National Guard and Reserve members assigned to units alerted or mobilized that are participating in OIF, OEF or Operation NOBLE EAGLE. Stop Loss currently affects alerted Active and Reserve soldiers typically from 90 days before their mobilization or deployment date, through their deployment, plus a maximum of 90 days beyond their return from deployment. Stop Loss is essential to ensuring unit integrity during combat operations. As authorized under Title 10, the size of future troop rotations will in large measure determine the levels of Stop Loss needed in the future. Initiatives such as Force Stabilization, Modularity and the Army's active and reserve component rebalancing should alleviate some of the stress on the force.

Protecting our troops remains a top priority. The rapid production and distribution of Interceptor Body Armor to our forces in OIF and OEF was a tremendous success. 100 percent of U.S. Government civilians and U.S. military members in Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa have had body armor since February of 2004. The Army has aggressively managed this critical item, accelerating production and fielding rates. The Army is now fielding Deltoid Auxiliary Protection armor and the Marine Corps is fielding Armor Protective Enhancement System to help protect shoulder and armpit regions that are not currently covered by Interceptor Body Armor. With your support, we will continue to work diligently to provide the best protective equipment for our troops.

Clearly as essential as providing body armor for our troops is providing armored vehicles to transport them. Our successes in increasing armor production have recently allowed us to institute a policy that servicemembers leaving Iraqi forward operating bases must be in vehicles with armor protection, whether a Humvee, truck, or other tactical wheeled vehicle.

The evolving threat in the Central Command Area of Responsibility (CENTCOM AOR) has significantly increased the requirements for the Up Armored Humvee and armor protection for all vehicles. In May 2003, the CENTCOM requirement for Up Armored Humvees was just 235. Their requirement is now over 10,000. CENTCOM has over 7,300 Up Armored Humvees, and the Army will meet the requirement of 10,000 by this July.

There are three levels of armor protection for all tactical vehicles. A Level 1 vehicle is provided directly from the manufacturer with integrated armor protection against small arms, IEDs, and mines. A Level 2 vehicle is equipped with a factory built, add-on kit installed in theater, to provide similar protection. Level 3, is a locally fabricated armor kit. Level 3 provides comparable protection to Level 2, excluding ballistic glass. All three levels meet detailed Army and Marine Corps specifications. Overall, of the more than 45,000 tactical wheeled military vehicles in CENTCOM, 87 percent have armor protection. As factory production of Level 2 kits has steadily increased to meet the changing requirement, the Army is replacing Level 3 with Level 2 armor. To accelerate this transition, the Army has added two truck installation facilities, making a total of five facilities in theater dedicated to installing factory-produced protection to our vehicles. Navy and Air Force military and civilian personnel are continuing efforts to accelerate armor installation in Iraq and Kuwait. Additionally, the Army is applying Level 2 armor in the United States before units deploy.

Even as we approach our goals for the number of armored vehicles in Iraq, the Army is fielding new capabilities to further protect our troops. Troops returning from Iraq are talking to industry leaders about better, and safer armor design and systems. We continue to refine the entire range of tactics, techniques, and procedures used to move needed personnel and supplies. For example, we have doubled the number of direct air delivery hubs in Iraq, and expanded intra-theater airlift to reduce the number of convoys traveling through high-risk zones. Since the beginning of these air-delivery initiatives earlier this year, we have been able to reduce the number of truck movements used to move equipment and supplies by 4,200. Because we cannot eliminate the risks entirely, we are rapidly developing systems to counter threats, including Improvised Explosive Devices. Overall, our efforts have been successful and are saving lives and limbs. With the continued strong support of Congress, we will continue to provide the best protection possible for our personnel.

Combatant Commanders and Services continue to identify preferred munitions shortfalls as one of their areas of concern, including Laser Guided Bombs and Joint Direct Attack Munitions production. Supplemental funding and programmed budget authority have bolstered Joint Direct Attack Munitions 193 percent and Laser-Guided Bomb kits 138 percent in the past year, continuing to reduce the gap between requirements and available inventory. In the long-term, we need to continue to fund the development of weapons like the Small Diameter Bomb, Joint Air-to-Surface

Standoff Missile, and Joint Standoff Weapon to build on our precision-delivery capabilities.

Last year, the DOD developed overarching policy and procedures for managing contractors during contingency operations. Once reviewed and approved by the Department, these documents will greatly aid in coordinating contractor operations.

The vision for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) can be summed up as delivering the right education, to the right people, at the right time, focusing on improved joint warfighting. Cold War threats and force structure were the building blocks for Joint Officer Management policies codified in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The requirement for JPME trained forces throughout different levels of seniority has grown significantly since the law went into effect. Over the last 3 years we have expanded JPME across the ranks and components to include an expansion of JPME phase two opportunities, JPME opportunities for enlisted personnel, junior officers starting with precommissioning, Reserve Component officers, senior enlisted advisors, and for two- and three-star general and flag officers. Training for Combatant Commanders is in the planning stage.

As we redefine jointness with our changing roles and missions, Congress has played a vital role in adapting JPME to this new environment by tasking DOD in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2005 to develop a new strategic plan for joint officer management. We must develop leaders at all levels capable of effectively accomplishing our strategic and operational objectives. As an example, we are looking at the core competencies required for our Joint C4 Planners and defining what it takes to train, educate and certify them in their profession, similar to our certification and training standards for our pilots.

Providing opportunities for foreign military personnel to train with U.S. forces is essential to maintaining strong military-to-military ties. Whether through classroom training or major exercises, training and education received by our allies helps build and maintain skilled coalition partners and peacekeepers and affords many future leaders the opportunity to live in our culture and understand our values. Many of the sharp mid-grade foreign officers who attended U.S. military training and exercises in the past decades are leading their militaries and countries around the world today. Over the past 5 years, the IMET budget has nearly doubled, from \$50 million in fiscal year 2000 to nearly \$90 million in fiscal year 2005. It is in our best interest to keep this important IMET process on track, and I thank Congress for continued support and funding of this important program.

Because these training opportunities and military-to-military relationships forged among allies are so important, I am concerned with U.S. Government restrictions that limit these relationships. The first is the Visa restrictions that affect foreign military personnel visiting the United States for training. The second is legislative restrictions. One example is the restriction placed on countries affected by the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA). ASPA's provisions ensure and enhance the protection of U.S. personnel and officials, but an unintended consequence has been a reduction in training opportunities with countries not supporting the Act.

Anthrax represents a significant threat to our Forces and I fully support the resumption of the Anthrax vaccine program. DOD is in full compliance with the April, 2005 court order requiring DOD to explain to servicemembers their right to refuse the vaccine.

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the current global environment have made the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF) a high demand asset for sourcing the combatant command's emergent warfighting needs. These funds allow the warfighting commanders to quickly mitigate financial challenges encountered during combat operations. Combatant Commanders use CCIF extensively and I support the full funding of this program to ensure we are responsive to the warfighter's short-fused needs.

The CJCS managed Joint Exercise Program (JEP) provides the transportation funding that supports the Combatant Commanders' Joint and multi-national training which influences the Global War on Terrorism, and supports our theater security cooperation plans worldwide. Since 9/11, high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO have forced the Combatant Commanders to reduce the Joint Exercise Program demand by 36 percent. In response to this dynamic environment, the Joint Staff has changed the program to make it strategy based and more responsive to the warfighters requirements. This year, JEP is conducting 117 exercises. 82 percent of these are focused on Theater Security Cooperation, preparation for OIF and OEF, and special operations forces activities, all of which are directly applicable to fighting the Global War on Terrorism. It is essential that Congress fully fund the Combatant Commanders' Joint Exercise Program.

Our joint warfighting operations around the world have clearly shown that freedom of navigation, both on the sea and in the air, remains absolutely critical to military planning and operations and is vital to U.S. national security interests. I strongly support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention as the best means to protect our navigational freedoms from encroachment.

We have many challenges facing our Joint Warfighting team as we enter our fourth year of sustained combat operations. I am acutely aware of the effects of operational demands on our Total Force. The Army Reserve recently highlighted that under current policies governing mobilization, training, and manpower management, they cannot sustain their current OPTEMPO demands and then regenerate their forces. This is a tough problem, but we have many initiatives in place to mitigate this and other challenges affecting our overall readiness status in 2005. Our Total Force can continue to support the National Security Strategy and this current high operational tempo, but we must analyze, refine and reassess our efforts so we can transform the force for the challenges of the 21st Century.

TRANSFORMING THE FORCE

I am proud of the transformational efforts and successes in the U.S. military, but we must continue our efforts to meet the challenges facing our country today and in the future. We are a Nation at war, so one of our greatest challenges in the military is to transform while conducting joint warfighting in the Global War on Terror, protecting the United States from direct attack, and reducing the potential for future conflict. We must continue to invest heavily in transformation, both intellectually and materially.

Transformation is not simply applying new technology to old ways of doing business. Transformation requires cultural change, new ways of thinking about problems, and changes in how we organize and train. I am proud of the innovation and initiative I see from our servicemen and women, both on headquarters staffs and in the field. The concept of Transformation is central to all our assessment and procurement processes. This year, we will work through three major processes—QDR, Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) and Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy—that have a long term, broad impact on our force posture.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is leading the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review process. The QDR will provide a comprehensive strategic plan that will set the standard for transforming the Armed Forces to ensure success against a wide range of national security challenges. This is the third Quadrennial Defense Review, and it is unique in that we have been engaged in sustained combat operations for the last 4 years. The QDR is underway and is scheduled to be released in February 2006. By law, the CJCS will assess the results, and risks, and make recommendations on the roles and missions of the DOD.

I thank Congress for continued support of our Base Realignment and Closure process. Past BRAC efforts, in the aggregate, closed 97 installations and affected many others within the United States. Through fiscal year 2001, these actions produced a net savings of \$17 billion and an annual savings thereafter of about \$7 billion. In March of 2004, the SecDef and I reported to Congress that the Department had substantial excess capacity. While we recognize BRAC is a challenging process, clear evidence of this excess capacity, coupled with a history of savings from past BRAC efforts, makes the argument for completing BRAC 2005 all the more compelling. BRAC 2005 provides an excellent opportunity to further transform the DOD by comparing our infrastructure with the defense strategy. BRAC is a valuable tool for maximizing our warfighting capability and eliminating excess capacity that diverts scarce resources away from more pressing defense needs.

One of our near-term transformational challenges is to better use the forces we have to provide needed capabilities to the Combatant Commander. The Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) transforms the Cold War footprint into one focused on capabilities, employing CONUS-based rotational forces that are lean and agile. This strategy enables rapid power projection and expands global presence and theater security programs by combining quick deployment, CONUS-based forces, with strategically positioned overseas-based forces. This strategy reduces the requirement for overseas support infrastructure and forces. Fewer remote-duty tours and longer CONUS assignments will mitigate family stress. Complementing IGPBS is the Army's transformation to brigade-centric modular forces that will increase the number of brigades available to rotate overseas from 33 to at least 43 active brigades by 2010.

DOD has already made many changes to our global posture since the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Combatant Commanders have continued to adjust our footprint to make our forward-stationed forces more relevant to our current and fu-

ture challenges. These posture initiatives are not only about adjusting numbers, but also about positioning the right capabilities forward to meet our needs and security commitments, while enhancing allies' and partners' transformation efforts in support of the Global War on Terrorism and regional security initiatives. For example, the SecDef has already approved several reductions within EUCOM and U.S. Forces Korea. The DOD, with the help of the Interagency, is moving forward in discussions with allies and partners on other specific proposals. As these discussions mature we must address the facilities and infrastructure needed to enable these capabilities. Our requests for overseas military construction this year are consistent with these plans and support our Combatant Commanders' transformation initiatives. I encourage your support in funding these critical projects.

We are reviewing many important weapon systems and DOD programs as we continue to transform. The Department's fiscal year 2006 budget submission restructured or reduced some programs and force structure. We focused on supporting current operations, near-term readiness and critical transformational programs. Reductions targeted areas where we have capability overlap, or the near-term risk was deemed acceptable to fund higher priorities. We will examine all of these programs and issues during the Quadrennial Defense Review and through other assessment tools like the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. We will maintain sufficient combat capability to execute our National strategies as we transform the Armed Forces to counter increasingly dangerous, dynamic, and diverse threats.

We are transforming across the force. In 2004, we took some big steps and made some difficult decisions, and we are already seeing positive results. Examples include the Army's restructuring into modular formations, and the Navy's continuing transformation of its force to include the restructuring of deployment cycles. Despite the demands of current operations, we remain focused on a wide array of transformational weapon systems and programs.

Maintaining supremacy over our enemies in both combat aircraft and combat support aircraft is a top joint warfighting priority. The continued development and production of the F/A-22 Raptor, V-22 Osprey, C-17 Globemaster III, E-10 Battle Management, F/A-18 Super Hornet, P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft, and UAVs are critical to maintaining this air supremacy. While some of these programs have been restructured, they remain very important joint warfighting platforms that are required to meet our National Security and military strategies.

We need to continue to fully support the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The F-35 is truly a joint aircraft, with three variants planned. This aircraft will be the mainstay of the next generation of the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and our allies' tactical aviation wings. The aircraft is in its 4th year of an 11-year development program, and will be a giant leap over the existing fighter and attack aircraft it is programmed to replace. The current design challenge is weight, which impacts performance requirements, particularly for the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing variant. Design teams have worked diligently to solve the weight issue and the F-35 is on track to meet weight requirements at IOC. The DOD has moved the first planned production procurement to the right 1 year, to fiscal year 2012 for the USMC variant and fiscal year 2013 for the USAF/USN variant. DOD has also added extra money to development.

To remain a truly global force, we must modernize our aging aerial refueling fleet. In November 2004, the Joint Resources Oversight Council approved the Air Refueling Aircraft Initial Capabilities document that identified a shortfall in our air refueling capability and provided a modernization, recapitalization, and transformation plan for the Air Force aerial refueling fleet. The Air Force is still studying alternatives. Based on the results of these studies, the DOD will develop a cost-effective strategy for sustaining this critical joint warfighting capability.

The DOD continues to make progress in providing missile defenses for our homeland, deployed forces, friends and allies. The DOD placed six ground-based interceptors in Alaska and two in California to provide a rudimentary capability to defend the United States from ballistic missile attack. The system is undergoing operational shakedown concurrent with continued research, development and testing. Confidence in the system readiness will come from ongoing ground testing, flight-testing, modeling and simulation, war games and exercises. As we make progress in the program and refine our operational procedures, the SecDef will decide when to place the system in a higher state of readiness.

Our maritime forces are aggressively pursuing their transformation efforts. The Navy is moving toward a more flexible and adaptable new generation of ships including nuclear aircraft carriers (CVN-21), destroyers DD(X), cruisers CG(X), the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the VIRGINIA-class fast attack submarine, and the enhanced aviation amphibious assault ship (LHA (R)). The Marine Corps is working in consultation with the Navy concerning the future maritime prepositioning force

(MPF(F)). The fleet of the future will likely be a numerically smaller force, but one with greater combat capabilities. The Navy is continuing to study the overall capability and size mix required for the Navy of the future.

Part of our transformation to a more lethal and agile force is our move toward Network Centric operations. Network Centric operations enable us to provide decisive combat power from a fully connected, networked and interoperable force. Central to this capability is the Global Information Grid (GIG). The GIG provides the backbone systems that provide global, end-to-end communications for DOD. The GIG will combine our future-force space and terrestrial C4 programs under one communications umbrella. Protecting the information on the GIG is also essential to warfighting operations, and our information assurance efforts continue to be a very high priority.

DOD Space capabilities are integral to the broad range of military operations we face today, and essential to meeting the challenges of the future. These capabilities provide decisive advantages for our Nation's military, intelligence, and foreign policy. They help warn of terrorist attacks and natural disasters. To meet these needs, Joint force commanders must have integrated Command and Control systems to dominate the battlefield.

Today, bandwidth demand exceeds our DOD space system capabilities, and our warfighting requirements continue to increase at a very high rate. More and more of our aging satellites are nearing the end of their expected life cycle. In response, DOD is developing new space communication systems such as the very important Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite program and the Transformational Communications Satellites (TSAT)/MILSATCOM program. AEHF is a critical system that will significantly increase our secure communication capabilities over the current Milstar system, and provide a bridge to TSAT. TSAT will provide a leap in our communications capabilities and will greatly enhance communications on the move, and assured command and control of our conventional and nuclear forces. It will allow small, mobile units to connect to the GIG anywhere in the world and will help provide persistent and detailed intelligence to the warfighters.

The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is a transformational software-programmable radio that will provide seamless, real-time voice, data, video and networked communications for joint forces. More than a radio replacement program, JTRS provides the tactical warfighter with net-centric capabilities and connectivity to the GIG. This new radio system is a significant improvement in capability and interoperability for the joint warfighters, and plays a critical role in networking our 21st century force.

Internationally, we made progress last year negotiating with the European Union with regard to their Galileo global positioning satellite system. The United States and the EU signed an agreement in June 2004 that stipulates Galileo signal structures will "cause no harm" to our future military use of GPS. Several international working groups established by that agreement will soon assess how future GPS and Galileo signal structures will interact.

Moving away from specific systems, there are several transformational concepts and programs. One of the most important goals of the Intelligence Reform efforts must be to ensure warfighters have unhindered access to intelligence to conduct their operations. We must be able to task national assets for intelligence to support the warfighter and enable users to pull and fuse information from all sources. As the roles and responsibilities of the intelligence organizations are refined, these changes must not weaken intelligence support to the warfighters. I strongly agree with the law's recommendation that either the Director of National Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director be an active duty commissioned military officer.

The information-sharing environment will be a force multiplier for countering terrorism by integrating foreign and domestic information into a single network. Initiatives such as incorporating Intelligence Campaign plans into Operational plans will inform the intelligence community what the warfighters need and greatly improve joint warfighters' use of intelligence.

Many of the successes in the GWOT are a direct result of successful information sharing with our allies and coalition partners. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, and Africa demonstrate both the importance and the shortfalls that exist in the timely sharing of intelligence. To be truly global in our fight on terrorism, we must continue to improve coalition command and control capabilities. To accomplish this, we have established a centralized multinational executive agent and a Joint Program Office to improve secure information sharing. Our goal is to incorporate multinational information sharing systems as an integral part of the Global Information Grid. Congressional support is needed as we continue to enhance our ability to network with our allies and global coalition partners.

As I deal with the Interagency on a daily basis on national security issues, I firmly believe we need to become more efficient and effective in integrating the efforts of various government agencies. I was pleased to observe and advise on the successful creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the recent Intelligence reforms. These two reforms should be just the beginning of our reform effort in the Interagency. Unifying the Interagency will be incredibly important to our country as we fight the GWOT and face the changing threats of the 21st Century.

In April 2004, the NSC Principals' Committee directed the establishment of Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department. This office will lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government efforts to prepare for post-conflict situations and help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict to peace. This is an important step because the Interagency has been challenged to meet the demands of helping post-conflict nations achieve peace, democracy, and a sustainable market economy. In the future, provided this office is given appropriate resources, it will synchronize military and civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national approach is applied to post-combat peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations.

Last year I reported that we had shifted the focus of our Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration—now named Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration—to Homeland Defense and Homeland Security requirements. The purpose of these demonstrations and warfighter assessments is to enable government and industry to join together in their use of Information Technology assets to solve Homeland Defense IT challenges. The goal is to field off-the-shelf products to meet Combatant Commander and Coalition Commander requirements in 12–18 months, greatly minimizing the normal acquisition timeline. I am happy to report that NORTHCOM, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the National Guard Bureau, along with the Services and more than 20 countries, will participate in these programs this year.

Joint Experimentation is central to transformation. Led by Joint Forces Command and involving Services, Combatant Commands, Government Agencies, and Multi-national partners, joint experimentation seeks to refine joint concepts and, ultimately, future joint force capabilities. Recent productive examples include UNIFIED QUEST 2004 and UNIFIED ENGAGEMENT 2004. In UNIFIED QUEST, the Army and JFCOM examined and assessed major combat operations and the very important transition to post-conflict. UNIFIED ENGAGEMENT was a joint, interagency, and multinational wargame that explored ways to sustain persistent dominance in the battlespace of the future. As we revise our joint concepts, we are incorporating results from these and many other experiments and wargames. These experiments and wargames have provided potential solutions to problems of joint force projection, multi-national and interagency operations, and decision making in a collaborative environment.

We must be able to rapidly deliver combat forces to the Joint Force Commanders and sustain them in combat operations. The Joint Staff is working with JFCOM and TRANSCOM to integrate our Deployment and Distribution Process and to develop a Joint Theater Logistics capability (JTL). Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM highlighted our need for JTL and logistics integration. These programs will provide a more responsive force projection and sustainment capability to the warfighter.

Another improvement to our logistics management processes is using state-of-the-art technologies like Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology. DOD used RFID during OIF as a supply-chain management tool to track supplies from the warehouse to the warrior. Other new technologies are helping us capture data at its source, modernize and transform our logistics systems, and improve the accuracy of data in our common operational picture, ultimately deploying resources to the warfighter more quickly.

In November 2004, we finalized an instruction on joint doctrine development to move valid lessons learned more rapidly into doctrine. When joint doctrine needs to change, there are now mechanisms in place to change doctrine outside the normal revision process. One example of this expedited review is the JROC validation of OIF and OEF lessons learned. When the JROC validates recommended doctrinal changes, layers of bureaucracy are removed, and the warfighters receive updated doctrine more quickly.

The Joint National Training Capability is an important Joint Forces Command-led program that will eventually encompass all joint training. This system became operational in 2004 and is beginning to link all training ranges, sites, nodes, and real and virtual events into a single network, allowing world-wide participation in training activities and integration of all joint training programs. For individual training, the Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability also became

operational in 2004. Managed and led by the Joint Staff, this project develops and shares up-to-date, critical joint military knowledge for education and training.

DOD is in the midst of completing a Strategic Capabilities Assessment to review the progress in fielding the New Triad, which includes non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities, defenses, and responsive infrastructure. This assessment will help recommend the number and types of forces needed to meet the President's goal of reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons. We have begun to make significant reductions on our way to 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2012. This reduction is possible only if Congress supports the other parts of the New Triad, our defenses and responsive infrastructure. STRATCOM has revised our strategic deterrence and response plan that became effective in the fall of 2004. This revised, detailed plan provides more flexible options to assure allies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries in a wider range of contingencies.

The transformational decisions we make today will have a lasting impact on our Nation's defense capabilities and strategic and tactical warfighting capabilities well into the 21st Century. These decisions will also have a lasting impact on our allies and coalition partners, who use our capabilities to improve many of their capabilities and technologies. Transformational decisions are difficult. We must make thoughtful, informed choices about systems and program that may be "new and improved" but not significantly transformational to keep up with our dynamic security environment. The Joint Chiefs understand this fully, and are leading our armed forces to transform.

CONCLUSION

We are a Nation at war. The demands placed on our Armed Forces this past year have been extensive, but our servicemen and women continued to perform superbly under conditions of significant stress and in the face of myriad challenges. I am tremendously proud of the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces for their continued hard work and sacrifice and that of their families.

This is a pivotal moment in our Nation's history and in world history. We must stay committed if we are to win the Global War on Terrorism and defend the United States and our national interests. Our way of life remains at stake, so failure is not an option. Our military is unwavering in our focus, resolve and dedication to peace and freedom. With Congress's continued strong support, our military will continue to effectively combat terrorism, counter the proliferation of WMD, help Iraq and Afghanistan build a stable and secure future, improve our joint warfighting capabilities, and transform our Force to meet future threats. I greatly appreciate your efforts and your focus to help the military meet its objectives and make the world a better and safer place for our citizens and the generations to follow.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much.

We will have a period now of 5 minutes apiece of our members here. I am informed that most members of the subcommittee are going to attend, so we have limited it to 5 minutes.

Let me recognize the chairman of the full committee first.

EMPLOYER TREATMENT OF GUARD AND RESERVE PERSONNEL

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

There has been some concern expressed about the fact that those who serve in the Reserve components of the armed forces when they are coming back to civilian status are in some cases losing the opportunity to work in the jobs they had before they were deployed and went on active duty. To what extent is the Department undertaking to try to deal with that situation and help make it possible for reservists and guardsmen to serve our country in this time of need and at the same time be treated fairly by the private sector when they return?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, first of all I would say that the employers of America have been terrific in general across the country. I am sure there are always situations where that is not the case, but they have done a great many things to be supportive of

members of the Guard and Reserve during the periods that they have been activated and when they return.

As you know, reservists' jobs are protected by law under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. We have an organization within the Department of Defense that works directly with employers when a reemployment problem arises and there is a national committee for employer support of the Guard and Reserve that exists and functions. They contact employers and attempt to work out problems with informal means. If that fails, then there is a formal complaint process that can go forward in the Department of Labor, which has the responsibility for investigating and resolving any complaints under that statute.

So I would say that I have heard of relatively few instances of problems and I hope that that is a reflection of the actual situation.

URGENCY OF SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

Senator COCHRAN. We are working with our colleagues over on the House side to resolve differences on the supplemental appropriations bill that provides substantial funding for military operations in the global war on terror and particularly with respect to our deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. We hope to complete action on that conference committee work this week, as you suggested in your opening statement. But what difficulty would the Department encounter if we are not able to do that, as we hope we can? Give me something I can pass on to the members of the conference committee as we meet today to try to light a fire under the process?

Secretary RUMSFELD. We checked with the services and the Army estimates that—I guess this is, what April 27. They estimate that around May 5 some of the commands may have to stop hiring and stop ordering supplies and stop awarding contracts until the House-Senate conference has completed their work and the supplemental been dealt with by the President.

The Army has already started slowing some obligations to try to make funds last so that they would not have to do that. Of course, once you start swinging funds around from one activity to another frequently it requires reprogramming, it requires inefficiencies that are unfortunate, that they have to be made up later.

MAINTAINING INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES

Senator COCHRAN. One of the concerns in some of our States is where we have industrial activities relating to shipbuilding or airplane manufacturing or other activities that provide armaments and equipment to the military forces, that in some cases there are substantial cutbacks in projected spending, so that the budgets that had been anticipated for building ships and some of these other activities are not what they are—what they were, they are not what they were expected to be, putting a lot of pressure on the ability of the employers to predict how many people they need to continue working at their shipyards and in other plants.

Do you expect that there would be any change in the requests that we are beginning to hear, cutting back the number of ships that we need in the future or other armaments? How do you expect

we are going to be able to maintain the efficiency in these industrial capabilities in the face of these unexpected cutbacks?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, the Navy has done a great deal of study on the shipbuilding, to take that specifically into account, and they now have some suggestions that are being considered by the Department of Defense and by the Congress, obviously. My anticipation is that they will have clarity and conviction in an appropriate time. The Quadrennial Defense Review also is something that is underway and that enters into this discussion.

But one of the important things I would say is that if we look only at numbers of ships it seems to me that we miss something terribly important. The fact is that when we had a fleet of 485 ships we routinely were able to deploy 102 ships out of 485, and that is because of the way the fleet was managed. Large numbers were constantly under repair, the crews were on leave. The whole process was arranged that way.

Today the fleet size is plus or minus 285 ships. It is low. On the other hand, we are routinely deploying 95 ships out of 285, compared to 102 ships out of 485. So what is really important is what are you able to use, what is the useability of the fleet, not the total number. Clearly, the useability is about the same.

Then the second question is the one I mentioned in my opening remarks, which was what can that ship do or what can that carrier battle group do? It can do three or four times as much as carriers and capabilities 10, 15, 20 years ago. So I think we need to look at capability. I do not deny that presence is important, but the deployability affects the presence issue.

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The chair recognizes our ranking member, Senator Byrd, for 5 minutes.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, General.

One of my constituents, Mrs. Lisa Vance of Morgantown, West Virginia, contacted my office last week. She is the widow of a West Virginia National Guardsman killed in Afghanistan in May 2002. She relates her story of the incredible burdens that she has had to face after her tragic loss. Mrs. Vance has gone through more trouble than any military widow ought to have to bear.

Mrs. Vance reported that paperwork errors nearly cost her \$50,000 in life insurance funds. She has never received the financial counseling to which she is entitled. She received no explanation of the health insurance benefits that she was eligible for immediately after her husband's death. A simple pay issue took 3 years to resolve. Some of the guidance Mrs. Vance received on important matters was based on Army field manuals that were more than 10 years out of date. At one point, her casualty assistance officer retired. No replacement ever arrived to assist her.

The bottom line is that the casualty assistance officers who assist widows do not appear to have adequate training for the incredibly difficult job that they must perform. I do not question the dedication or commitment of the soldiers who must perform this job. There are questions about whether the military is giving these offi-

cers sufficient training to assist grieving widows in their hour of greatest need.

General Myers, how much training is given to casualty assistance officers before they are sent out to care for grieving families?

General MYERS. You know, Senator Byrd, that is an issue that we follow very, very carefully. My suspicion is this is a unit-specific problem where the training either was not done properly or, for whatever reason, the proper leadership was not provided. I do not think this is a problem that is systemic. I will get you the facts for exactly how much assistance, but from the information that I get this is obviously an isolated case and it is a very bad case and nobody should have to go through that.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

The goal of our Casualty Assistance programs is to provide prompt reporting, dignified and humane notification and efficient and compassionate assistance to family members, including a thorough review of the death benefits, compensation and entitlements. We have confirmed that our National Guard casualty assistance officers or representatives receive the same comprehensive training and use the same policies, schoolhouses and syllabi as their active duty counterparts.

The Military Services ensure that personnel assigned casualty assistance or notification responsibilities receive appropriate training. Training is conducted in multiple ways: course of instruction at formal schools; classroom instruction; training videos; video teleconferencing; and distance learning via the Web; review of applicable Service Directives and Instructions; hard copy casualty assistance guides.

Assignment as a casualty assistance officer can be one of the most challenging and emotionally charged duties a Service member will ever assume. Therefore, we train and prepare them as much as possible to perform their mission well. Assistance officers can be assigned from the unit of the deceased, from the parent installation, or from the unit closest to where the family is located. As a result of this dedicated and professional assistance and a genuine desire to assist the families of a fallen brother or sister, we often hear from the families that they consider their Casualty Assistance Officer part of the family.

In those cases where we discover that the assistance provided was less than adequate, immediate actions are taken to address any unresolved issues or problems with the family.

Question. Do members of the National Guard receive the same training as their active duty counterparts?

Answer. Yes. The National Guard receive the same level of training provided to the active force members. When a member of the National Guard becomes a casualty, a trained casualty officer, who may be either active duty or National Guard, nearest to the next-of-kin is assigned to the family.

Question. Have there been any changes to the training for casualty assistance officers based upon the experiences of war widows like Mrs. Vance?

Answer. Yes. To ensure that our policies and programs stay current and address the needs of our Service members and their families, we chair a Joint Casualty Advisory Board that meets three times a year to review, assess, and recommend appropriate changes. Along with the normal attendees at these meetings, the Casualty Heads from each of the Military Services, the Joint Staff, representatives from other Federal agencies such as the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Social Security Administration, and non-profit organizations, we have added family support groups and surviving family members. This partnership approach on policy development, especially involving those who have experienced a loss and received the follow-on assistance, guarantees our program is addressing the required services to meet the needs of our Service members and their families.

Feedback from family members has assisted the Military Services in updating their casualty assistance training programs. Specifically, training improvements have included increased emphasis on providing family members with factual information on their loved one's case without speculation, responding to family member questions in a more timely manner, ensuring family members have a complete understanding of their benefits and entitlements, expediting the return of personal effects, and maximizing the use of chaplain support in the notification and assistance process.

Additionally, family member input has resulted in new policies pertaining to the public release of casualty information, additional resources for bereavement counseling for extended family members, and expedited claims processes from the Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Social Security Administration.

Senator BYRD. Do members of the National Guard receive the same training as their active duty counterparts?

General MYERS. They should, absolutely.

Senator BYRD. Are there adequate numbers of chaplains in the armed forces to comfort the war widows?

General MYERS. I would say for the most part there are, although there is and has been for some time a lack of adequate Catholic priests in the armed forces chaplaincy, as there are a lack of priests in the civilian community. It has been a continuing problem. But I think in other denominations that is not a problem.

Senator BYRD. General Myers, do you feel that there is a need to increase the chaplains to compensate for the strain of overseas deployments, and is there a need for more funding to provide more chaplains for the armed services?

General MYERS. It has not been brought to my attention that that is a shortfall that needs to be addressed, so I cannot answer that question.

[The information follows:]

Upon further analysis, there are chaplain shortages in the Reserve Components (RCs) of the Services. We need to concentrate recruiting efforts so that RCs are properly manned with chaplains to serve the needs of deployed Service members, as well as Service members and families at home. RC chaplain manning expressed as a percentage of the requirement is:

	Percentage Manned
Army National Guard	60
Army Reserve	72
Navy Reserve	84
Air National Guard	89
Air Force Reserve	95

Chaplain retention is very high in all components. The lower manning numbers reflect the challenge in recruiting civilian clergy as chaplains and mirror the challenges that the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are having in recruiting all types of Soldiers. Current initiatives to recruit more RC chaplains include:

1. Developing legislation to provide a seminary tuition loan repayment plan for those who serve 3 years in the Army Reserve or Army National Guard chaplaincies after graduation. If adopted, this legislation would require a funding increase.

2. Increasing recruiting efforts in all components, with recruiters visiting seminaries and attending faith group annual conferences.

3. Increasing efforts to recruit prospective chaplain candidates from Service members with college degrees who are leaving active duty to attend seminary.

With these initiatives in place, and the continued support of Congress, we expect to see an increase in RC chaplains to better support our Service members and their families.

Senator BYRD. Have there been any changes to the training for casualty assistance officers based upon the experiences of war widows like Mrs. Vance?

General MYERS. You bet, because the benefits have changed over time and so that is a program that is continually updated by the services who are responsible for that.

Senator BYRD. How can Congress assure that the widows of troops who were killed in Iraq in recent days will not have the same problems that Mrs. Vance encountered?

General MYERS. Well, it is something we have addressed from the day that we started this war on terrorism and against violent extremism. In an effort to try to do that, we have—to help, if everything else fails, we have an operation called Military One Source that has been set up here, actually I think in Virginia. It is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to provide the kind of assistance that you just mentioned. So if they are not getting the help, if people are not getting the help they need on any question, they have a toll-free telephone number, Internet, and e-mail access, and we will refer the questions to the appropriate authorities and follow up to make sure it gets done.

As you know, also early on we had some questions about the Reserve components' ability to provide the kind of information, not just on casualties, but basic information to the families. This is because in the Reserve component case many of the families are not co-located on a base or a camp or a station or a post, and the Reserve component has really stood up to that requirement and provides excellent, I think, information to the families and the employers, for that matter, of those that are employed.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, General Myers.

SERVICES AND COUNSELING PROVIDED TO SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBERS

Secretary Rumsfeld, are you satisfied with the services and counseling provided to war widows?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator Byrd, any time one hears a story that you have cited about Mrs. Vance, obviously you cannot be satisfied. The points that General Myers made, there are a variety of ways to try to assist people in the event that there is a breakdown in the system. There is frequently breakdowns in any system, as we all know.

One other thing that exists today is an organization called AmericaSupportsYou.mil, where you can go on the Internet and you can find out ways that citizens in communities are helping people who may have difficulties. It is a terrific web site because it shows all the things that are being done around the country to assist people who are connected with the military and to support them as well as to support the troops.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, what are the areas that need improvement and what is being done about it?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, the things that have been done, in addition to what General Myers has cited here, this family support activity, there is for the really injured, there is a separate activity that is designed to assist people who come back with severe injuries of any type and to assist them and their families in that period after they begin to become disconnected from the military in the event that they do disconnect from the military, although I must say there are an increasing number of severely injured people who are staying in the military and being able to continue to serve.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you, Senator. We will come back later, Senator Byrd.

Senator Feinstein is recognized for 5 minutes.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, let me thank you very much for your service to our country. I know the days have been tough and long and I just want you to know that Californians are very grateful and thank you for your service.

F-22 ACQUISITION

I would like to ask two questions on procurement, having to do with the F/A-22 and the C-130J. If I understand the President's budget correctly, it is going to complete the procurement program for the F/A-22 with the production of 179 planes instead of the original 750. It will end the program in 2008 instead of 2011. Are you effectively then truncating this program and completing it by 2008?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, I would describe it slightly differently. Last year's planned purchase of F/A-22s was 277 and that has been brought down to 170 aircraft through 2008. This is a very fine aircraft from everything I can tell. It is still in process, however, and it is very expensive.

As a result, the Quadrennial Defense Review is designed to in this case determine the number of wings, whether a single wing or one and a half wings or two wings might be appropriate. Until that work is done, we will not know whether—what number between 170 and something like 277 might be appropriate.

I think that as we come out of the QDR, where we are looking at other capabilities that relate to air dominance, we ought to have a better idea of what portion of the air dominance role would be played by a F/A-22 from a cost benefit standpoint.

Senator FEINSTEIN. So it is 170 by 2008. Are you figuring the additional aircraft at \$250 million per plane?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The last number I heard was about \$250 million. \$257 million is the latest rounded number.

C-130J ACQUISITION

Senator FEINSTEIN. Now let me ask you about, if I can, the C-130J. You end procurement in 2006. You are going to be 100 short of the original purchase. It is a \$3.5 billion saving; \$1 billion is just in cancellation of the contract—is that true?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I am not certain of that number. I know there has been a good deal of debate about what the cancellation or termination of a multi-year contract would cost and the issue is open. We have said that there is some additional information that has become available subsequent to putting the President's budget to bed and at some point in the weeks ahead we will have better information. To the extent it suggests that any adjustments ought to be made in what we propose, obviously we will come back to the Congress with those proposals.

ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR

Senator FEINSTEIN. I appreciate that.

Now, very smart, Mr. Secretary. You have apparently divided the money for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator between the energy budget and the defense budget, with \$4.5 million in one and \$4 million in the other. As you know, in the energy budget, the funding was deleted last year. So this year you have divided it.

In March, the Secretary of Energy was asked on the House side about how deep he thought the bunkerbuster could go and he said "a couple of tens of meters maybe." He was asked if there was any way to have a bomb that penetrated far enough to trap all fallout, and he said: "I do not believe that. I do not believe the laws of physics will ever permit that."

I asked him that same question when the Energy Appropriations Subcommittee met just a few weeks ago. He said essentially the same thing. It is beyond me as to why you are proceeding with this program when the laws of physics will not allow a missile to be driven deeply enough to retain the fallout which will spew in hundreds of millions of cubic feet if it is at 100 kilotons.

So I am mystified by the fact that the money was deleted last year, but you are back this year and you have split it into two budgets.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator Feinstein, you make a mistake by saying I am very smart by splitting it. I had no idea.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, I figure you figured you have a better chance in this subcommittee than you do in Energy.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Maybe just lucky rather than smart.

Let me just take a minute on the subject. It is an interesting subject. There are some 70 countries that are currently pursuing underground programs. Today dual use equipment that is available anywhere in the world to anybody who wants it can dig in 1 day a distance in solid rock longer than a basketball court and twice as high as the basket, one machine, 1 day, underground in solid rock.

Seventy countries are pursuing activities underground. So the question comes what ought our country to do about that or do we want to think about, study, the idea of having a capability of dealing with that. At the present time we do not have a capability of dealing with that. We cannot go in there and get at things in solid rock underground.

The proposal—the only thing we have is very large, very dirty, big nuclear weapons. So the choice is not do we have—do we want to have nothing and only a large dirty nuclear weapon or would we rather have something in between? That is the issue. It is not the way your question characterized it in my view.

Now, are we proposing a specific weapon? No. We are proposing a study. We are proposing that some work be done, analysis, not nuclear explosion work but a study, to see if we are capable of developing or designing something that would give us the ability to penetrate, not with a large nuclear explosion but penetrate either with a conventional capability or with a very small nuclear capability in the event that the United States of America at some point down the road decided they wanted to undertake that kind of a project.

It seems to me studying it makes all the sense in the world.

General, do you want to comment?

General MYERS. I would make the exact same point. The choice is between targets today that we have weapons assigned against, underground targets, which the only capability we have is a big weapon. What we are looking at and what we have proposed in the study is can some of the smaller weapons be, can the case be hardened enough to get enough penetration to have some impact against these targets without going to the option that nobody likes, which is a more robust, a bigger weapon? And the issue also is, it is a study and it is not to design a new weapon.

Senator FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair.

I would just appreciate a clarification. Are you saying that the 100 kiloton bomb is out, that you are not looking at the development of a 100 kiloton bomb, but it is a low yield bomb?

Secretary RUMSFELD. My understanding is that they are not talking about making any weapon. They are talking about a study that relates particularly to penetration.

General MYERS. And they are looking at specific weapons that are in the inventory and can the case be made hard enough on those particular weapons to get the kind of penetration they think will be effective against these deeply buried and hardened targets.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Specter is recognized for 5 minutes.

Senator FEINSTEIN. My time is up. Thank you.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for your service. Beginning with the base closure issues, Pennsylvania has been very hard hit in the past, characterized by the closing of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, for which we still have not recovered in our State as there was some proliferation of contracts which went out from that installation. I am going to be submitting to you questions for the record and I do not want to ask a question now to take up the time. I want to move on. But I do hope that consideration will be given to the historic import of the bases in Pennsylvania, which of course has been around for a long time as a State. Illustrative of that is the War College, where there is enormous pride in the community Carlisle, Pennsylvania, where it is located. When the President decided where he wanted to go, he went to the War College with great pomp and ceremony, made quite a point that only two Georges as sitting Presidents marched into Carlisle; one was George Washington on a great stallion, a great portrait, and the other was President Bush.

So I would just hope that real consideration would be given to the tradition and the economic factors, where people are biting their nails in Pennsylvania as to what is going to happen next after we have had so many closures.

This afternoon a conference committee will be sitting on the \$81 billion request by the Department of Defense, and it has been broadly supported. We are appreciative of what you are doing, Mr. Secretary, and what you are doing, General, and what the troops are doing, and we are going to back you. But there is a lot of disquiet out there among the people as to what is happening in Iraq and disquiet as to what is happening to our discretionary budget.

I chair a subcommittee which is responsible for education, health care and worker safety and it has been cut by almost a full percent, and with the inflation factor I am about \$7 billion short. That

makes it very, very tough to sell when you have the National Institutes of Health (NIH), health care programs, Pell grants, and education.

The question that I have for you, Mr. Secretary, comes up on the Rand report. It was summarized in the Washington Post and it was highly critical, as is known. This is a report, at least according to the Post, that was prepared for you and that you thought was worthy of careful consideration.

We had the situation with General Shinseki some time ago, who had made a prediction about the number of troops which would be necessary to handle post-Iraq problems, and I will not characterize the response to General Shinseki, but it was not one of approbation as to what happened. But the Rand study, and I will not quote it extensively, criticizes DOD for a lack of political-military coordination and actionable intelligence in dealing with the counter-insurgency campaign.

Well, it is just highly critical. I have a three-part question for you, Mr. Secretary. Was General Shinseki right, number one? Number two, is the Rand report right? Number three, what has been or will be done to meet the questions raised by the Rand report?

NUMBER OF TROOPS FOR IRAQ WAR

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I will start and General Myers may want to comment on it. But I think that the first thing I would say about the troop strength that General Shinseki was asked about in a congressional committee, and his response was that he thought it would take, as I recall—and I am going the paraphrase; I do not have it in front of me. His response after being asked two or three times was that he thought it might take roughly the same number of troops to deal with the country after major combat operation as it would take to prevail in the conflict, and I believe he then said several hundred thousand.

It turned out that General Franks had several hundred thousand ready to go in and he also had a plan that if he decided he did not need them he would have excursions, escape plans, so that they would not go in. We would put in what he believed to be the right number.

General Franks, General Abizaid, General Myers, General Pace proposed the correct number of troops and—correction. They proposed a number of troops. That is the number we went with. That is the number we have in there today. It is perfectly possible for anyone in or out of Government to critique that and say: Gee, I think there ought to be more or there ought to be less. But the fact of the matter is that the military experts on the ground from the beginning have said what they thought the number ought to be.

The tension that they have balanced is this. The more troops you have, the more targets that you have and the more people you might get killed. The more troops you have, the more of an occupying power you are, the heavier footprint, the more force protection you need, the more logistics you need, and the more intrusive you are on the people of that country.

Now, the Soviets had 300,000 people in Afghanistan and they lost, and we had 20,000 or 30,000 people in Afghanistan and it is

coming out pretty darn well. So I must say I am tired of the Shinseki argument being bandied about day after day in the press.

Senator SPECTER. It was not an argument. It was a question.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I understand that. But the fact is that we have done what the generals on the ground believed to be the right thing. I believe they are right and I think that the progress that was made in Afghanistan demonstrates that, and I think the progress being made in Iraq demonstrates that. When the President went around the room and asked if all the chiefs—well, I will let you describe it, General. You were there.

General MYERS. Well, of course before major combat in Iraq the Commander in Chief had all his service chiefs, and as a matter of fact at a separate session all of General Franks' commanders and General Franks, and asked if anybody had any reservations, if they had everything we needed, and if we were ready to go. And everybody gave a thumbs-up on that. So that is how that process worked.

I would say on——

Secretary RUMSFELD. And General Shinseki was there in the room.

General MYERS. Certainly I do not think anybody argues——

Senator SPECTER. And he was silent? Was General Shinseki silent in the face of that question put to him, or in a room where he was present?

General MYERS. I cannot remember. He certainly did not bring up a couple hundred thousand. We were all—all the service chiefs were in total support of General Franks' plan, the numbers that we had planned, all of that. Yes, we were all on board. There was nobody—there were no outliers.

On the other hand, just one more time: General Shinseki was in front of a Senate committee. He was asked a question and he said several times, you know, that is really not my business, I would need to talk to the combatant commander and I have not done that, and when pressed offered a number.

He is an experienced, very experienced Army officer. He had a lot of experience in the Balkans and he gave them a number based on his experience and so forth. I do not think he would ever say that he was prepared to go to the bank with that number. He was providing the number when asked, when asked several times, and it is his right to give that number. We had lots of discussions later on about what is the right number and is the force strength appropriate for the tasks and the mission that we had inside Iraq. In the end we all agreed that the plan—and by the way, the plan was developed over some time in a very iterative fashion between the Commander in Chief, the Secretary of Defense, and the military leadership, and evolved over time. I mean, it changed dramatically from the first time we ever got together with General Franks on this issue, which was before any thought of going into Iraq was actually on the table, until we finally went in. So it was a long process.

I would only comment on the Rand report, I am aware of it. I have not read it. I have read the executive summary. It is in the joint staff, in my case it is in the joint staff, and we are looking at each of those, those pieces.

One of the things that has characterized this effort both in Afghanistan—well, in the last 3½ years, different from previous I think is that we have really paid attention to trying to capture what we have done right and what we have done wrong, the lessons learned process, Senator Specter. It is very aggressive, and when I say aggressive we have people in Iraq today, but we have had them since major combat, that have been participating with the forces there, helping them, but also capturing lessons learned for Joint Forces Command to compile so we can then take action.

So we have I think a very good process on how we capture those and then try to internalize them, put the resources to them and solve the problems. That is what we are all about, and the Rand report will help in that regard. I do not have specific comments on it today.

Secretary RUMSFELD. There is not a month that goes by that we do not look at troop levels in Iraq and troop levels in Afghanistan and ask people what is the right number, what is the best way to use them, what are the advantages and disadvantages of more or less. It is a constant process for us.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Inouye is recognized.

Senator INOUE. Mr. Secretary, we are relying heavily on our National Guard and the Reserves, so much so that some are suggesting that the Reserve component is already broken. Furthermore, it is becoming much more difficult to recruit and retain our ground forces and for the first time in many years the Army and Marine Corps are not meeting their recruiting targets, and there are some who are already discussing the draft.

STATUS OF OUR MILITARY PERSONNEL

In your view, what is the current status of our military personnel, including end strength and recruiting and retention numbers?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, generally retention has been fine in the services. With respect to recruiting, there has not been a problem of recruiting in the Air Force or the Navy. The Army and the marines have missed their targets by relatively small amounts. A couple of reasons for that. One is the targets are up. We are increasing the size of the Army and we are increasing the size of the Marines.

A second reason is because retention of people who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan is high. They are the normal people that would be recruited into the Guard and Reserve and instead many of them are being retained because our troop levels are higher. So we are not surprised that that exists, and as a result we have had to deploy additional recruiters and provide additional incentives and there is some debate within the experts who do this as to whether or not they will meet their goals by the end of the year, the fiscal year.

I do not know if they will or not for the Army or the marines in terms of recruiting, but it certainly looks like they will in retention. They are taking all the appropriate steps to get there.

Second, generally what is the state of the Guard and Reserve? I think the idea that they are broken is not correct. I think they are performing fabulous service overseas. They are getting experi-

ence that has not existed since the Vietnam war, and these individuals have additional training and additional experience and additional capability. I think the only people who could conceivably be talking about a draft are people who are speaking from pinnacles of near-perfect ignorance. The last thing we need is a draft. We just do not. We have got a volunteer Army, a Navy, Marines, an Air Force, and they are doing a fabulous job, and all we have to do is see that we provide the right incentives to attract and retain the people we need, and we will continue to have a superb total force.

General MYERS. If I may just tag on a little bit, let me talk about retention for just a minute. As the Secretary said, retention is exceeding all goals. It is particularly high in the Reserve component units that have been mobilized and deployed. That tells you something right there. It tells you that these folks are proud to serve, they understand the mission, they are willing to serve.

That retention, both in the Active component, particularly in the Active component, where it is high as well, that hurts our recruiting for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. It continues to be a problem because they rely on those folks that are getting out of the Army to come on to Reserve duty, at a time when the active Army is building up to 30,000 additional end strength. So the recruiting goal this year is huge. I think it is 80,000 or in that realm.

The Marine Corps has missed its recruiting goals in January, February, March, but the numbers, particularly in March, are very small. We will have to see what additional recruiters, what additional incentives do to correct that. I hope it turns around.

I hope the moms and dads and the aunts and the uncles and the grandparents in this country understand that this is a Nation at war, that the stakes are extremely high. Just transport yourself back to the days and weeks following September 11, 2001, and reflect on the uncertainty that was in all our minds. And another event like that would have serious consequences for this country, of course, and it would put at stake our way of life. So this is noble business that our service men and women are doing in Iraq, Afghanistan, Djibouti, around the world, and we need the encouragement from the moms and dads and the aunts and uncles and the rest of the folks out there to encourage the young men and women of this country to sign up for this noble cause, which I think will have a huge impact on the outcome of our future and our way of life.

STRESS ON THE FORCE

Secretary RUMSFELD. If I could just add, Senator, there is stress on the force. However, we have only activated out of the Guard and Reserve about 40 percent. The problem is not that we have got too few. The problem is that we are so badly organized and have been for decades. We have the wrong skill sets on active duty relative to the Guard and Reserve. We need to get some of those skill sets out of the Guard and Reserve, onto active duty, so we do not have to overuse a small fraction of the Guard and Reserve.

We also have to rebalance within the active force and the Guard and Reserve so that we have the best skill sets, more of skill sets that are more likely to be needed. That is just something that is

going forward. We are already doing a great deal of that. Pete Schoomaker and Fran Harvey have done a lot to do that and it has been very helpful.

One other thing we are doing, thanks to the National Security Personnel System, is we are going to be able to do a better job of getting military people out of civilian jobs. There may be 200,000, 300,000 military people out of 1.4 million active duty that are doing jobs that can be done by civilians or contractors.

So there are plenty of ways to reduce stress on the force just by good management practices, which we are hard at.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, sir.

C-130J ACQUISITION

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Secretary, I think you have commented that there has been additional information received about the C-130J since the President's budget was submitted. I am not asking you a question, but I just encourage you to give us a supplemental if you possibly can, because clearly that amendment is going to come on the floor. If it is not covered by the budget, we are going to run into problems as far as stretching, taking something out to make room for that C-130J amount.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I see.

PROCUREMENT OF PLANNED NEW SYSTEMS

Senator STEVENS. Let me ask you this. According to the plans we have seen, Department of Defense procurement accounts will grow about 50 percent from \$70 billion to \$118 billion from this fiscal year to the 2011 timeframe. Even with such growth, it looks like the Department's ability to field many new systems that are in development or initial development, initial procurement—F-22, Joint Strike Fighter, DD(X), the Littoral combat ship, the Future Combat System, space satellites, a whole series of things, to name them.

What is going to be the ability to continue on those systems with that type of projection of the procurement accounts?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, that is a question, Senator, Mr. Chairman, that we all wrestle with. It has been one that has been around as long as I have been connected with the Defense Department, is the so-called bow wave problem. What happens is that a lot of things get started and that one then looks out and says, well, once you start into development, as opposed to research and the early stages, the costs go up. Therefore, you have to manage that so that you have an ability to cope with whatever needs to be procured in those out-years.

But for a variety of reasons, some things disappear, some things do not work, sometimes needs change and tough choices get made. We made tough choices in this budget. Four years ago we made tough budget choices when we looked at the bow wave problem. You are quite right, I see a bow wave looming now, procurement bow wave looming. But on the other hand, I have a feeling that it will be like every other time: When the going gets tough, people make tough decisions, and that is the way it has to be.

COST AND IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES

Senator STEVENS. Well, in the general economy the progression is such that the next generation of technology is usually less costly and more efficient than its predecessor. In terms of defense procurement, it seems that we continue to grow in terms of costs notwithstanding the differences in size, et cetera. Is anyone examining into that? Why can we not get more technology development that is related to costs?

Secretary RUMSFELD. A couple of thoughts. Time is money and you are quite right, 25 years ago when I was Secretary of Defense the length of time to acquire a weapon system was about half of what it is today. This is during a period in the last 25, 30 years where technology has sped up, it has accelerated rather than decelerated.

So something is wrong with the system. We are going to have a very serious look at the acquisition process in the Quadrennial Defense Review period. Gordon England, who just shortly I believe will be confirmed by the Senate and sworn in, will be the person who will be deeply involved in that.

I would say one other thing, however. If a ship costs twice as much but it is three times as capable, then one has to say, what have we got? Well, we have got something that is more valuable at a higher cost, but on a cost-benefit basis it is improved as opposed to deteriorated. A smart bomb may cost what a precision bomb costs or somewhat less, but you have to drop 10 dumb bombs to equal one smart bomb, the lethality of one smart bomb.

So apples-to-apples comparisons it seems to me do not quite work necessarily. But we do have that problem and it is something we are concerned about and it is something we are addressing.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

General Myers, we are all worried about retention throughout the services. What is your feeling about retention as we come through this period we are in now? Do we need additional incentives to retention and enlistment?

General MYERS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think we have some pretty good incentives in place and, as I said earlier in response to Senator Inouye's question, retention right now is very good in all the services. If you look at the statistics, you may think the Air Force and the Navy retention is down a little bit, but that is programmed because both of those forces, the Air Force and the Navy, are shrinking and so they do not want to retain as many people.

But for the Army, the Army active, the Army Reserve component, for the Marine Corps and Reserves, retention actually is very, very good. So I guess my quick analysis would be that we have got the incentives about right.

I would like to tag on just a little bit more about the Reserve component. This is an extremely important part of our military capability and our national security. So whatever we do, the incentives and so forth, recruiting and retention in that component, we have got to do it right because this is a great way for the military, the volunteer military, to connect to America.

If you look at a map of America and you look at all the Guard and Reserve locations, some of them pretty small admittedly, it is

a great way to connect to the American people, to the employers out there, to family and friends. I think it is extremely important and wanted to mention that, Senator. This is not a capability, while it is being used pretty hard in terms of personnel tempo and operational tempo, that we ought to fritter away. We ought to take very good care of it.

In our retention money, I think—and this is the fiscal year 2006 budget—we have got almost \$1 billion in retention items for selected reenlistment bonuses and Reserve component health care, educational benefits, enlisted supervisory retention pay, critical pay for our special operators, who are in big demand now by contractors in Iraq or Afghanistan or other places in the world, tuition assistance, almost \$900 million, almost \$1 billion in retention items there that will help.

I was in Kabul about 6 or 7 weeks ago. I got to reenlist I think at one time 29 people out of an Army National Guard unit from Indiana. It was, first, a great privilege—that was the day I was there. I think the week before they reenlisted something like 200. So once we can get them in the door we are keeping them, because they are fulfilled by the mission that they are performing.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Cochran, do you have any further questions?

Senator COCHRAN. No further questions.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Byrd, do you have any further questions?

PAY AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS

Senator BYRD. Thank you, yes. Thank you.

In January of this year members of the 201st Field Artillery Battalion of the West Virginia National Guard contacted me from Iraq with a serious pay problem. Last year the Government Accountability Office reported that members of the 19th Special Forces Group of the West Virginia National Guard came under enemy fire during a trip from Afghanistan to Qatar to fix the rampant pay problems in that unit.

Secretary Rumsfeld, I understand that the accounting system used to process pay for reservists in other military services do not have the same problems as those for the National Guard. Why do these problems persist with the National Guard, and when will they be fixed? Why cannot the Department of Defense get rid of the accounting systems that do not work for the National Guard and simply adopt the computer systems that pay other troops fairly and accurately?

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is exactly the question I ask in the Department frequently. As you know as well as I do, Senator, the services have their own systems in large measure and the Guard and Reserve systems have tended to be different from the active duty systems. It was a result of the departments growing up as separate entities and their policies were different and their approaches were different and their systems were different. Some of them used a shoe box with three by five cards, some used a shoe box with five by seven cards, I guess. The net result was that you have problems.

Now, we are testing and deploying a forward-compatible pay modern integrated pay system, I am told. The end state should be a fully integrated pay and personnel system for the Department of Defense. I do not know when that end point is. Tina, do you?

Ms. JONAS. We are beginning to deploy that system this year. We have some testing issues with it, but we are beginning to deploy that.

Also, the defense integrated military human resource system (DIMHRS) program, which I am sure you are aware of, Senator, is another key program which will be coming on line in 2006.

Senator BYRD. Well, does Congress need to step in with legislation to fix this problem? How long do you think it will take for the Pentagon to address these pay problems once and for all?

Ms. JONAS. Sir, the Congress has been extremely helpful with respect to the funding. The DIMHRS program in particular has been of great interest to us and the Congress has been very generous in that regard. We appreciate your help on that.

PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR U.S. TROOPS

Senator BYRD. Last week the Dallas Morning News carried an article about the need for special bulletproof shorts to protect the legs of troops while traveling in vehicles in Iraq. Although Congress has provided additional funds for bulletproof vests for all troops in combat zones, the large number of roadside bombs in Iraq are known to cause deadly injuries to the legs of soldiers. The article reports that the marines have developed a low-cost set of bulletproof leggings, but the Army, which has the bulk of the troops in Iraq, is insisting on buying its own version of this protective gear which costs \$9,400 a set, requires special air-conditioning technology, and weighs 38 pounds.

Secretary Rumsfeld, we now know that our troops did not have enough bulletproof vests to protect them in the early stages of the occupation of Iraq. What are we doing to accelerate the schedule to get this type of protective equipment out to our troops?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator Byrd, we have got some charts here. I do not know if we want to bother to put them up. But the Department has looked at the requests from the combatant commanders as to what they believed were needed by way of capabilities and equipment. The job of the combatant commander is to look at what he has, ask for what he needs, but in the meantime adapt tactics, techniques, and procedures so that he can protect his troops. He has the obligation of seeing that they can perform their mission and simultaneously that they are managed and deployed used in a way that is respectful of the value that they are to our society.

That is what they are doing, and they have had an up-ramp, for example, in up-armored Humvees. That is the chart on the small arms protective inserts. As you can see, production has gone from December 2002, where the production rates were 40,000, up to production rates at very high levels, up in the high 400,000s.

So they have responded very rapidly and very successfully. But the important thing is, for the lives of the troops, that between the time that they need something and the time they get it—and that changes because the enemy has a brain. The enemy, for example

with respect to explosive devices, may use one frequency and you get a jammer that will stop that, and they will change frequencies and they will use a different technique. They will use a telephone technique or a garage door opener or something.

So you have to keep adapting continuously, and that shows the rate at which the adaptation took place, which is quite impressive.

Senator BYRD. Well, are there additional funds included in the supplemental appropriation bills or your regular appropriation request to provide for new types of bulletproof armor to protect our troops in Iraq? If so, how many sets of bulletproof leggings or similar equipment will be provided to our troops and when will they receive this equipment?

General MYERS. Senator Byrd, the answer to your question is yes, there is funding. There is an effort ongoing in the armed services to continually improve the garments they wear. A couple of the improvements are to make them better against a more serious threat. I do not want to get into the classified here, but a more serious threat. And also to make them lighter, because obviously the troops in many cases, in most cases, have to move around in this gear as well.

So that is ongoing. There is money in both budgets to help do that. They are fielding advance sets as the technology becomes available for the current vests. We see some inserts; there are some new inserts being developed that are being fielded as we speak and they are producing tens of thousands of these to go into theater.

But this is a continuing process and in both budgets there is adequate money for this effort. On the leggings, I have not heard that. I will personally look into that issue. I had not heard that before. I will go look at it.

Senator BYRD. I thank you.

I think that chart is about bulletproof vests.

Senator STEVENS. Senator, Senator Shelby is here. Could we go to him and we will come back to you again, sir.

Senator BYRD. I just have one more question and you will be through with me.

PROTECTING TROOPS FROM ROADSIDE BOMBS

What specifically needs to be done to protect the legs of our troops from roadside bombs?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I will start and Dick can pick it up. It seems to me the first and most important thing is what is being done, and that is to, to the extent possible, not have vehicles out operating without appropriate armor in areas outside of protected compounds. So the first thing would be, if you had too little armor to protect those vehicles, you would not use those vehicles outside of a compound. You would find different ways to do it. You use air-lift or you would have different supply centers, or you would use contractors. There are a variety of things that people can do to change their tactics and their techniques and their approaches.

Today we now have a situation where only occasionally would there be a U.S. vehicle with U.S. military people in it outside of a protected compound that did not have an appropriate level of armor.

Now, the problem with armor, what does it mean, appropriate level? We have seen M-1 tanks that have been totally destroyed. So armor is not necessarily going to protect somebody. If you have a protective insert and body armor and then you get an armor-piercing shell, for example, it is going to go through it. There is no protection that is perfect and 100 percent and all the time everywhere, and that is just the reality of it.

Senator BYRD. That is a given. We all understand that.

Thank you.

General MYERS. I would just like to go back to the point, because you asked the question what can we do. The part that plays the biggest role here, besides the vehicles and the personal protection, it is the tactics that the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and the officers devise and their reaction to the enemy as they change their tactics.

So technology can help. You can do things with body armor, with armored vehicles. But in the end the biggest thing we can do is make sure we have smart, well trained, educated, informed, good intelligence, so troops out there that can address this threat.

You asked the question earlier. Let me just fill in the blank here a little bit. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2004 we have spent \$5.5 billion on force protection efforts and we plan on spending another \$3.3 billion in fiscal year 2005. Interestingly enough, in the supplemental there is \$2.7 billion in force protection efforts, which is just another reason we need to get the supplemental as soon as possible. That money will not get spent until we get it.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I hope we will be sure that we are providing enough money for this, and I hope that we will take every step possible to see that this equipment is provided as soon as possible.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you, Senator.

CANCELLATION OF JOINT COMMON MISSILE

Senator Shelby is recognized.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, welcome again. Everybody has welcomed you, but we appreciate what you are doing, the challenge you have, and we are here to do what we can to help you in that regard.

The joint common missile, if I could get into that just a minute. The joint common missile was proposed for termination in Presidential Budget Decision 753. Eight months, Mr. Chairman, into phase one of system design and development, the joint common missile, a remarkably healthy, low-risk program, on schedule, on budget—think of that, on budget—and successfully demonstrating important new capabilities for the warfighter.

Cancelling the joint common missile, I believe, ignores the opinion of our top military leaders and deprives our service members of a new capability, Mr. Secretary, that they believe they need to survive against future threats. Further, the joint common missile meets joint service requirements and fills a critical capabilities gap that cannot be met by upgrading existing weapons systems.

An example: The joint common missile—I know you both know this—has twice the standoff range of the Hellfire, Longbow, and

Maverick missiles it will replace on Army, Navy, Marine aircraft. The accuracy of its trimode seeker would give our Air Force—give our forces precision strike lethality to eliminate threats that are located near noncombatants.

That is why the top-ranking officers in all three services that have requested the joint common missile—the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps—all believe that the program must be restored.

What is the justification, other than trying to save some short-term money, for proposing eliminating this? I think it is a mistake. I think a lot of people think it would be a big mistake.

General MYERS. Senator Shelby, the reason that our advice to the Secretary was to cancel this particular program was that it had been in development for a long period of time and they actually have—they have a very ambitious goal, as you know, of a seeker that has I think three different technologies in it, three different—it is a trimode, three modes of acquiring the target. Designing that seeker was certainly high technical risk.

With the inventory of Hellfires and Maverick missiles over 35,000, we have other ways of doing the job. So it was thought this program, let us terminate this program. The requirement does not go away. The requirement recycles back down to our capabilities requirements system, and we will look at the requirement and maybe back off some of the features we want in this missile. But it was technically having some difficulties and that is why we joined in.

Senator SHELBY. Well, we have been told recently that they have been jumping over all the barriers, that everything was working well; it was, as I said, under budget and the program was moving very fast. This is in the last few days.

General MYERS. The information we had back in December when these decisions were made is that there was cost growth, schedule creep, and high technical risk in the seeker, and that is why it was—I have not reviewed it here—

Senator SHELBY. We would like to further talk with you and the Secretary. A lot of us, about this, not just myself, but a lot of us believe that it would be a big, big mistake to cancel this very promising, very on-budget, on-time joint common missile. So we will get back with both of you on this, and that will ultimately be a decision of the committee anyway.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I have today. Thank you.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Inouye.

Senator INOUE. Mr. Chairman, I just have a statement I would like to make.

Mr. Secretary, as part of your global posture review you will be repositioning forces around the world. In the Asia Pacific region you will be moving forces out of Korea and possibly moving some marines out of Okinawa. As you know, our Asian neighbors, both friends and potential adversaries, are very sensitive to changes in the U.S. military posture and management structures which govern these forces.

In that light, I was disturbed to learn that the Navy is contemplating changes to its management structure for the Pacific fleet separate from your global posture review. Considering all the other

changes that are underway in the region, I would hope that you would not support any changes to the operational or administrative control or other management functions of the Pacific fleet.

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Secretary, that is a request, but I would state this, that Senator Inouye and I have made a practice of traveling to the Pacific now for over 30 years. Every time we go to a foreign country we ask the same question of a new generation of people involved in the operation. We literally have been doing this now for more than 30 years. We ask them: What do you think about the presence of the United States in the Pacific? Do you think we should reduce it or should we increase it?

I think I cannot remember one single country, including China, who ever said anything to us about reducing the forces in the Pacific. We are the stabilizing force in the Pacific. So I emphasize his question or his statement.

COMPLETION OF QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

Let me ask you one last question. I did promise we would be out of here by 12:30. Will the QDR be completed in time for the President to take it into account in terms of the 2007 budget request?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The QDR of course is an activity that is made up of many parts and the answer is that there is no question but that we will be informed as we go through the QDR process this year in ways that will in fact affect the fiscal year 2007 budget. There may very well be pieces of it that we would assign for further study and that would not be at a stage of completion that would enable us to be informed by the outcomes for the 2007, in which case they would very likely affect 2008 or later. But a lot of it will be.

Senator STEVENS. Well, again, I think we can remember times when the QDR came to us at a time that we already had the President's request and it certainly confused the subject of defense before this subcommittee. So whatever we can do to get the information that pertains to the appropriations request before the 2007 budget is received I think would be very helpful here, very helpful.

Secretary RUMSFELD. We will certainly try to do that. You are quite right, it is a distraction to send up a budget and then be asked by Congress to do a Quadrennial Defense Review simultaneously and begin that process and have it reveal things that lead you to a different conclusion, and I can well understand the layering effect and the distraction it causes and we will try to do our best.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

Well, again, gentlemen and Ms. Jonas, we thank you very much for your testimony. I want to make this statement to you. I have made it to you privately and others may not agree with me. But I have been privileged to be at meetings, Mr. Secretary, that you have had with the Joint Chiefs. I have never seen such a relationship between the chiefs and the Secretary—open discussion, open critique, and really a give and take that was very, very, really I think very helpful and very healthy as far as the Department is concerned.

You obviously, Mr. Secretary, had a previous iteration as Secretary, so there has never been a Secretary that had more background than you have.

But I will say this to General Myers. I have been a devotee of General Eisenhower since World War II and had the privilege of serving under him. As I have told you personally and I would like to say publicly now, you come as close to Ike as any general I have ever known. So we thank you very much for your service and we will look forward to being with you whatever you do.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

There will be questions submitted for the record, Mr. Secretary. I failed to notify that, but that is common practice.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER

Question. As Chairman of the Senate Depot Caucus, I am a strong advocate for maintaining a viable organic depot maintenance capability within the Department of Defense. I would like to note that the Government Accountability Office has criticized the Defense Department for failing to develop a long-term strategic plan for the military depots. What is your long-term strategic plan for this dedicated group of highly skilled civilian workers who have served you and our warfighters so well in peacetime and in war?

Answer. The Department is engaged in a multiple-year transformation of its organizations and doctrine to better focus force structure and resources on the national security challenges of the 21st century. An integral part of this activity is an ongoing analysis of options for transforming DOD's support infrastructure to become more agile and responsive. As such, DOD's long-term strategy for providing depot maintenance is still evolving, and is guided by the following:

- Depot maintenance mission. Sustain the operating forces with responsive depot-level maintenance, repair, and technical support—worldwide.
- Depot maintenance vision. Agile depot maintenance capabilities that are fully integrated into a warfighter-focused sustainment enterprise, supporting the full spectrum of operational environments.

Question. It has been reported that the Army will spend \$7 billion this year to repair and replace equipment returning from Iraq. Depots have doubled their workforce and are working around the clock and still we hear reports of vehicles lacking significant armor. If the war ended today, it is estimated that it would take all of our depots two years, at full capacity, to restore all the equipment used in Iraq. Considering that some of these vehicles are being run at six times the normal rate and that we will be maintaining a significant presence in Iraq for some time to come, how will this impact your recommendation on the future of our depots to the BRAC Commission?

Answer. Our BRAC analysis of the organic depot maintenance infrastructure was reviewed by a joint group with representatives from all Services. Existing and projected workload levels as well as the anticipated requirements of the 2025 force structure were considered. Military value, coupled with the capacity analysis formed the basis for our recommendations.

Question. You are driving the Defense Department's transformation from an industrial age military organization to a 21st century information age force focused around the advanced sensors and communication systems that are Tobyhanna's expertise. The support of these systems matches Tobyhanna's mission perfectly and thus it seems natural that Tobyhanna should conduct the depot support for these advanced systems.

What steps have been taken to ensure Tobyhanna has the skills, facilities, and latest technology to support the maintenance and logistical requirements of the future weapons systems that you so strongly advocate?

Answer. We have taken a number of steps to assure that Tobyhanna Army Depot has what it takes to support current and future weapon systems in their areas of

expertise. Preparing the depot for a new weapon system starts early in the acquisition of the that system with the Core Depot Analysis, performed in compliance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 2464. This analysis determines the depot maintenance that must be performed on a weapon system in order to fully support the most intense of the war scenarios planned for by the Joint Chiefs. The depot that performs that work must then be equipped, the employees fully trained, and any necessary facilities prepared to take on that maintenance. We have established a process in which the program manager works with the depot and its parent command to assure that this analysis is complete and that the budgets for the weapon system reflect any requirements to purchase equipment and build or upgrade facilities to perform the new workload. In the past, this was somewhat difficult because the program managers operated independently—not in the same chain of command as the depot. We are now establishing Life Cycle Management Commands (LCMC) which merge the staffs of the Program Executive Officers (for whom the program managers work) and the commodity commands (for whom the depots work), giving us seamless control over the development of a new weapon system and the establishment of its support structure. Tobyhanna's parent LCMC, the Communications-Electronics LCMC, was the first "out-of-the-box" of these centers. In addition to the steps taken with each specific weapon system, we have well-established programs in the depot to keep the facilities and equipment up-to-date by investing the depot's own capital, and to train the workforce for each weapon system supported—including training provided at the equipment manufacturer.

Question. Letterkenny Army Depot is the number one provider of tactical missile system support to the Department of Defense. Our military arsenal has several hundred thousand aging, deteriorating missiles. Demilitarization for these missiles requires disassembly and open burning or detonation. Letterkenny is the major storage site for tactical missiles on the East Coast and could offer safer, environmentally sound technology to recover, recycle, and reuse (R³) these missile components. However, there is no consolidated program to research and operate a large scale, environmentally friendly demilitarization program for tactical missiles.

In May of 2003, I proposed to you the establishment of a Center of Technical Excellence (CTX) for missile demilitarization be created at Letterkenny Army Depot. There was \$1.75 million in the fiscal year 2004 budget to initiate a pilot program for MLRS recycle/reuse at Letterkenny. There was no funding for this initiative in fiscal year 2005 budget. I am again proposing a CTX for missile demilitarization/R³ be created at Letterkenny Army Depot. I would like your input on this proposal.

Answer. Letterkenny Munitions Center (LEMC) is currently working with Defense Ammunition Center (DAC) and Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) to develop a resource recovery and recycling (R³) capability for missiles. In fiscal year 2004, DAC received \$1.75 million to start this process. A team was formed utilizing personnel from DAC, AMRDEC and LEMC to look at the 21 different missile systems stored at LEMC, to include MLRS. We are leveraging the process at Anniston Defense Munitions Center (ADMC) for the TOW missile R³. This initial funding is being used to develop Technology Trees to determine all of the hazardous components in each missile and the technology possibilities for each. It is also being used to develop methods and equipment for removing explosives from 4 different warheads, and to prepare a building at LEMC for the warhead equipment. The initial \$1.75 million is enough only to start the process. We believe the amount required will be at least \$10 million over the next two years and more as newer technology becomes available.

Question. Tobyhanna, Letterkenny and the entire organic industrial base have responded magnificently in supporting the GWOT, especially operations in Iraq. This performance reinforces my belief that we must maintain a strong, public sector capability to meet the logistics needs of our Warfighters. Do you share that belief, and, if so, how will you ensure we retain that capability during BRAC 2005. Specifically, what is the Defense Department doing, through BRAC and in other transformational planning, to ensure that DOD retains a robust, efficient, well-trained and well-equipped public depot maintenance structure for the challenges of the present and future?

Answer. I do share your assessment of the performance our organic industrial base. Our BRAC analysis of the organic depot maintenance infrastructure was reviewed by a joint group with representatives from all Services. Existing and projected workload levels as well as the anticipated requirements of the 2025 force structure were considered. Military value, coupled with the capacity analysis formed the basis for our recommendations. Our recommendations retain the essential capabilities of the Departments' organic industrial base.

Question. How will the Department ensure that the BRAC recommendations comply with the national defense mandates of Title 10, namely Sections 2464 and 2466, which ensure a ready source of depot maintenance?

Answer. Our depot-related BRAC recommendations are consistent with the mandates prescribed by Title 10. Existing workloads, workloads necessary to sustain core capabilities and projected requirements associated with the 2025 force structure were all considered in our analysis and subsequent recommendations.

Question. Does the Department intend to privatize its depots and other maintenance facilities?

Answer. No. The Department is committed to maintaining depot maintenance core capabilities and other related maintenance capabilities in Government-owned and operated facilities using Government equipment and personnel to assure effective and responsive maintenance support for DOD operations.

Question. The 193rd SOW is one of the largest units in the Air National Guard with 1,700 military personnel. The 193rd conducts psychological operations and civil affairs broadcast missions and is the only Air National Guard unit assigned to Special Operations Command and the only unit in the military that conducts this mission. The ongoing quest to equip the 193 Special Ops Wing with its last two C-130J models continues. The original plan, which began five years ago, called for replacing eight older models with eight new J models but the USAF keeps postponing the procurement of the last two planes leaving the 193rd with the six planes. What is the timeline for delivery of the final two C-130Js to the 193rd SOW?

Answer. The United States Special Operations Command's requirement is for a total of six EC-130Js at Harrisburg. To assist the 193rd SOW with training requirements, the Air Force will provide one additional C-130J (aircraft number seven) in September 2005. The number seven C-130J aircraft has already been delivered to the USAF and will be transferred from another station to the 193rd SOW.

Question. I am concerned about the Defense Department's diminishing support for Guard counterdrug programs and the related funds it needs. The Guard is one of the best vehicles for doing this mission because they are in the communities served, and have existing networks with law enforcement and other first responders. Our civilian law enforcement will be seriously degraded without the Guard counterdrug programs. What is your position on the Guard's counterdrug mission and do you have any plans to enhance or decrease their role?

Answer. The NG fulfills a vital role in performing CN operations. The Guard is also a major contributor in the on-going War on Terrorism, a major priority that has challenged both active and reserve components. The Department must carefully balance the ability of the NG to support both missions. The Department agrees that the NG can provide military unique services in support of CNs operations.

In 2003, the Department conducted a comprehensive review of its 129 counterdrug programs to transform DOD's CNs Activities in a post 9/11 environment. In certain cases, in order to relieve stress on our Title 10 forces, we increased the levels of effort and type of support (air/ground reconnaissance, intelligence analysts, and training for LEAs) that we wanted the NG to provide. In cases where the NG was providing support that Federal, state and local law enforcement ought to be doing on their own (i.e. missions that were not military unique), we recommended that those activities be transferred or terminated. For example, the U.S. Customs Service stated that they would be able to "effectively discharge" its cargo/mail inspection duties without support from the NG.

The support that DOD provides should not only complement domestic law enforcement, but should also enhance unit readiness.

Question. Will you please provide the Department of Defense's efforts to armor vehicles from all services? I would appreciate current statistics on the status of the armoring of vehicles, including specific levels of armor, and a timeline detailing the efforts and challenges the Department faces in achieving this requirement.

Answer. The Department is on track to meet CENTCOM (Level I and II) armor vehicle requirements by September 2005. Our biggest challenge is to keep pacing items for the Level I and II application on schedule.

As of May 27:

Level I (Up Armored Humvees)—8,279 completed of 10,577 required;

Level II (Steel and Ballistic Glass)—22,242 completed of 29,974 required; and

Level III (Steel only)—11,378 completed.

The Marine Corps achieved the Level I/II goal in August 2004. Army is on track to achieve this objective by September 2005. Air Force vehicles are level I and II, and Navy uses non-tactical vehicles for on-base use only.

Question. The Naval Foundry and Propeller Center at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard Detachment-Philadelphia has been in existence for more than 85 years and is the

Navy's only remaining propeller foundry. Are there any plans to privatize this mission?

Answer. No privatization initiatives are currently planned. Any initiative to privatize an organic depot capability could possibly require a DOD request for Congressional amendment of 10 U.S.C. 2464 (core depot capability requirement) or 10 U.S.C. 2466 (50–50 law) to prevent non-compliance with Title 10 requirements.

Question. The Army War College at Carlisle Barracks has a long and distinguished history. One of the key aspects of having the College in close proximity to Washington, D.C. is the ability for the AWC to draw upon the expertise of high ranking leaders to lecture and meet with tomorrow's military leaders. Do you agree that the student experience of having access to these leaders is an invaluable component of their educational experience?

Answer. The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) must be close enough to the National Capital Region (NCR) to both support and influence the Army Staff. USAWC support to organizations inside NCR has expanded to include: CSA, HQDA, Joint Staff, DOD agencies, Inter-Agency communities (DOS, DHS, DOJ). The close proximity to the NCR facilitates access to: key national and international policy makers, senior military leaders, director level personnel from OSD, JS, ARSTAF, Inter-Agency environment, governmental, military, and private think tanks, and the Defense intellectual community in the "Northeast Corridor". The current location supports curriculum IAW Congressional intent and JPME—USAWC curriculum focuses on national military strategy. USAWC curriculum, therefore, addresses the nexus between national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy and campaigning which is directly linked to the activities within the National Capital Region. Recent increases in U.S. military interaction with interagency organizations reinforces the need for proximity to National Capital Region. The current location allows for access for academic trips to interagency bodies, think tanks, and corporate locations, it is a transportation hub that facilitates speakers, support, and coordination efforts, it allows for continuity of operations and faculty recruitment and retention. Carlisle, Pennsylvania promotes Army well-being and quality of life: Carlisle area rated second least stressful metropolitan area in America. [Sperling's Best Places]; Lower cost of living eases recruitment and retention; provides access to the U.S. Army Heritage & Education Center (AHEC), the Army Physical Fitness Research Institute (APFRI), the Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), personnel for core and elective curricula faculty. USAWC offers a comprehensive professional and personal program in an overall environment that encourages students to study and confer; it provides a "community of senior leaders" that fosters free exchange of ideas without distractions of other competing activities. Since 1973, 15 separate studies examined location or command arrangements of the USAWC and have supported retaining USAWC at Carlisle Barracks.

Question. The Naval Support Activity in Philadelphia, and specifically the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP) and DLA missions, play a critical role in supporting our forces. Would privatizing or moving these individuals and missions disrupt the flow of supplies and harm our warfighters?

Answer. Ensuring the uninterrupted and seamless flow of supplies from America's industrial base to our warfighters is at the heart of the Defense Logistics Agency's mission and our unwavering first priority.

The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP), a tenant of the Naval Support Activity Philadelphia, plays a vital role in execution of this vital mission. DSCP has been a leader in innovative approaches to providing outstanding support in an efficient manner.

As to privatization, or competitive sourcing, under OMB Circular A-76, the Agency retains responsibility for the function. The OMB Circular A-76 contains guidance to determine whether a function is commercial in nature as opposed to inherently governmental. Only those that are commercial in nature can be subjected to public-private competition. The premise of, and our experience with, A-76 is that employee status of the service provider should be transparent to the customer. Once it has been decided to subject a function to A-76, the procedures of the Circular are implemented to ensure that the selected service provider's performance proposal meets the requirements of the warfighter as outlined in the performance work statement, demonstrating its capability to take on and continue the mission. Past DLA performance work statements have included specific requirements concerning the transition from Government performance to either implementation of the Government Most Efficient Organization (MEO) or contractor performance. These requirements are designed to deliver a seamless transition of responsibility. The performance work statements also have acceptable performance level standards that the selected service provider is required to meet throughout the performance period.

There are no current plans to move DSCP, however if a decision were made to move DSCP, the agency would take all necessary measures to ensure the transition is executed with the absolute minimum amount of impact on the warfighter. As we know from experience, some personnel working in the four supply chains currently managed by DSCP would not transition and this experience and expertise would be quickly reconstituted in the new location.

Question. Since we are experiencing severe reserve component retention and recruiting shortfalls at this time, how important is the maintenance of joint service footprints near major population centers in recruitment and retention?

Answer. Maintenance of the Department's footprint is a priority. We continue to aggressively model the infrastructure to assure best industry practices are applied to our facilities. The current 67 year recapitalization rate metric and the 93 percent sustainment rate assure the proper funding is in place to maintain this joint Service footprint.

Question. Can you describe the domestic homeland security mission requirements of our forces? Are these missions joint in nature? How has the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security coordinated its efforts and funds?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) augments the resources and capabilities of domestic civil authorities when their resources have been overwhelmed or DOD can provide a unique capability. The Department of Defense is in support of civil authorities. Therefore, requirements are determined by other Federal agencies and are situation specific.

The Commanders of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) are responsible for supporting civil authorities once requests have been approved by the Secretary of Defense. USNORTHCOM has two tasks forces, Joint Task Force Civil Support and Joint Task Force North that provide command and control of forces in its area of responsibility. USPACOM utilizes Joint Task Force Homeland Defense to provide command and control with their area of responsibility.

Support provided by DOD's U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the exception. USACE responds to civil authorities under Public Law and the National Response Plan. In accordance with the National Response Plan, USACE is the Primary Agency for Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works and Engineering. Funding for USACE missions are part of their operating budget or may be reimbursable under the Stafford or Economy Act depending on the mission requirement.

A difference of note between Homeland Security and Homeland Defense is simply that in a Homeland Defense mission, DOD will be the lead (as opposed to Defense Support to Civil Authorities where typically a DHS agency will lead).

Homeland Defense is broken down into domains. The defense domains consists of air, land and maritime. Current Homeland Defense mission requirements are no different than standard warfighting requirements, except that they are oriented more towards protection vice attacking for offensive operations. Some current Homeland Defense missions are the Air Patrols over the National Capitol Region flown by the Air National Guard in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE and Quick Reaction Forces on stand-by for domestic deployment.

Question. Are these missions joint in nature?

Answer. All domestic missions are joint in nature. Once a requirement has been established, the Department looks for the Service or Services that can best provide the resources and/or capabilities to effectively and efficiently meet the mission requirements.

This is true of Homeland Defense missions as well. The DOD will lead any Homeland Defense mission, most likely through USNORTHCOM or one of its subordinates. JFCOM, as the force provider, will look at forces available to best provide the particular capability to satisfy mission requirements across the spectrum of defense domains.

Question. How has the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordinated its efforts and funds?

Answer. The Departments of Defense and Homeland Security are involved in continuous coordination to ensure national homeland security objectives are met.

Examples:

- DOD worked with DHS's U.S. Secret Service to plan for and execute security at National Special Security Events (NSSEs) in 2004. These NSSEs include the Group of Eight (G8) Summit, Republican and Democratic National Conventions, the State of the Union and the State Funeral for former President Reagan.
- DOD provide DHS with unmanned aerial vehicles in support of their Arizona Border Control Initiative from June 2004 to January 2005.
- From October 2004 to February 2005, DOD provided support to DHS's Interagency Security Plan. DOD is still involved in the DHS Interagency Security

Plan (ISP) 2005, which is a vehicle for putting forward DHS initiatives that DOD may be required or requested to support. This is a "living document" that requires continual coordination between DOD and DHS for new and ongoing DHS programs.

—In support of DHS's Federal Emergency Management Agency, DOD provided personnel, facilities, equipment, food, water, ice and medical support to the state of Florida after an unprecedented four hurricanes hit the state in August and September.

DOD normally provides support on a reimbursable basis under the Stafford or Economy. One exception was the support provided to DHS's Interagency Security Plan. The Secretary of Defense determined that support provided to the ISP provided a training benefit to the Department and reimbursement was waived.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND

Question. The (V)3 AESA radar system once it completes development within the next year will be the most advanced and capable tactical aircraft weapons system in the world. It also makes the F-15C the most capable homeland defense platform on the planet which is why I am mystified the Air Force elected to not pursue production once the system completes the design phase.

Are you aware that the U.S. Air Force elected to shelve the (V)3 AESA radar system after almost \$68 million invested? And has your staff briefed you on the capabilities of this system as it compares to the system in the F-22 and the F-16 and how this system will enhance the homeland defense capabilities of CONUS based aircraft?

Answer. Yes, I am aware of Air Force budget decisions, system capabilities/comparisons (including the AESA radar) in Homeland Defense and other mission areas, and how budget limitations impact force capabilities. The Air Force is committed to completing the development of the F-15C/D AESA radar program in fiscal year 2006. We plan to continue to incorporate AESA technologies on various platforms, including the F-15. However, at this time, higher Air Force funding priorities preclude AESA procurement for the F-15C/D fleet. The Air Force's investment strategy seeks to strike a sound, capabilities-based balance between modernizing legacy fighters and fielding F/A-22 and F-35 in a timely manner.

Question. If this country needs more affordable fighters we may very well need more F-15's but I cannot get the Pentagon to release \$1 million for an RFP so that Boeing and the Air Force can begin negotiations for the purchase of at least two aircraft which will keep the production line open through the end of calendar year 2006. The action of the Air Force is shortsighted and detrimental to the diminishing aircraft industrial base which now consists of just two prime manufacturers. It is not in the best interests of the nation or the taxpayer to have just one supplier of tactical aircraft for the Air Force, which is Lockheed Martin, yet this is exactly what will happen if the F-15 line closes.

Can you provide me an update on the status of the \$1 million which OSD needs to release in order for an RFP for two aircraft to move forward? Failure to do this could result in an additional cost of \$20 million if we have to negotiate a sale late in this legislative cycle.

Answer. The \$1 million for an F-15E Request for Proposal (RFP) is released to the F-15 program. We expect to be on contract for the RFP effort by May 30, 2005. The remaining portion of the \$110 million Congressional add for advanced procurement will remain on Air Force withhold pending fiscal year 2006 Congressional add to fully fund the aircraft procurement.

Question. As BRAC draws near and as it relates to the Air National Guard I am concerned that the process has been designed to validate a pre-determined view of the Future Total Force as defined strictly by the active Air Force, without the substantive input of the Air National Guard. Without the substantive input of the National Guard I question the validity of the plan and possibly the BRAC process and its impact on the ability of the Air Guard to remain an integral partner in the Total Force.

Can you give me your assessment of the Guard's role in the development of the Future Total Force Strategy of the U.S. Air Force? By the Guard's role I refer to the input of the TAG's from states with significant Air Guard assets.

Answer. Yes, I am aware of Air Force budget decisions, system capabilities/comparisons (including the AESA radar) in Homeland Defense and other mission areas, and how budget limitations impact force capabilities. The Air Force is committed to completing the development of the F-15C/D AESA radar program in fiscal year 2006. We plan to continue to incorporate AESA technologies on various platforms,

including the F-15. However, at this time, higher Air Force funding priorities preclude AESA procurement for the F-15C/D fleet. The Air Force's investment strategy seeks to strike a sound, capabilities-based balance between modernizing legacy fighters and fielding F/A-22 and F-35 in a timely manner.

Question. I understand you are committed to outsourcing military functions that can be ably performed by civilian contractors. Are you aware that the Army Military Postal Service Agency conducted an internal study of the MPSA and published its findings in year 2000 which recommended that "all" or some of the functions of MPSA be outsourced? Are you aware that I have recommended to Army that the Department move to outsource all MPSA functions? Are you also aware that a significant number of Army billets are dedicated solely to moving and sorting military mail?

Answer. The military Postal System operates as an extension of the U.S. Postal System under Title 39 U.S.C.; therefore outsourcing of military postal functions must be coordinated and agreed to by the Postal Service. The Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA), conducted an internal study on outsourcing and they have been working with the military services to outsource functions within the military postal system. As an example, the Air Force has outsourced the majority of their main mail terminal in Frankfurt (66 military positions; 3 civilian positions), and the U.S. Army has outsourced most of their mail processing and surface transportation at the Joint Military Mail Terminals (JMMT) in both Kuwait and Baghdad and several military post offices (MPO), including the Coalition Provisional Authority MPO at the Palace Compound in the Green Zone, Baghdad, Iraq. Furthermore, MPSA is currently reviewing guidelines for the Services on what functional areas within the Military Postal Service may be considered for further outsourcing, by the services, versus what is inherently governmental. Upon completion of this policy, a meeting with all Services, U.S. Postal Service (USPS), and DOD will take place to coordinate a way ahead. We are doing this with USPS input to ensure the policy adheres to all laws and regulations binding USPS. Currently throughout DOD there are approximately 2,274 active duty personnel of which 570 are Army personnel providing full-time postal duties.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. Do you still stand by your earlier estimates of the number of "trained and equipped" Iraqi security personnel?

Answer. I do stand by my earlier estimates of the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security personnel. Each week I receive a report from the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq. This report is put together by Lieutenant General Dave Petraeus' Headquarters and is reviewed by General Casey. This number reflects the number of Iraqi forces who have been trained and equipped to the standards previously provided to Congress. However, "trained and equipped" does not tell you the capability of Iraqi security personnel. We have recently begun to measure this capability. The new process for measuring Iraqi Security Forces capability looks at six areas of readiness: personnel, command and control, training, sustainment, equipping and leadership. Using these measurements, units are assessed on their ability to execute counterinsurgency operations and are given a readiness rating of Level 1-4. A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.

Question. To what extent are the Pentagon's estimates of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces reliable?

Answer. The estimates reflect the number of police who have been trained and equipped minus estimated losses based on reports from Multi-National Corps-Iraq. They are the best estimates available, and Multi-National Forces-Iraq is constantly reviewing means to improve upon them.

Question. What specifically do you attribute to the difficulty of training an adequately-sized Iraqi Security Force—funding, capability, equipment, or some other factor?

Answer. Training the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) with the right balance of capabilities presents many challenges, and steps are being taken to ensure the ISF has the means to maintain domestic order and deny a safe haven to terrorists. Some of the challenges in developing a capable Iraqi Security Force are: working with a different culture; overcoming poor leadership habits and corruption developed under the former regime; working within a cash-based economy; developing capable bases that have largely been destroyed; developing command, control and communication

systems where none existed; and training security forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations when they had never performed them.

Question. How many Iraqi security personnel do you estimate will be recruited, equipped, and trained by the \$5.7 billion that was allocated for this purpose in the fiscal year 2005 Supplemental bill?

Answer. The fiscal year 2005 supplemental will fund the most critical institutional training, equipment and infrastructure requirements for about 270,000 Iraqi Security Forces.

Question. You also state in the funding justification language for the fiscal year 2005 Supplemental, and I quote: "The Iraqi Interim and Transitional Governments, with Coalition assistance, have fielded over 90 battalions in order to provide security within Iraq . . . All but one of these 90 battalions, however, are lightly equipped and armed, and have very limited mobility and sustainment capabilities." (page 25)

Does this statement remain true today?

Answer. At the time of that statement, only one mechanized battalion was operational. Currently there are two mechanized battalions that are capable of planning and executing counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units. The vast majority of Iraqi security forces are infantry and police-type units, which we consider to be "light" forces.

Question. Would you please tell the Committee how many Iraqi battalions today are fully-equipped, armed, and capable of successfully carrying out their mission in Iraq?

Answer. There are 102 battalion level combat units in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Defense conducting operations at the company though battalion level. 81 of these battalions are in the Ministry of Defense and 21 battalions are in the Ministry of Interior. These forces are capable of conducting security operations—in some cases with Coalition assistance and in some cases without assistance.

APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF UP-ARMORED HUMVEES

Question. Since the beginning of this year, it is my understanding that the U.S. Central Command has increased its estimate of the number of up-armored Humvees needed in Iraq and Afghanistan at least 5 separate times. And earlier this month, the Army stated that it was 855 vehicles short of procuring the 8,105 factory-armored Humvees needed for its missions in the Middle East. In addition, it has come to my attention that several days ago the U.S. Central Command again increased its estimate of required Humvees to 10,079. I remember you came before this Committee in February and told us that there were no longer any military vehicles operating in Iraq (outside of a protected zone) that lacked "an appropriate level of armor?"

Can you explain why the Pentagon has so often underestimated the need for up-armored Humvees since the beginning of this war?

Answer. The Pentagon has not under estimated the need for Up-Armored Humvees. The increase in Up-Armored Humvee requirements corresponds with the results of a constant mission analysis conducted by the Operational Commander and his staff. This analysis takes into account the changing tactics, techniques, and procedures of the Iraqi insurgents, and the requirement for U.S. forces to operate outside of secure operating bases. As the enemy's tactics, techniques, and procedures change so will the requirements.

Question. Are you confident that we currently have an appropriate number of up-armored Humvees in Iraq and Afghanistan? If not, when do you estimate that we will have the necessary number of vehicles?

Answer. The Combatant Commander, CENTCOM determining the need for UAH through the use of an Operational Need Statement (ONS) to request what he needs to conduct military operations. Since the first ONS for 235 UAH in May 2003, the validated theater requirement has grown to the current requirement of 10,079. Almost without exception, each jump in the requirement was preceded by an operational event in theater whereby the insurgency began employing a different method of attack against the coalition forces. The Army will continue producing UAH at the maximum monthly production rate of 550 until the requirement of 10,079 is satisfied from production in July 2005 with in-theater delivery by September 2005.

Question. A GAO report released this month suggests that the Pentagon "failed to use the maximum available production capacity" to produce factory-armored Humvees even as the requirements increased.

How many factory-armored Humvees are currently being produced each month?

Answer. O'Gara-Hess (OHEAC) is currently producing at their maximum production rate of 550 vehicles per month.

Question. Can you say confidently that all 5 Army depots are now operating at their "maximum" capacity in regards to up-armor and repairing Humvees?

Answer. The Army Depots have completed theater validated production requirements for HMMWV's add-on armor kits. The Validated Theater requirement is 13,872 kits of which the Army has produced 14,220 kits.

Question. And is it true that only one small factory in Ohio is producing the armor to fortify Humvees?

Answer. No; armor for HMMWVs has been produced in four configurations. O'Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt Armor Company is the armor producer for the M1114 Up-armored HMMWV. Ground System Industrial Enterprise (GSIE) with seven Army Depots have produced the Armor Survivability Kit (ASK) Add-on Armor, O'Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt with Simula produced the Enhanced HARDkit Add-on Armor and ArmorWorks is the producer of the HMMWV troop carrier.

RESERVE AND GUARD RETENTION

Question. It has been reported that the Army National Guard missed its recruiting goal by 27 percent in the first half of this fiscal year, while the Army Reserve came up 10 percent short.

Can you comment on the current recruitment and retention rates of the Army Guard and Reserve?

Answer. LTG Schultz: The Army National Guard is at 77 percent of its accession mission to date for fiscal year 2005 (26181/34167). However, it has accomplished its retention mission at a rate of 103 percent (18796/18231). Overall, the Army National Guard is at 98 percent of its authorized strength. The accession mission is developed based partly on attrition rates from previous years. With its improved retention this fiscal year, the Army National Guard can achieve its endstrength requirements while still falling short of its accessions mission.

Question. Has raising the maximum enlistment age from 35 to 39 led to an increase in the number of recruits?

Answer. LTG Schultz: The ARNG has enlisted 101 Non Prior Service Soldiers who were 35-39 years old. This is relatively a small amount of accessions and there are no current marketing initiatives to penetrate this population. The Army National Guard anticipates the annual enlistments to be around the 600 mark.

Question. What about pay incentives? Do you think increasing pay and benefits for the Guard and Reserve would be a helpful tool to recruiting?

Answer. LTG Schultz: The Army National Guard is not unlike any other business in the open market, the higher the pay and incentives, the more recruits you have applying for the job regardless of the risk. The current economy has fewer eligible applicants being sought after by a larger and larger pool of businesses and governmental entities. It goes without saying, improving pay and incentives would show an increase in recruits.

STRESS ON THE ACTIVE-DUTY AND RESERVE FORCE

Question. Since September 2001, over a million active and reserve forces have been deployed. Of that, one-third have been deployed twice. The Pentagon's current policy sets a standard of one-year deployed for every three years of duty for active-duty forces and one-year in every 5 to 6 years for reserve forces. Deployment data shows that over one-third of the 457,000 Army active duty and Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces have been deployed more than once since September 2001. That suggests that DOD's current policy standards are not being met for a large share of Army forces.

Assuming current force levels continue in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006, how many and what share of Army active duty and reserve forces will have been deployed: More than once? More than twice? Since 9/11?

Answer. The number of Active and Reserve Soldiers who will be deployed more than once by the end of fiscal year 2006 is difficult to determine accurately at this early date. If today's statistics hold true throughout the next 18 months an increasingly larger number of Active Soldiers will deploy for a second time and third time while the Reserve Forces will continue to contribute but at a much lower rate due to two mitigating policies, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's limiting Partial Mobilization service to 24 cumulative months and the Army's 12 months "boots on the ground" policy. Combined these two policies will temper the reuse of our Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers.

The Army estimates that approximately 185,500 Soldiers currently assigned to the Active Component will have or are currently deployed, whereas 258,000 currently assigned RC Soldiers have or are currently mobilized with the majority serving overseas and many less in support of an operation stateside but away from their

homes. I emphasize that the RC figures are the total number mobilized of which the majority are or have deployed overseas. In order for an RC Soldier to be deployed to a combat zone more than once they must currently be a volunteer.

Projecting current required deployment force levels to the end of fiscal year 2006 implies the Active Army number will grow to approximately 206,000 who have deployed for at least one six month or longer period. Of these, 18,700 (3.8 percent) will have deployed twice and 370 (less than .1 percent of AC assigned strength) will have deployed three times.

The number of Reserve of the Army Personnel who have been mobilized more than once is approximately 46,000 (8.7 percent), mobilized more than twice is approximately 7,500 (1.4 percent) of the present population. The vast majority of these Soldiers volunteered to be remobilized. By the end of fiscal year 2006, the percentage should not be significantly changed based upon the policies already cited. These projections are only estimates.

Question. Assuming, conservatively, that current force levels continue, could DOD meet its stated standards for active and reserve forces in: fiscal year 2005? fiscal year 2006? fiscal year 2007?

Answer. As the Army begins its third major rotation of forces to Iraq and its seventh major rotation of forces to Afghanistan, we remain committed to meeting CENTCOM requirements for trained and ready forces. The Army will continue to adapt to ensure our nation's success in what will be a continued War on Terrorism. We are pursuing policies and initiatives focused on providing the active duty force necessary to meet global force commitments and to increase the dwell times for deploying units in order to attain the DOD standard. The centerpiece of these efforts has been the transformation of the current Active Component (AC) and RC force to a 21st century modular force, and the expansion of the AC combat force structure from 33 brigades to 43 brigades. These efforts create a larger force of more capable brigade combat teams, relieving some of the stress of current force requirements. Another initiative aimed at increasing dwell time is the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) readiness model. ARFORGEN establishes a three year cycle for AC units, which includes the availability for one deployment in three years and a six year cycle for RC units, which includes availability for one year of deployment in six years. The initial application of ARFORGEN will focus on the BCT. Application of ARFORGEN for echelons above brigade CS/CSS units is more difficult and will be dealt with in subsequent applications of ARFORGEN as force requirements permit. Additional efforts to increase dwell include contracting logistics requirements, utilizing "in lieu of" substitutions for force requirements, and accelerated rebalancing of AC and RC forces to replace low demand units with high demand units (i.e. changing RC field artillery units to military police units). The projected result of these initiatives is an increase in average dwell time for active component forces from the OIF/OEF 04-06 to OIF/OEF 05-07, OIF/OEF 06-08, and OIF 07-09.

Sustaining the Army's current level of commitment presents several challenges. Successive year-long combat rotations have had an impact on overall Army readiness. Moreover supplying the necessary Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) capabilities to our coalition forces has become increasingly difficult with each rotation, causing the Army to adopt new and innovative sourcing solutions. In order to maintain current force levels the Army has had to increase the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for active duty forces deploying most units with dwell time less than the two year DOD goal. These challenges, while significant, are manageable, but the DOD stated standards will not be achieved for a portion of the Force. Today the Army has been able to achieve an average dwell time peak of 19 months between regular Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) rotations. The length of Soldier's dwell time will decrease as the Army loses access to Reserve Component (RC) BCTs as well as other High Demand/Low Density RC formations:

As a rule RC utilization continues to meet the DOD stated standard, with involuntary redeployment of personnel to a contingency operation being the exception. Maintaining the current level of force commitments will require the remobilization of selected RC units, however every effort will be made to fill these units with personnel who have not deployed to a contingency operation or personnel who volunteer for redeployment to a contingency operation. Maintaining the current force levels will require the continued deployment of forces at less than the two year DOD goal. However, the Army is taking steps to increase active duty unit dwell time.

Iraqi Security Forces continue to improve and accept a growing share of the security responsibilities. As Iraqi Security Forces achieve the ability to conduct independent operations, the requirements for U.S. forces will begin to decrease. Potential force reductions would result in greater average dwell times for the OIF/OEF 07-09 rotation.

While the OPTEMPO for Army units has been high for the last three years, a combination of Army initiatives and potential decreases in force requirements should reduce the stress on the force. The Army remains committed to achieving the DOD standard of one deployment in three years for AC forces and one deployment in six years for RC forces and will take all measures possible towards that goal.

ARMY RESTRUCTURING

Question. The Army requested \$4.6 billion in the fiscal year 2005 Supplemental for “modularity,” or force restructuring at the brigade-level. The Army first announced this modularity initiative in August 2003 with a plan to create between 43 to 48 units of action by 2007.

While the \$4.6 billion for the Army’s modularity initiative may be necessary, why was it not included in the President’s fiscal year 2006 base budget?

Answer. The Army developed estimates for the Army Modular force after reviewing the specific equipment and facility needs to those units planned for conversion. The fiscal year 2005 supplemental supports only those equipment requirements for these near term deployers, both active and Reserve Component. The accelerated process of the supplemental when compared to the normal budget process—a matter of months compared to almost two years—permits us to more precisely determine our requirements in this very dynamic environment. We have programmed for modularity requirements beginning in fiscal year 2007 when we will have more certainty of our deployment schedules and associated equipment and facility needs.

Question. I would also be very interested to know where you plan to request modularity funding next year: In the fiscal year 2007 base budget or in another supplemental?

Answer. We have realigned a portion of the fiscal year 2006 PB to support Army Modular Forces, and expect to need an additional \$5 billion in an fiscal year 2006 supplemental for investment items and \$3 billion for fully-burdened personnel costs. From fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011, the Army base program will fund the remaining requirements for the Army Modular Force, not to include personnel costs. Upon return from operations in Iraq, the Army anticipates it will need \$4 billion per year from the end of the conflict plus two years to fully reset its equipment to mission capable standards.

Question. On a different note, as you move to reorganize the Army into faster, smaller, and more mobile combat units, concerns have been raised that this would lead to a loss of “armor and firepower” and the ability to wage more conventional warfare. In addition, I understand that this restructuring is based on the assumption that there is no need to permanently increase troop endstrength.

How will the transition from a Division-centric force to a Brigade-centric force affect our ability to engage in not only non-conventional, but conventional warfare?

Answer. The Army Modular Force Brigade Combat Team (BCT) is full-spectrum capable in major combat operations, stability and support operations. The modular BCT has equal and in many ways greater capability to engage in conventional and unconventional warfare compared to a division-based brigade. Fundamentally, the modular BCT is a more informed, agile, cohesive, combined-arms team. The modular heavy BCT retains the M1A2 Abrams tank, the M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzer. Instead of 3 battalions of 3 companies in the non-standardized baseline, every BCT has 2 battalion task forces of 5 companies (2 armor, 2 infantry, 1 engineer). Instead of 3 batteries of 6 field artillery systems, there are 2 batteries of 8 guns. This is a comparable level of armor, infantry and firepower, but the BCT has significantly increased intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and communication capabilities that were formerly found at division-level. The modular BCT has an entire Armed Recon Squadron, 18 more UAVs, a company of Military Intelligence analysts, and a Signal company with greater network connectivity and space-based access to Joint intelligence. With improved network-enabled battle command and Future Combat Systems spiral acceleration, leaders have greater quality of information, ability to collaborate and coordinate, improved situational understanding, and greater agility to seize opportunities on the battlefield to fight on the most favorable terms. A RAND study has shown these network-centric capabilities in the modular Stryker BCT increased mission effectiveness and reduced casualties by a factor of 10 during urban operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Adding capability for unconventional warfare, the BCT has more human intelligence and robust command posts, with planning expertise in civil affairs, psychological, public affairs and information operations. Thus the modular BCT improves capability for unconventional warfare while retaining conventional overmatch against any current threat. This force structure also offers the

optimum capability balance for the new strategic context of continuous full-spectrum operations in persistent conflict. 43–48 active component BCTs and assured, predictable access to 34 reserve component BCTs provides the rotational base needed to meet Army strategic requirements, including the Global War on Terror, and preserve the quality of the All Volunteer Force. The Army will address the question of end-strength within the on-going QDR and the Army Campaign Plan.

Question. You have also suggested that you plan to re-train about 100,000 soldiers, or 10 percent of the current force, in order to better position the Army for the combat challenges it will face today and in the future.

While I agree that it makes sense at some level to re-train soldiers based on our current needs, would it not, in the long-term, be more cost-efficient and practical to simply increase troop endstrength, rather than attempt to solve the shortages by potentially creating new ones?

Answer. The Army had cold war capabilities that were no longer relevant for the current strategic environment. Our rebalancing adjusted this existing force structure to provide a more ready force properly balanced and postured as a full joint war fighting partner. Rebalancing as part of the Transformation process will posture the Army to better fight the Global War on Terrorism. Additionally, the temporary 30,000 end strength increase allows the Army to continue to transform while sustaining its current level of operational commitments. A permanent increase in troop end strength is based on many factors including the defense strategy, Combatant Commander Force requirements and other factors.

ABUSE OF IRAQI FEMALE PRISONERS IN IRAQ

Question. Last time you appeared before us in February, Senator Leahy and I both asked you a question about whether you were aware of any mistreatment of female Iraqi prisoners by U.S. forces in Iraq—allegations that included assault and rape. At the time you promised to “get back to us and get the answer for the record.”

I have yet to receive a response to this question so I will ask you again—Secretary Rumsfeld, are you aware of any mistreatment of Iraqi women prisoners, including allegations of sexual abuse?

Answer. I transmitted the following to Congress on April 27, 2005 in response to questions for the record from my appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee on February 16, 2005.

The Department of Defense investigates all allegations of abuse of detainees. There have been four investigations into allegations of sexual misconduct involving female detainees. The investigations are described below:

(1) The Taguba Report included an incident where 3 soldiers took a female detainee to another area of Abu Ghraib. There was an allegation of sexual assault in which the detainee's blouse was removed and one soldier apparently kissed the detainee. An investigation concerning this incident was opened. The soldiers involved were assigned to the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Bragg, NC. Initially, the soldiers were charged with sexual assault, conspiracy, maltreatment of a prisoner and communicating a threat (for allegedly telling a female detainee that she would be left in the cell with a naked male detainee). The investigation was closed as a result of insufficient evidence to prove or disprove the allegations. However, the unit commander determined that the soldiers violated a unit policy that prohibits male soldiers from interviewing female detainees. The soldiers received non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for violation of a lawful regulation or order, (Article 92, UCMJ). A Sergeant was reduced from the grade of E-5 to the grade of Specialist, E-4 and forfeited \$500 of his pay and allowances for one month; a Specialist, was reduced from the grade of E-4 to the grade of Private First Class, E-3 (the reduction was suspended), and also forfeited \$750 of his pay and allowances for one month; and a second Specialist was reduced from the grade of E-4 to the grade of Private First Class, E-3 and forfeited \$500 of his pay and allowances for one month.

(2) The Taguba Report includes a statement that a male MP Guard had sex with a female detainee. The witness statement references a video of Private Graner having sex with a female in the prison. After an extensive investigation into the allegations of abuse by Private Graner and others at the Abu Ghraib prison, there has been no evidence uncovered that establishes that Private Graner had sexual intercourse with female detainees.

An allegation was substantiated against Private Graner, however, for photographing a female detainee exposing her breasts. On January 10, 2005, Private Graner was convicted by a ten-member enlisted panel at a General Court-martial for numerous offenses stemming from his abuse of detainees while stationed as

a guard at Abu Ghraib prison. Included in the charges was a multi-specification charge of Dereliction of Duty which included one specification alleging that "[t]he accused photographed a female detainee exposing her breasts." Private Graner was found guilty of this specification. He was sentenced on all the charges to which he was found guilty and sentenced to reduction from the grade of Staff Sergeant, E-6, to the lowest enlisted grade, Private, E-1, to total forfeitures of pay and allowances, to confinement for 10 years, and to a Dishonorable Discharge.

(3) A 75-year old Iraqi female alleged she was captured and detained for 10 days and claimed that she was robbed, sodomized, indecently assaulted and deprived of food and water at a remote location. The woman described her captors as American Coalition Forces but could not provide any further descriptions of the personnel allegedly involved. The investigation was initially closed for insufficient evidence, but has since been re-opened for further investigation after the identification of additional leads.

(4) A female detainee alleged she was raped and knifed in the back by unknown U.S. personnel at the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility. These allegations were reported via a newspaper article in the Los Angeles Times. Following the publication of the article, CID opened an investigation and attempted to locate the alleged victim and her attorney. CID coordinated with the Iraqi Ministry of Justice and made numerous attempts to locate witnesses for information. After extensive efforts, CID closed the investigation as a result of insufficient evidence either to identify potential suspects or to prove or disprove the allegations.

WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM IRAQ

Question. General George Casey stated on CNN's "Late Edition" in March that there would likely be "very substantial reductions in the size of our forces" in Iraq by March 2006.

Does the Pentagon have a timetable for withdrawing troops in Iraq?

Answer. The President has stated on numerous occasions that Coalition forces will remain in Iraq until the mission of stabilizing the country is complete. Articulating a detailed plan for withdrawal before we have completed this mission would undermine confidence in our commitment to defeating the terrorists in Iraq. To create such doubts about American resolve would only lead to increased attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, and likely to more attacks against Americans throughout the world. It is far more important, therefore, to focus on the objectives we are trying to achieve rather than set arbitrary deadlines.

Question. Do you agree with General Casey's assessment that there will be a "substantial reduction" of our forces in Iraq within a year?

Answer. General Casey's full statement was: "By this time next year . . . Assuming that the political process continues to go positively, and the Sunni are included in the political process, and the Iraqi army continues to progress and develop as we think it will, we should be able to take some fairly substantial reductions in the size of our forces."

I agree that if at this time next year the political process and security situation in Iraq met the standards of success as defined by the President, we will be able to make some reduction in the size of our forces in Iraq. However, it is far more important that we focus on achieving our objectives of helping the Iraqi people to create a stable and secure Iraq than on setting arbitrary deadlines.

F/A-22 RAPTOR PROGRAM

Question. The Pentagon's budget request would prematurely terminate the procurement program for the F/A-22 Raptor by fiscal year 2008, ending with the production of 179 planes rather than the original production request of up to 750 aircraft through fiscal year 2011.

Can you tell me if the Pentagon still plans to end the F/A-22 program early? If so, why?

Answer. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2006 allocates funding for production of F/A-22 aircraft through fiscal year 2008. In making this recommendation to the President, senior members of the Department of Defense considered the full range of investments underway in air dominance (F/A-22, F-35, Joint Unmanned Combat Air System, F/A-18 E/F/G, and the networks to link them). The Secretary decided to continue funding production of the F/A-22 through fiscal year 2008 to provide the nation a significant number of F/A-22s in the overall mix of systems. The Secretary also decided to continue the F/A-22 modernization effort to provide the airplanes with a broad range of attack capabilities.

The Secretary has committed to a discussion of joint air dominance capabilities in the context of the Quadrennial Defense Review. All systems' contributions to joint

air dominance will be assessed to determine how the investment plan balances near-, mid-, and far-term risks.

Question. How much money does the Pentagon expect to save by ending procurement of the F/A-22 by fiscal year 2008?

Answer. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2006 cut the F/A-22 program by \$10.5 billion. These savings will be partially offset by the cost to extend the service life of existing aircraft, or procure new aircraft to provide the required capability. There may also be some cost impacts on other programs, including the Joint Strike Fighter, because Lockheed-Martin's facilities share overhead rates.

Question. Is this number based on an estimated cost of \$250 million per aircraft?

Answer. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2006 reduced the F/A-22 program by \$10.5 billion and the procurement quantity by 96 aircraft. The 96 aircraft reduction is based on an average Unit Flyaway Cost per aircraft of \$109 million.

C-130J PROGRAM

Question. I have been informed that the Pentagon estimates that ending this program early will save \$3.5 billion. Nevertheless, it is my understanding that it will cost in the region of \$1 billion simply to cancel the contract.

Does the Pentagon still plan on completing the C-130J program in fiscal year 2006?

Answer. No. As I notified the congressional defense committees, we have carefully reviewed our decision to terminate the C-130J program, and we believe it is in the best interests of the Department to complete the multi-year contract.

Question. Considering that 30 older C-130s were recently grounded by the Air Force due to cracks on the exterior of the planes, do you anticipate that the Air Force and Navy will have the necessary number of cargo aircraft to fulfill their current and future missions?

Answer. Though operations in the global war on terror have added stress to our mobility resources, we currently have enough C-130 aircraft to accomplish our ongoing intra-theater airlift mission. We are assessing the Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS), which is providing insights into the right mix of airlift, sealift, air refueling, and pre-positioning assets to meet future challenges. In a follow-on study to MCS, we are examining future force requirements for intra-theater airlift within the context of the Quadrennial Defense Review. We expect these analyses to provide a foundation for future C-130 fleet recapitalization decisions.

GLOBAL HAWK PROGRAM

Question. I'd like to ask a question about the Global Hawk, which is based at Beale Air Force Base in California. This aircraft flies very high, very fast, for long periods of time with large powerful sensors—I understand that a single Global Hawk could have surveyed the entire area devastated by the recent Tsunami in Asia on a single mission. It has also performed rave reviews as part of surveillance operations in Iraq. I understand that one Global Hawk identified 55 percent of time-sensitive air defense targets destroyed during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Is the Global Hawk something the Combatant Commanders have been requesting for operations?

Answer. Yes. Since September 11, 2001, we have received three separate Global Hawk Request For Forces from the Commander, United States Central Command. Additionally, the regional Combatant Commanders have highlighted a collective requirement for a persistent platform with robust Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities through their Integrated Priority Lists. Global Hawk is the only system currently programmed that will be capable of fulfilling this requirement.

Question. Has the Pentagon looked at accelerating delivery of this vital capability?

Answer. The Department of Defense is incrementally fielding capability as soon as it becomes available. In addition, we are examining ways to accelerate our testing approach. Finally, and most importantly, we are on track to deploy our first two production aircraft later this summer to augment or replace our deployed Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration aircraft currently supporting the Global War on Terrorism.

ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR

Question. At the March 2, 2005 House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher asked Ambassador Linton Brooks of the National Nuclear Security Administration the following question: "I just want to know is there any way a [Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator] of any size that we would drop will not produce a huge amount of radioactive debris?"

Answer. The amount of radioactive debris is commensurate with the yield of the weapon.

Question. Ambassador Brooks replied: "No, there is not." When Congresswoman Tauscher asked him how deep he thought a bunker buster could go he answered: "... a couple of tens of meters maybe. I mean certainly—I really must apologize for my lack of precision if we in the administration have suggested that it was possible to have a bomb that penetrated far enough to trap all fallout. I don't believe that—I don't believe the laws of physics will ever let that be true."

Do you agree? If so, why should we move forward with the development of a nuclear bunker buster that inevitably will spew millions of cubic feet of radioactive debris in the atmosphere?

Answer. I agree that a nuclear penetrator will never attain a depth to prevent all fallout. The recent National Academy of Sciences report on Earth Penetrating Weapons (EPWs) is entirely consistent with our long understanding of the capabilities and limitations of such a weapon. The downward shock multiplying effect of shallow penetration led us to field the B61-11 EPW in the 1990's and various precision conventional munitions in the last decade to address a growing threat from sanctuaries provided by a wide range of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs).

At the present time, the nuclear weapon stockpile consists of weapons that were designed for Cold War missions. In order to place at risk most of the known HDBTs that are beyond our conventional earth penetration capability, our only option is a surface burst nuclear weapon 10 to 50 times more powerful than an equally effective nuclear earth penetrator, depending on the structural character of the target. Accordingly, the fallout is 10 to 50 times less for the smaller RNEP weapon.

A serious shortfall in capability against HDBTs remains today. The completion of the RNEP study is necessary if we are to address all plausible capabilities to satisfy validated requirements and meet the President's direction for options to halt confidently a WMD attack on U.S. territory, troops, Allies, and friends, launched or supported from HDBT sanctuaries.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. President Bush has requested \$9 billion for missile defense for fiscal year 2006. The United States has spent \$92 million on missile defense since 1983 and the Administration anticipates spending an additional \$58 billion over the next six years. Some experts put the overall price tag at well over \$150 million.

Given the number of national defense priorities we face—providing for non-proliferation activities, deterrence, homeland security—how do you justify spending so much on missile defense?

Answer. The threat to the United States, its deployed forces overseas, and its friends and allies from ballistic missile attack is a real one. Combined with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, this threat must be addressed, and our ballistic missile defense program is designed to do so.

Since 1984, I understand that we've spent a little more than 1 percent of our total Defense budget on ballistic missile defense. When one considers that we now have an initial capability to destroy incoming long-range missiles where before we had absolutely none, the money we have invested to develop this capability has been well spent. It is also worth noting that the Government Accountability Office has estimated that the damage from the attacks of September 11, 2001 cost the nation \$83 billion. An attack by even a single ballistic missile equipped with weapons of mass destruction could no doubt cost the nation far more than that.

Additionally, Department of Defense funding has contributed to the fielding of ground and sea based defenses to protect U.S. and allied forces from short and medium range missiles. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 system, for example, performed successfully in an operational environment during Operation Iraqi Freedom, successfully intercepting and destroying enemy missiles in every engagement.

I agree that non-proliferation, deterrence, and homeland security are all important defense priorities, and the Department is working to address each. In fact, as part of the New Triad, which combines active defenses with strike capabilities and a responsive infrastructure, our ballistic missile defense program plays an important role in stemming the spread of weapons of mass destruction, deterring our adversaries from attacking the United States with ballistic missiles, and defending the homeland in the event of a ballistic missile attack.

Question. The missile defense system experienced two test failures in December, 2004 and February, 2005. The system was not declared operational at the end of 2004 as had been planned by the Administration.

What criteria will you use to determine whether or not the system will be declared operational? When do you believe this will occur? Will you move forward with declaring the system operational if future tests fail?

Answer. We have fielded the initial set of capabilities necessary to shoot down an incoming ballistic missile. The system is currently in a “shakedown period” under which our crews are gaining valuable experience in operating the system, and should some threat arise, we could transition the system from a test phase to an operational phase in a short period of time.

A decision to put the system on a higher level of alert will be based on a number of factors. These factors include: the advice I receive from the Combatant Commanders, and other senior officials of the Department; our confidence in the operational procedures we have developed; demonstrated performance during both ground and flight tests; modeling and simulation; and the threat.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Question. What type of submunition will the Army and Marine’s Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) carry? Will it have a self-destruct mechanism? What is its predicted failure rate?

Answer. The M-30 Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) carries dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) submunitions equipped with mechanical fuzes. A self-destruct fuze is not currently available to support production in fiscal year 2006. In operational testing, the dud rate at ranges between 20–60 kilometers was 1.8 percent, and the average dud rate of all other ranges (less than 20 kilometers and greater than 60 kilometers) was 3.65 percent.

Question. Of the 1,026 (Army) and 648 (Marines) GMLRS rockets requested, how many would have unitary warheads and how many would carry submunitions?

Answer. All M-30 GMLRS rockets procured in fiscal year 2006 will be equipped with DPICM submunitions. In accordance with fiscal year 2005 appropriations language directing unitary munitions procurement acceleration, 486 GMLRS unitary variants with a two-mode fuze are being procured under a low-rate initial production (LRIP-II) contract. This unitary variant will be available in fiscal year 2007.

Question. In February 2003 the Army awarded a contract to manufacture 500,000 self-destruct fuzes for 105 mm M915 artillery shells yet it has requested no money to retrofit those weapons. Why?

Answer. The self-destruct fuze effort for the 105 mm M915 is new production, and, therefore, money for retrofit is not required.

Question. Why was the Army’s fiscal year 2005 request for money to retrofit 155 mm projectiles carrying submunitions with self-destruct devices cut from \$42.2 million to \$17.9 million in the final Appropriations Act?

Answer. Fiscal year 2005 funding was redirected from 155 mm self-destruct fuze retrofit because technological progress in the production of electronic self-destruct fuzing has not matured at the pace initially anticipated.

Question. Were the 2,000 Hydra 70 MPSM HE M261 rockets requested by the Army in fiscal year 2005 actually procured?

Answer. No. While the fiscal year 2005 budget request for Hydra 70 rockets included an overall quantity of 176,000 for the Army, none of the requested munitions were of the multi-purpose submunition high explosive (MPSM HE) M261 variant. The Army’s move to “smarter” Hydra 70 rockets led to a realignment of overall Hydra funding and the end of procuring the MPSM HE M261 cluster munitions after fiscal year 2003.

Question. Why did the Air Force decide not to request procurement money for the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD) this year?

Answer. The Air Force weighed its procurement priorities and chose to terminate the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispense—Extended Range (WCMD-ER) production starting in fiscal year 2006. While WCMD-ER would provide improvements over the existing WCMD inventory, the Air Force determined that WCMD-ER was not as important as other Air Force priorities.

The Department of Defense continues to procure cluster munitions in the form of sensor fuzed weapons (SFW) for targets requiring cluster effects and also continues to evaluate the need for cluster munitions.

Question. Why did the Secretary of Defense cut funding for the Air Force’s WCMD-Extended Range in the Program Budget Decision, December 2004?

Answer. In the President’s Budget for 2006, critical budget shortfalls were balanced, and the Department of the Air Force identified WCMD-ER for termination.

While WCMD-ER would provide improvements over the existing WCMD inventory, the Department balanced the continued modification in light of other priorities.

The Department of Defense continues to procure cluster munitions in the form of SFW for targets requiring cluster efforts and also continues to evaluate the need for cluster munitions.

Question. Has the Air Force evaluated the performance of the CBU-105 (Sensor Fuzed Weapon) in Iraq? Does it plan to do so?

Answer. The Air Force has employed 68 CBU-105s in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Formal performance measures have not been collected due to the difficult nature of post-attack assessments of SFW submunitions. Assessment is difficult because the small projectiles do not leave readily identifiable damage other than small holes. Additionally, many CBU-105 targets were either completely destroyed or moved from their original locations by the Iraqi army. Anecdotally, the Air Force has received informal feedback from various credible sources in the field on CBU-105 performance, and it has all been extremely positive.

Question. What weapon will the 15 CBU-87 cluster bomb dispensers the Air Force requested this year be used for?

Answer. The 15 CBU-87(T-3)/B bomb dispensers requested are inert dispensers for use as air training munitions used in conjunction with the BLU-97(D-4)/B. The "T-3" nomenclature indicates a CBU-87 dispenser equipped with a proximity sensor that initiates canister opening and dispersion of inert BLU-97(D-4)/B test submunition. The BLU-97 provides realistic training and evaluation of dispenser and munitions characteristics and can be dropped from a variety of aircraft.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much. Our next subcommittee meeting will be a closed session this afternoon at 2:30 to discuss classified programs in the 2006 budget. Our next open session will be Tuesday, May 10, at 10 a.m., when we will receive testimony on the defense medical programs.

The subcommittee stands in recess. We thank you all for your attendance.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., Wednesday, April 27, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, May 10.]